On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 2:07 PM, Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> wrote:
On Oct 23, 2015 10:01 AM, "Kees Cook"
<keescook(a)chromium.org> wrote:
>
> On Fri, Oct 23, 2015 at 9:19 AM, Andy Lutomirski <luto(a)amacapital.net> wrote:
> > I would argue that, if auditing is off, audit_seccomp shouldn't do
> > anything. After all, unlike e.g. selinux, seccomp is not a systemwide
> > policy, and seccomp signals might be ordinary behavior that's internal
> > to the seccomp-using application. IOW, for people with audit compiled
> > in and subscribed by journald but switched off, I think that the
> > records shouldn't be emitted.
> >
> > If you agree, I can send the two-line patch.
>
> I think signr==0 states (which I would identify as "intended
> behavior") don't need to be reported under any situation, but audit
> folks wanted to keep it around.
Even if there is a nonzero signr, it could just be a program opting to
trap and emulate one of its own syscalls.
At present, that is a rare situation. Programs tend to be ptrace
managed externally. Is there anything catching SIGSYS itself?
-Kees
--
Kees Cook
Chrome OS Security