On Fri, Aug 30, 2019 at 11:31 AM Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com> wrote:
On 8/30/2019 6:44 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> On 8/15/19 1:41 PM, Aaron Goidel wrote:
>> Presently, there is no way for LSMs to enable collection of supplemental
>> audit records such as path and inode information when a permission denial
>> occurs. Provide a LSM hook to allow LSMs to selectively enable collection
>> on a per-task basis, even if the audit configuration would otherwise
>> disable auditing of a task and/or contains no audit filter rules. If the
>> hook returns a non-zero result, collect all available audit information. If
>> the hook generates its own audit record, then supplemental audit
>> information will be emitted at syscall exit.
>>
>> In SELinux, we implement this hook by returning the result of a permission
>> check on the process. If the new process2:audit_enable permission is
>> allowed by the policy, then audit collection will be enabled for that
>> process. Otherwise, SELinux will defer to the audit configuration.
>
> Any feedback on this RFC patch? I know Paul provided some thoughts on the general
topic of LSM/audit enablement in the other patch thread but I haven't seen any
response to this patch.
Audit policy should be independent of security module policy.
I shouldn't have to change SELinux policy to enable this data
collection. I should be able to change the audit configuration
to get this if I want it.
The idea is that the LSM can request that the audit subsystem
selectively enable auditing (per-task, and hopefully per-record-type);
the audit policy can still be configured as you normally. This is to
work around people (and distros) that disable audit, yet still want to
audit some information (yeah, I know ...).
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com