On Sun, Aug 5, 2018 at 4:32 AM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
Create a new audit record AUDIT_CONTAINER to document the audit
container identifier of a process if it is present.
Called from audit_log_exit(), syscalls are covered.
A sample raw event:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): arch=c000003e syscall=257 success=yes exit=3
a0=ffffff9c a1=56374e1cef30 a2=241 a3=1b6 items=2 ppid=606 pid=635 auid=0 uid=0 gid=0
euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=3 comm="bash"
exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
key="tmpcontainerid"
type=CWD msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): cwd="/root"
type=PATH msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): item=0 name="/tmp/" inode=13863
dev=00:27 mode=041777 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype=
PARENT cap_fp=0000000000000000 cap_fi=0000000000000000 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PATH msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): item=1 name="/tmp/tmpcontainerid"
inode=17729 dev=00:27 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=CREATE cap_fp=0000000000000000
cap_fi=0000000000000000 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1519924845.499:257):
proctitle=62617368002D6300736C65657020313B206563686F2074657374203E202F746D702F746D70636F6E7461696E65726964
type=CONTAINER msg=audit(1519924845.499:257): op=task contid=123458
See:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
See:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
See:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
See:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 7 +++++++
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/audit.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 3 +++
4 files changed, 35 insertions(+)
...
@@ -2045,6 +2045,30 @@ void audit_log_session_info(struct
audit_buffer *ab)
audit_log_format(ab, " auid=%u ses=%u", auid, sessionid);
}
+/*
+ * audit_log_contid - report container info
+ * @tsk: task to be recorded
+ * @context: task or local context for record
+ * @op: contid string description
+ */
+int audit_log_contid(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct audit_context *context, char *op)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ if (!audit_contid_set(tsk))
+ return 0;
+ /* Generate AUDIT_CONTAINER record with container ID */
+ ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONTAINER);
+ if (!ab)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ audit_log_format(ab, "op=%s contid=%llu",
+ op, audit_get_contid(tsk));
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(audit_log_contid);
As discussed in the previous iteration of the patch, I prefer
AUDIT_CONTAINER_ID here over AUDIT_CONTAINER. If you feel strongly
about keeping it as-is with AUDIT_CONTAINER I suppose I could live
with that, but it is isn't my first choice.
However, I do care about the "op" field in this record. It just
doesn't make any sense; the way you are using it it is more of a
context field than an operations field, and even then why is the
context important from a logging and/or security perspective? Drop it
please.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com