Re: [PATCH ghak90 V6 02/10] audit: add container id

On 2019-07-16 19:30, Paul Moore wrote: > On Tue, Jul 16, 2019 at 6:03 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > > On 2019-07-15 17:04, Paul Moore wrote: > > > On Mon, Jul 8, 2019 at 2:06 PM Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com&gt; wrote: > > > > > At this point I would say we are at an impasse unless we trust > > > > ns_capable() or we implement audit namespaces. > > > > > > I'm not sure how we can trust ns_capable(), but if you can think of a > > > way I would love to hear it. I'm also not sure how namespacing audit > > > is helpful (see my above comments), but if you think it is please > > > explain. > > > > So if we are not namespacing, why do we not trust capabilities? > > We can trust capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL) for enforcing audit container > ID policy, we can not trust ns_capable(CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL). Ok. So does a process in a non-init user namespace have two (or more) sets of capabilities stored in creds, one in the init_user_ns, and one in current_user_ns? Or does it get stripped of all its capabilities in init_user_ns once it has its own set in current_user_ns? If the former, then we can use capable(). If the latter, we need another mechanism, as you have suggested might be needed.