[PATCH] audit: accelerate audit rule filter
by Zixuan Zhao
From: zhaozixuan <zhaozixuan2(a)huawei.com>
Audit traverses rules when a syscall exits until it finds a matching rule.
For syscalls not monitored by any rules, audit has to traverse all rules
to know they are not interested. This process would be repeated many times
and cause performance issues when a user adds many syscall rules. To solve
this problem, we add an array to record the number of rules interested in
a syscall. When a syscall exits, audit will check the array to decide
whether to search syscall-rules or just quit. The complexity can be
optimized from O(n) to O(1) for syscalls that are not monitored by rules.
This patch does so with the following changes:
1. We define a global array audit_syscall_rules to record the number of
rules interested in a syscall. For compatible architectures which may have
two different syscall sets, we define one more array called
audit_compat_syscall_rules.
2. When a rule is added/deleted by a user, we use the syscall_nr
interested by the rule as the index of the global array and +1/-1 the
corresponding value. Considering tree-type rules usually monitor many
syscalls which may reduce the optimization effect, we move them from
audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT] to a new rule list named
audit_filter_dir_list, and add a new function audit_filter_dir to handle
these rules.
3. Add a check in function audit_filter_syscall. If
audit_syscall_rules[major] == 0 (or audit_compat_syscall_rules[major] == 0
for compatible architecture), quit the function early.
We used lat_syscall of lmbench3 to test the performance impact of this
patch. We changed the number of rules and run lat_syscall with 1000
repetitions at each test. Syscalls measured by lat_syscall are not
monitored by rules.
Before this optimization:
null read write stat fstat open
0 rules 1.87ms 2.74ms 2.56ms 26.31ms 4.13ms 69.66ms
10 rules 2.15ms 3.13ms 3.32ms 26.99ms 4.16ms 74.70ms
20 rules 2.45ms 3.97ms 3.82ms 27.05ms 4.60ms 76.35ms
30 rules 2.64ms 4.52ms 3.95ms 30.30ms 4.94ms 78.94ms
40 rules 2.83ms 4.97ms 4.23ms 32.16ms 5.40ms 81.88ms
50 rules 3.00ms 5.30ms 4.84ms 33.49ms 5.79ms 83.20ms
100 rules 4.24ms 9.75ms 7.42ms 37.68ms 6.55ms 93.70ms
160 rules 5.50ms 16.89ms 12.18ms 51.53ms 17.45ms 155.40ms
After this optimization:
null read write stat fstat open
0 rules 1.81ms 2.84ms 2.42ms 27.70ms 4.15ms 69.10ms
10 rules 1.97ms 2.83ms 2.69ms 27.70ms 4.15ms 69.30ms
20 rules 1.72ms 2.91ms 2.41ms 26.49ms 3.91ms 71.19ms
30 rules 1.85ms 2.94ms 2.48ms 26.27ms 3.97ms 71.43ms
40 rules 1.88ms 2.94ms 2.78ms 26.85ms 4.08ms 69.79ms
50 rules 1.86ms 3.17ms 3.08ms 26.25ms 4.03ms 72.32ms
100 rules 1.84ms 3.00ms 2.81ms 26.25ms 3.98ms 70.25ms
160 rules 1.92ms 3.32ms 3.06ms 26.81ms 4.57ms 71.41ms
As the result shown above, the syscall latencies increase as the number
of rules increases, while with the patch the latencies remain stable.
This could help when a user adds many audit rules for purposes (such as
attack tracing or process behavior recording) but suffers from low
performance.
