1, remove the permission check of pid namespace. it's no reason
to deny un-init pid namespace to operate audit subsystem.
2, only allow init user namespace and init audit namespace to
operate list/add/del rule, tty set, trim, make equiv operations.
3, allow audit namespace to get/set audit configuration, send
userspace audit message.
Signed-off-by: Gao feng <gaofeng(a)cn.fujitsu.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 13 ++++++-------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 095f54d..c4d4291 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -573,11 +573,7 @@ out:
static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
{
int err = 0;
-
- /* Only support the initial namespaces for now. */
- if ((current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) ||
- (task_active_pid_ns(current) != &init_pid_ns))
- return -EPERM;
+ struct audit_namespace *ns = current->nsproxy->audit_ns;
switch (msg_type) {
case AUDIT_LIST:
@@ -586,6 +582,7 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
case AUDIT_GET:
case AUDIT_SET:
+ break;
case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
@@ -594,13 +591,15 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
case AUDIT_TTY_SET:
case AUDIT_TRIM:
case AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV:
- if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
+ if ((current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) ||
+ (ns != &init_audit_ns) ||
+ !capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
err = -EPERM;
break;
case AUDIT_USER:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
- if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
+ if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
err = -EPERM;
break;
default: /* bad msg */
--
1.8.3.1