[PATCH V3 00/10] capabilities: do not audit log BPRM_FCAPS on set*id

The audit subsystem is adding a BPRM_FCAPS record when auditing setuid application execution (SYSCALL execve). This is not expected as it was supposed to be limited to when the file system actually had capabilities in an extended attribute. It lists all capabilities making the event really ugly to parse what is happening. The PATH record correctly records the setuid bit and owner. Suppress the BPRM_FCAPS record on set*id. See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/16 The first to eighth just massage the logic to make it easier to understand. Some of them could be squashed together. The patch that resolves this issue is the ninth. It would be possible to address the original issue with a change of "!uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)" to "!(uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid))" but it took me long enough to understand this logic that I don't think I'd be doing any favours by leaving it this difficult to understand. The final patch attempts to address all the conditions that need logging based on mailing list conversations, recoginizing there is probably some duplication in the logic. Richard Guy Briggs (10): capabilities: factor out cap_bprm_set_creds privileged root capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status capabilities: rename has_cap to has_fcap capabilities: use root_priveleged inline to clarify logic capabilities: use intuitive names for id changes capabilities: move audit log decision to function capabilities: remove a layer of conditional logic capabilities: invert logic for clarity capabilities: fix logic for effective root or real root capabilities: audit log other surprising conditions security/commoncap.c | 166 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------ 1 files changed, 107 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)