Signed-off-by: zhaozixuan <zhaozixuan2(a)huawei.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 13 +++++
kernel/audit.c | 15 ++++++
kernel/audit.h | 12 +++++
kernel/auditfilter.c | 122 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 48 ++++++++++++++++-
5 files changed, 207 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 82b7c1116a85..988b673ac66d 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -280,6 +280,19 @@ static inline int audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t)
#define AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN 2 /* audit record should be hidden */
#define AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL 4 /* audit record incomplete */
+#include <asm/seccomp.h>
+#define AUDIT_ARCH_NATIVE SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE
+#define AUDIT_ARCH_NATIVE_NR SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR
+#ifdef SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
+#define AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT
+#define AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT_NR SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR
+#define AUDIR_ARCH_MAX_NR (SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR > \
+ SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR ? SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR : \
+ SECCOMP_ARCH_COMPAT_NR)
+#else
+#define AUDIR_ARCH_MAX_NR SECCOMP_ARCH_NATIVE_NR
+#endif
+
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
#include <asm/syscall.h> /* for syscall_get_arch() */
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 121d37e700a6..813a69bbf81a 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1638,6 +1638,10 @@ static struct pernet_operations audit_net_ops __net_initdata = {
static int __init audit_init(void)
{
int i;
+ struct audit_rule_count *arc = NULL;
+#ifdef AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT
+ struct audit_rule_count *compat_arc = NULL;
+#endif
if (audit_initialized == AUDIT_DISABLED)
return 0;
@@ -1668,6 +1672,17 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
panic("audit: failed to start the kauditd thread (%d)\n", err);
}
+ arc = alloc_audit_rule_count(AUDIT_ARCH_NATIVE_NR);
+ if (!arc)
+ panic("audit: failed to initialize audit_syscall_rules\n");
+ rcu_assign_pointer(audit_syscall_rules, arc);
+#ifdef AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT
+ compat_arc = alloc_audit_rule_count(AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT_NR);
+ if (!compat_arc)
+ panic("audit: failed to initialize audit_compat_syscall_rules\n");
+ rcu_assign_pointer(audit_compat_syscall_rules, compat_arc);
+#endif
+
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL,
"state=initialized audit_enabled=%u res=1",
audit_enabled);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index d6a2c899a8db..7e452b9e2a30 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -199,6 +199,11 @@ struct audit_context {
struct audit_proctitle proctitle;
};
+struct audit_rule_count {
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+ int length;
+ unsigned int counts[0];
+};
extern bool audit_ever_enabled;
extern void audit_log_session_info(struct audit_buffer *ab);
@@ -216,6 +221,13 @@ static inline int audit_hash_ino(u32 ino)
/* Indicates that audit should log the full pathname. */
#define AUDIT_NAME_FULL -1
+extern struct audit_rule_count *audit_syscall_rules;
+#ifdef AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT
+extern struct audit_rule_count *audit_compat_syscall_rules;
+#endif
+extern inline struct audit_rule_count *alloc_audit_rule_count(int length);
+extern struct list_head audit_filter_dir_list;
+extern int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val);
extern int audit_match_class(int class, unsigned syscall);
extern int audit_comparator(const u32 left, const u32 op, const u32 right);
extern int audit_uid_comparator(kuid_t left, u32 op, kuid_t right);
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index db2c6b59dfc3..53da9cf99d29 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -60,6 +60,12 @@ static struct list_head audit_rules_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = {
DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex);
+struct audit_rule_count *audit_syscall_rules;
+#ifdef AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT
+struct audit_rule_count *audit_compat_syscall_rules;
+#endif
+LIST_HEAD(audit_filter_dir_list);
+
static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
{
switch (f->type) {
@@ -909,6 +915,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_find_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
}
}
goto out;
+ } else if (entry->rule.tree) {
+ *p = list = &audit_filter_dir_list;
} else {
*p = list = &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr];
}
@@ -926,6 +934,105 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_find_rule(struct audit_entry *entry,
static u64 prio_low = ~0ULL/2;
static u64 prio_high = ~0ULL/2 - 1;
+inline struct audit_rule_count *alloc_audit_rule_count(int length)
+{
+ struct audit_rule_count *arc = kzalloc(
+ sizeof(struct audit_rule_count) + sizeof(unsigned int) * length,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (arc)
+ arc->length = length;
+ return arc;
+}
+static int copy_rule_counts(int arch, struct audit_rule_count **old_counts,
+ struct audit_rule_count **new_counts)
+{
+ if (arch == AUDIT_ARCH_NATIVE)
+ *old_counts = rcu_dereference_protected(audit_syscall_rules,
+ lockdep_is_held(&audit_filter_mutex));
+#ifdef AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT
+ else if (arch == AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT)
+ *old_counts = rcu_dereference_protected(audit_compat_syscall_rules,
+ lockdep_is_held(&audit_filter_mutex));
+#endif
+ else
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ *new_counts = alloc_audit_rule_count((*old_counts)->length);
+ if (!*new_counts)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memcpy((*new_counts)->counts,
+ (*old_counts)->counts,
+ sizeof(unsigned int) * (*old_counts)->length);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline bool arch_monitored(struct audit_entry *entry, int arch)
+{
+ return (entry->rule.arch_f == NULL ||
+ audit_comparator(arch,
+ entry->rule.arch_f->op,
+ entry->rule.arch_f->val));
+}
+
+static int audit_update_syscall_rule(struct audit_entry *entry, int delt)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+ int err = 0;
