Serge,
Ok, this sounds most reasonable. Thanks
-Tim
On Tue, 14 Dec 2004 14:50:14 -0600, Serge E. Hallyn <serue(a)us.ibm.com> wrote:
Tim,
Why can't you store the info in the current->audit record until syscall
exit, and only send a message to userspace if the syscall exit says to
do so?
-serge
Quoting Timothy R. Chavez (chavezt(a)gmail.com):
> Stephen,
>
> Yes I've also been giving that some thought too. How we split up
> responsibility. If we do as you suggested, we'd simply have to piece
> together each log message in userspace with the appropriate timestamp
> and serial number to get the full record. Still there would need to
> be a hook there that gave the piece of the record the syscall couldn't
> create, that is, the "filename=%s filterkey=%s (which could be used in
> userspace to index a table that will return the full path location
> that filename completes or whatever)", right? Plus the hooks to
> assign "auditability" to those filenames that appear in our
> watchlists. Anyway, this approach is reasonable. I'll just figure
> out this route and leave it up to userspace to stich the complete
> record together.
>
> (send this privately by accident)
>
> On Tue, 14 Dec 2004 15:03:08 -0500, Stephen Smalley <sds(a)epoch.ncsc.mil>
wrote:
> > On Tue, 2004-12-14 at 15:00, Timothy R. Chavez wrote:
> > > Hello,
> > >
> > > I've been kind of thinking about this. Presumably, we want to audit
> > > both failed and successful attempts in whatever vfs function we happen
> > > to be in. For instance, if we fall out of vfs_mkdir because
> > > may_create returned an error, we'd like to receive an audit message
> > > that said something like, "filename=myfile syscall= mkdir()
> > > error=<errno>.....", but, would I want to do this by hooking
each
> > > conditional statement? Is there a better approach? The only other
> > > one I can think of would be to have one exit point in the functions
> > > and audit right before we exit...
> >
> > The audit framework already lets you audit on syscall exit, which lets
> > you capture information like this. As I understand it, you don't need
> > additional hooks for that purpose, just for enabling auditing based on
> > object identity and for propagating audit attributes on objects.
> >
> > --
> > Stephen Smalley <sds(a)epoch.ncsc.mil>
> > National Security Agency
> >
> >
>
>
> --
> - Timothy R. Chavez
>
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>
--
- Timothy R. Chavez