On Mon, 2018-03-05 at 08:50 -0500, Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
On 2018-03-05 08:43, Mimi Zohar wrote:
> Hi Richard,
>
> This patch has been compiled, but not runtime tested.
Ok, great, thank you. I assume you are offering this patch to be
included in this patchset?
Yes, thank you.
I'll have a look to see where it fits in the
IMA record. It might be better if it were an AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO
auxiliary record, but I'll have a look at the circumstances of the
event. Can you suggest a procedure to test it?
Like IMA-measurement and IMA-appraisal, IMA-audit is enabled based on
policy. The example IMA policy, below, includes IMA-audit messages for
files executed. 'cat' the policy to /sys/kernel/security/ima/policy.
/etc/ima/ima-policy:
audit func=BPRM_CHECK
There's a FireEye blog titled "Extending Linux Executable Logging With
The Integrity Measurement Architecture"* that explains how to augment
their existing system security analytics with file hashes.
* https://www.fireeye.com/blog/threat-research/2016/11/extending_linux
_exec.html
Mimi
> ---
>
> If the containerid is defined, include it in the IMA-audit record.
>
> Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar(a)linux.vnet.ibm.com>
> ---
> security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 3 +++
> 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> index 33b4458cdbef..41d29a06f28f 100644
> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c
> @@ -335,6 +335,9 @@ void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint,
> audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, algo_hash);
>
> audit_log_task_info(ab, current);
> + if (audit_containerid_set(current))
> + audit_log_format(ab, " contid=%llu",
> + audit_get_containerid(current));
> audit_log_end(ab);
>
> iint->flags |= IMA_AUDITED;
> --
> 2.7.5
>
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635