On Tue, Dec 31, 2019 at 2:50 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
Add audit container identifier support to the action of signalling the
audit daemon.
Since this would need to add an element to the audit_sig_info struct,
a new record type AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO2 was created with a new
audit_sig_info2 struct. Corresponding support is required in the
userspace code to reflect the new record request and reply type.
An older userspace won't break since it won't know to request this
record type.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 7 +++++++
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/audit.c | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
kernel/audit.h | 1 +
security/selinux/nlmsgtab.c | 1 +
5 files changed, 45 insertions(+)
...
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 0871c3e5d6df..51159c94041c 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -126,6 +126,14 @@ struct auditd_connection {
kuid_t audit_sig_uid = INVALID_UID;
pid_t audit_sig_pid = -1;
u32 audit_sig_sid = 0;
+/* Since the signal information is stored in the record buffer at the
+ * time of the signal, but not retrieved until later, there is a chance
+ * that the last process in the container could terminate before the
+ * signal record is delivered. In this circumstance, there is a chance
+ * the orchestrator could reuse the audit container identifier, causing
+ * an overlap of audit records that refer to the same audit container
+ * identifier, but a different container instance. */
+u64 audit_sig_cid = AUDIT_CID_UNSET;
I believe we could prevent the case mentioned above by taking an
additional reference to the audit container ID object when the signal
information is collected, dropping it only after the signal
information is collected by userspace or another process signals the
audit daemon. Yes, it would block that audit container ID from being
reused immediately, but since we are talking about one number out of
2^64 that seems like a reasonable tradeoff.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com