Re: [PATCH 3/4] AUDIT: audit when fcaps increase the permitted or inheritable capabilities
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Hash: SHA1
Serge E. Hallyn wrote:
>> ... except if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT) && uid==0) I
guess?
>>
>> And then it also might be interesting in the case where
>> (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT) && uid==0) and pP is not full.
> I guess so, although this seems like a case of being interested in a
> (unusual) non-privileged execve().
I'm not sure what you mean - but this can only happen if bits are taken
out of the capability bounding set, right?
Yes, it can happen as you say.
This is a case of an unprivileged uid==0 execution. Since we don't
appear to want to audit other non-privileged execve()s, its not clear to
me that this one deserves attention.
>>>> rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm);
>>>>
>>>> + audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, &vcaps);
>>>> +
>>> When rc != 0, the execve() will fail. Is it appropriate to log in this case?
>> It might fail because fP contains bits not in pP', right? That's
>> probably interesting to auditors.
> In which case, how is the fact it didn't execute captured in the audit log?
I assume as a FAIL? (Not sure of the exact wording in the logs)
OK. As long as its clearly identified as a failure and the logs are not
misleading - making it look like the execve() succeeded with privilege -
then I'm not as concerned.
Cheers
Andrew
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.7 (Darwin)
Comment: Using GnuPG with Mozilla - http://enigmail.mozdev.org
iD8DBQFI//oF+bHCR3gb8jsRAjZxAKCoSXL7CwTfQJt7Wn55nT8MwHbiEgCcD+Qm
VVHHZ9QiInaVb2faUt9Q77E=
=gJU0
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----