On 2020-01-22 16:28, Paul Moore wrote:
On Tue, Dec 31, 2019 at 2:49 PM Richard Guy Briggs
<rgb(a)redhat.com> wrote:
>
> Implement the proc fs write to set the audit container identifier of a
> process, emitting an AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP record to document the event.
>
> This is a write from the container orchestrator task to a proc entry of
> the form /proc/PID/audit_containerid where PID is the process ID of the
> newly created task that is to become the first task in a container, or
> an additional task added to a container.
>
> The write expects up to a u64 value (unset: 18446744073709551615).
>
> The writer must have capability CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL.
>
> This will produce a record such as this:
> type=CONTAINER_OP msg=audit(2018-06-06 12:39:29.636:26949) : op=set opid=2209
contid=123456 old-contid=18446744073709551615
>
> The "op" field indicates an initial set. The "opid" field is
the
> object's PID, the process being "contained". New and old audit
> container identifier values are given in the "contid" fields.
>
> It is not permitted to unset the audit container identifier.
> A child inherits its parent's audit container identifier.
>
> Please see the github audit kernel issue for the main feature:
>
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/90
> Please see the github audit userspace issue for supporting additions:
>
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/51
> Please see the github audit testsuiite issue for the test case:
>
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/64
> Please see the github audit wiki for the feature overview:
>
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/wiki/RFE-Audit-Container-ID
>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge(a)hallyn.com>
> Acked-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
> Acked-by: Neil Horman <nhorman(a)tuxdriver.com>
> Reviewed-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace(a)redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
> ---
> fs/proc/base.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> include/linux/audit.h | 25 ++++++++++++++++++++
> include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 ++
> kernel/audit.c | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> kernel/audit.h | 1 +
> kernel/auditsc.c | 4 ++++
> 6 files changed, 126 insertions(+)
...
> diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
> index 397f8fb4836a..2d7707426b7d 100644
> --- a/kernel/audit.c
> +++ b/kernel/audit.c
> @@ -2356,6 +2358,62 @@ int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
> return audit_signal_info_syscall(t);
> }
>
> +/*
> + * audit_set_contid - set current task's audit contid
> + * @task: target task
> + * @contid: contid value
> + *
> + * Returns 0 on success, -EPERM on permission failure.
> + *
> + * Called (set) from fs/proc/base.c::proc_contid_write().
> + */
> +int audit_set_contid(struct task_struct *task, u64 contid)
> +{
> + u64 oldcontid;
> + int rc = 0;
> + struct audit_buffer *ab;
> +
> + task_lock(task);
> + /* Can't set if audit disabled */
> + if (!task->audit) {
> + task_unlock(task);
> + return -ENOPROTOOPT;
> + }
> + oldcontid = audit_get_contid(task);
> + read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
> + /* Don't allow the audit containerid to be unset */
> + if (!audit_contid_valid(contid))
> + rc = -EINVAL;
> + /* if we don't have caps, reject */
> + else if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL))
> + rc = -EPERM;
> + /* if task has children or is not single-threaded, deny */
> + else if (!list_empty(&task->children))
> + rc = -EBUSY;
> + else if (!(thread_group_leader(task) && thread_group_empty(task)))
> + rc = -EALREADY;
[NOTE: there is a bigger issue below which I think is going to require
a respin/fixup of this patch so I'm going to take the opportunity to
do a bit more bikeshedding ;)]
It seems like we could combine both the thread/children checks under a
single -EBUSY return value. In both cases the caller should be able
to determine if the target process is multi-threaded for has spawned
children, yes? FWIW, my motivation for this question is that
-EALREADY seems like a poor choice here.
Fair enough.
> + /* if contid is already set, deny */
> + else if (audit_contid_set(task))
> + rc = -ECHILD;
Does -EEXIST make more sense here?
Perhaps. I don't feel strongly about it, but none of these error codes
were intended for this use and should not overlap with other errors from
writing to /proc.
> + read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
> + if (!rc)
> + task->audit->contid = contid;
> + task_unlock(task);
> +
> + if (!audit_enabled)
> + return rc;
> +
> + ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONTAINER_OP);
> + if (!ab)
> + return rc;
> +
> + audit_log_format(ab,
> + "op=set opid=%d contid=%llu old-contid=%llu",
> + task_tgid_nr(task), contid, oldcontid);
> + audit_log_end(ab);
Assuming audit is enabled we always emit the record above, even if we
were not actually able to set the Audit Container ID (ACID); this
seems wrong to me. I think the proper behavior would be to either add
a "res=" field to indicate success/failure or only emit the record
when we actually change a task's ACID. Considering the impact that
the ACID value will potentially have on the audit stream, it seems
like always logging the record and including a "res=" field may be the
safer choice.
This record should be accompanied by a syscall record (and eventually
possibly a CONTAINER_ID record of the orchestrator, if it is already in
a container). The syscall record has a res= field that already gives
this result.
> + return rc;
> +}
> +
> /**
> * audit_log_end - end one audit record
> * @ab: the audit_buffer
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635