Quoting Richard Guy Briggs (rgb(a)redhat.com):
Introduce macros cap_gained, cap_grew, cap_full to make the use of
the
negation of is_subset() easier to read and analyse.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
---
security/commoncap.c | 16 ++++++++++------
1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c
index b7fbf77..6f05ec0 100644
--- a/security/commoncap.c
+++ b/security/commoncap.c
@@ -513,6 +513,12 @@ void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap,
bool *effec
*effective = true;
}
It's subjective and so might be just me, but I think I'd find it easier
to read if it was cap_gained(source, target, field) and cap_grew(cred, source, target)
This looks correct though, so either way
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
+#define cap_gained(field, target, source) \
+ !cap_issubset(target->cap_##field, source->cap_##field)
+#define cap_grew(target, source, cred) \
+ !cap_issubset(cred->cap_##target, cred->cap_##source)
+#define cap_full(field, cred) \
+ cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_##field)
/**
* cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve().
* @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds
@@ -541,10 +547,9 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid);
/* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */
- if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted))
+ if (cap_gained(permitted, new, old))
bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
-
/* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised
* credentials unless they have the appropriate permit.
*
@@ -552,8 +557,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
*/
is_setid = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid);
- if ((is_setid ||
- !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) &&
+ if ((is_setid || cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) &&
((bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) ||
!ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) {
/* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */
@@ -605,8 +609,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
* Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think
* that is interesting information to audit.
*/
- if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) {
- if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) ||
+ if (cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) {
+ if (!cap_full(effective, new) ||
!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) ||
issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) {
ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);
--
1.7.1