+ struct audit_rule_count *new_counts = NULL;
+ struct audit_rule_count *old_counts = NULL;
+ bool update_native;
+#ifdef AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT
+ struct audit_rule_count *new_compat_counts = NULL;
+ struct audit_rule_count *old_compat_counts = NULL;
+ bool update_compat;
+#endif
+ if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT || entry->rule.watch || entry->rule.tree)
+ return 0;
+
+ update_native = arch_monitored(entry, AUDIT_ARCH_NATIVE);
+ if (update_native) {
+ err = copy_rule_counts(AUDIT_ARCH_NATIVE, &old_counts, &new_counts);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+#ifdef AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT
+ update_compat = arch_monitored(entry, AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT);
+ if (update_compat) {
+ err = copy_rule_counts(AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT, &old_compat_counts, &new_compat_counts);
+ if (err) {
+ kfree(new_counts);
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+#endif
+
+ for (i = 0; i < AUDIR_ARCH_MAX_NR; i++) {
+ if ((audit_in_mask(&entry->rule, i) == 0))
+ continue;
+ if (i < AUDIT_ARCH_NATIVE_NR && update_native)
+ new_counts->counts[i] += delt;
+#ifdef AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT
+ if (i < AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT_NR && update_compat)
+ new_compat_counts->counts[i] += delt;
+#endif
+ }
+
+ if (update_native) {
+ rcu_assign_pointer(audit_syscall_rules, new_counts);
+ kfree_rcu(old_counts, rcu);
+ }
+#ifdef AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT
+ if (update_compat) {
+ rcu_assign_pointer(audit_compat_syscall_rules, new_counts);
+ kfree_rcu(old_compat_counts, rcu);
+ }
+#endif
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Add rule to given filterlist if not a duplicate. */
static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
{
@@ -957,6 +1064,15 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
return err;
}
+ err = audit_update_syscall_rule(entry, 1);
+ if (err) {
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
+ /* normally audit_add_tree_rule() will free it on failure */
+ if (tree)
+ audit_put_tree(tree);
+ return err;
+ }
+
if (watch) {
/* audit_filter_mutex is dropped and re-taken during this call */
err = audit_add_watch(&entry->rule, &list);
@@ -994,7 +1110,7 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND;
} else {
list_add_tail(&entry->rule.list,
- &audit_rules_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
+ &audit_rules_list[entry->rule.listnr]);
list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list);
}
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
@@ -1035,6 +1151,10 @@ int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry)
goto out;
}
+ ret = audit_update_syscall_rule(e, -1);
+ if (ret)
+ goto out;
+
if (e->rule.watch)
audit_remove_watch_rule(&e->rule);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index b1cb1dbf7417..da764328c3aa 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -789,7 +789,7 @@ static enum audit_state audit_filter_task(struct task_struct *tsk, char **key)
return AUDIT_STATE_BUILD;
}
-static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
+int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
{
int word, bit;
@@ -805,6 +805,25 @@ static int audit_in_mask(const struct audit_krule *rule, unsigned long val)
return rule->mask[word] & bit;
}
+static bool audit_syscall_monitored(int arch, int major)
+{
+ struct audit_rule_count *arc = NULL;
+
+ if (arch == AUDIT_ARCH_NATIVE)
+ arc = rcu_dereference(audit_syscall_rules);
+#ifdef AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT
+ else if (arch == AUDIT_ARCH_COMPAT)
+ arc = rcu_dereference(audit_compat_syscall_rules);
+#endif
+ else
+ return false;
+
+ if (major < arc->length)
+ return arc->counts[major] != 0;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
/* At syscall exit time, this filter is called if the audit_state is
* not low enough that auditing cannot take place, but is also not
* high enough that we already know we have to write an audit record
@@ -820,6 +839,11 @@ static void audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
return;
rcu_read_lock();
+ if (likely(!audit_syscall_monitored(ctx->arch, ctx->major))) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return;
+ }
+
list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT], list) {
if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
@@ -833,6 +857,25 @@ static void audit_filter_syscall(struct task_struct *tsk,
return;
}
+static void audit_filter_dir(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+ struct audit_entry *e;
+ enum audit_state state;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_dir_list, list) {
+ if (audit_in_mask(&e->rule, ctx->major) &&
+ audit_filter_rules(tsk, &e->rule, ctx, NULL,
+ &state, false)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ ctx->current_state = state;
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
/*
* Given an audit_name check the inode hash table to see if they match.
* Called holding the rcu read lock to protect the use of audit_inode_hash
@@ -1638,6 +1681,7 @@ void __audit_free(struct task_struct *tsk)
context->return_code = 0;
audit_filter_syscall(tsk, context);
+ audit_filter_dir(tsk, context);
audit_filter_inodes(tsk, context);
if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
audit_log_exit();
@@ -1719,7 +1763,6 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
if (!list_empty(&context->killed_trees))
audit_kill_trees(context);
-
if (!context->dummy && context->in_syscall) {
if (success)
context->return_valid = AUDITSC_SUCCESS;
@@ -1745,6 +1788,7 @@ void __audit_syscall_exit(int success, long return_code)
context->return_code = return_code;
audit_filter_syscall(current, context);
+ audit_filter_dir(current, context);
audit_filter_inodes(current, context);
if (context->current_state == AUDIT_STATE_RECORD)
audit_log_exit();
--
2.17.1
4 years
- 3
- 3
Maximum Value for q_depth
by Amjad Gabbar
I am currently seeing a lot of auditd dispatch error issues. It is related
to a particular keyed rule that from the looks of it is generating close to
a million events /day. I have seen previous answers where it was advised to
increase the q_depth value to a suitable number.
Based on this, I would like to confirm what is the maximum advisable value
q_depth can have/take?
4 years
- 2
- 1