On Fri, 2017-07-28 at 09:11 -0400, Steve Grubb wrote:
On Friday, July 28, 2017 3:23:31 AM EDT Richard Guy Briggs wrote:
> In the process of normalizing audit log messages, it was noticed
> that the
> AVC initialization code registered an audit log KERNEL record that
> didn't
> fit the standard format. In the process of attempting to normalize
> it it
> was determined that this record was not even necessary. Remove it.
Actually, I'd probably go the other direction. I'd make it useful.
How about a
AUDIT_MAC_INIT record that records, name of MAC framework, status
(enabled/
disabled), and enforcing mode (enforcing/permissive). This way if
there is an
investigation that needs to know the initial system state, we have
that
information preserved. There might be one or two other tidbits people
might
want to know like policy version or number of overrides (booleans)
deviating
from policy baseline. But I'd say that's nice to have and not
mandatory.
I'm pretty sure that was the intent of the event and its probably to
satisfy
one of the FMT_MSA.3 common criteria requirements about initial
subject/object
security attribute association.
None of that is known in avc_init(). Aren't you already getting what
you need from AUDIT_MAC_STATUS and AUDIT_MAC_POLICY_LOAD?
-Steve
> Ref:
http://marc.info/?l=selinux&m=149614868525826&w=2
> See:
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/48
> Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
> ---
> security/selinux/avc.c | 2 --
> 1 files changed, 0 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
> index e60c79d..4b42931 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/avc.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
> @@ -197,8 +197,6 @@ void __init avc_init(void)
> avc_xperms_data_cachep =
> kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_data",
> sizeof(struct
> extended_perms_data),
> 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL);
> -
> - audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
> AUDIT_KERNEL, "AVC
> INITIALIZED\n"); }
>
> int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page)