[PATCH] audit: create explicit AUDIT_SECCOMP event type
The seccomp path was using AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND from when seccomp mode 1
could only kill a process. While we still want to make sure an audit
record is forced on a kill, this should use a separate record type since
seccomp mode 2 introduces other behaviors. In the case of "handled"
behaviors (process wasn't killed), only emit a record if the process is
under inspection.
Cc: Julien Tinnes <jln(a)google.com>
Cc: Will Drewry <wad(a)google.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook(a)chromium.org>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 3 ++-
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/auditsc.c | 14 +++++++++++---
3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index bce729a..9d5104d 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -157,7 +157,8 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr);
static inline void audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
{
- if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
+ /* Force a record to be reported if a signal was delivered. */
+ if (signr || unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
__audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, code);
}
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 76352ac..09a2d94 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -106,6 +106,7 @@
#define AUDIT_MMAP 1323 /* Record showing descriptor and flags in mmap */
#define AUDIT_NETFILTER_PKT 1324 /* Packets traversing netfilter chains */
#define AUDIT_NETFILTER_CFG 1325 /* Netfilter chain modifications */
+#define AUDIT_SECCOMP 1326 /* Secure Computing event */
#define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
#define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 2f186ed..157e989 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2735,7 +2735,7 @@ void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags)
context->type = AUDIT_MMAP;
}
-static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr)
+static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
kuid_t auid, uid;
kgid_t gid;
@@ -2753,6 +2753,11 @@ static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason,
long signr)
audit_log_task_context(ab);
audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
+}
+
+static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr)
+{
+ audit_log_task(ab);
audit_log_format(ab, " reason=");
audit_log_string(ab, reason);
audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
@@ -2783,8 +2788,11 @@ void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code)
{
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_ANOM_ABEND);
- audit_log_abend(ab, "seccomp", signr);
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_SECCOMP);
+ if (unlikely(!ab))
+ return;
+ audit_log_task(ab);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " sig=%ld", signr);
audit_log_format(ab, " syscall=%ld", syscall);
audit_log_format(ab, " compat=%d", is_compat_task());
audit_log_format(ab, " ip=0x%lx", KSTK_EIP(current));
--
1.7.9.5
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security