[[PATCH V4]] audit: trigger accompanying records when no rules present
by Richard Guy Briggs
When there are no audit rules registered, mandatory records (config,
etc.) are missing their accompanying records (syscall, proctitle, etc.).
This is due to audit context dummy set on syscall entry based on absence
of rules that signals that no other records are to be printed.
Clear the dummy bit if any record is generated.
The proctitle context and dummy checks are pointless since the
proctitle record will not be printed if no syscall records are printed.
The fds array is reset to -1 after the first syscall to indicate it
isn't valid any more, but was never set to -1 when the context was
allocated to indicate it wasn't yet valid.
The audit_inode* functions can be called without going through
getname_flags() or getname_kernel() that sets audit_names and cwd, so
set the cwd if it has not already been done so due to audit_names being
valid.
The LSM dump_common_audit_data() LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET:AF_UNIX case was
missed with the ghak96 patch, so add that case here.
Thanks to bauen1 <j2468h(a)googlemail.com> for reporting LSM situations in
which context->cwd is not valid, inadvertantly fixed by the ghak96 patch.
Please see upstream github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/120
This is also related to upstream github issue
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/96
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
---
Passes audit-testsuite.
Chagelog:
v4:
- rebase on audit/next v5.9-rc1
- squash v2+v3fix
- add pwd NULL check in audit_log_name()
- resubmit after revert
v3:
- initialize fds[0] to -1
- init cwd for ghak96 LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET:AF_UNIX case
- init cwd for audit_inode{,_child}
v2:
- unconditionally clear dummy
- create audit_clear_dummy accessor function
- remove proctitle context and dummy checks
kernel/audit.c | 1 +
kernel/audit.h | 8 ++++++++
kernel/auditsc.c | 11 +++++++----
security/lsm_audit.c | 1 +
4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 68cee3bc8cfe..8604eccb348f 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1865,6 +1865,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
}
audit_get_stamp(ab->ctx, &t, &serial);
+ audit_clear_dummy(ab->ctx);
audit_log_format(ab, "audit(%llu.%03lu:%u): ",
(unsigned long long)t.tv_sec, t.tv_nsec/1000000, serial);
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index 3b9c0945225a..abcfef58435b 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -290,6 +290,13 @@ extern int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t);
extern void audit_filter_inodes(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct audit_context *ctx);
extern struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void);
+
+static inline void audit_clear_dummy(struct audit_context *ctx)
+{
+ if (ctx)
+ ctx->dummy = 0;
+}
+
#else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
#define auditsc_get_stamp(c, t, s) 0
#define audit_put_watch(w) {}
@@ -323,6 +330,7 @@ static inline int audit_signal_info_syscall(struct task_struct *t)
}
#define audit_filter_inodes(t, c) AUDIT_DISABLED
+#define audit_clear_dummy(c) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
extern char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len);
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 8dba8f0983b5..9d2de93f40b3 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -929,6 +929,7 @@ static inline struct audit_context *audit_alloc_context(enum audit_state state)
context->prio = state == AUDIT_RECORD_CONTEXT ? ~0ULL : 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->killed_trees);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&context->names_list);
+ context->fds[0] = -1;
return context;
}
@@ -1367,7 +1368,10 @@ static void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
/* name was specified as a relative path and the
* directory component is the cwd
*/
- audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
+ if (&context->pwd)
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, " name=", &context->pwd);
+ else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
break;
default:
/* log the name's directory component */
@@ -1435,9 +1439,6 @@ static void audit_log_proctitle(void)
struct audit_context *context = audit_context();
struct audit_buffer *ab;
- if (!context || context->dummy)
- return;
-
ab = audit_log_start(context, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_PROCTITLE);
if (!ab)
return; /* audit_panic or being filtered */
@@ -2079,6 +2080,7 @@ void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
}
handle_path(dentry);
audit_copy_inode(n, dentry, inode, flags & AUDIT_INODE_NOEVAL);
+ _audit_getcwd(context);
}
void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
@@ -2197,6 +2199,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode, 0);
else
found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
+ _audit_getcwd(context);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
diff --git a/security/lsm_audit.c b/security/lsm_audit.c
index 53d0d183db8f..e93077612246 100644
--- a/security/lsm_audit.c
+++ b/security/lsm_audit.c
@@ -369,6 +369,7 @@ static void dump_common_audit_data(struct audit_buffer *ab,
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, p);
else
audit_log_n_hex(ab, p, len);
+ audit_getcwd();
break;
}
}
--
2.18.4
5 years, 1 month
[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.4 24/64] audit: CONFIG_CHANGE don't log internal bookkeeping as an event
by Sasha Levin
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit 70b3eeed49e8190d97139806f6fbaf8964306cdb ]
Common Criteria calls out for any action that modifies the audit trail to
be recorded. That usually is interpreted to mean insertion or removal of
rules. It is not required to log modification of the inode information
since the watch is still in effect. Additionally, if the rule is a never
rule and the underlying file is one they do not want events for, they
get an event for this bookkeeping update against their wishes.
Since no device/inode info is logged at insertion and no device/inode
information is logged on update, there is nothing meaningful being
communicated to the admin by the CONFIG_CHANGE updated_rules event. One
can assume that the rule was not "modified" because it is still watching
the intended target. If the device or inode cannot be resolved, then
audit_panic is called which is sufficient.
The correct resolution is to drop logging config_update events since
the watch is still in effect but just on another unknown inode.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
kernel/audit_watch.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit_watch.c b/kernel/audit_watch.c
index f45a9a5d3e47a..af453f3c2b3dd 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_watch.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c
@@ -316,8 +316,6 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct audit_parent *parent,
if (oentry->rule.exe)
audit_remove_mark(oentry->rule.exe);
- audit_watch_log_rule_change(r, owatch, "updated_rules");
-
call_rcu(&oentry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
}
--
2.25.1
5 years, 1 month
[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.9 34/90] audit: CONFIG_CHANGE don't log internal bookkeeping as an event
by Sasha Levin
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit 70b3eeed49e8190d97139806f6fbaf8964306cdb ]
Common Criteria calls out for any action that modifies the audit trail to
be recorded. That usually is interpreted to mean insertion or removal of
rules. It is not required to log modification of the inode information
since the watch is still in effect. Additionally, if the rule is a never
rule and the underlying file is one they do not want events for, they
get an event for this bookkeeping update against their wishes.
Since no device/inode info is logged at insertion and no device/inode
information is logged on update, there is nothing meaningful being
communicated to the admin by the CONFIG_CHANGE updated_rules event. One
can assume that the rule was not "modified" because it is still watching
the intended target. If the device or inode cannot be resolved, then
audit_panic is called which is sufficient.
The correct resolution is to drop logging config_update events since
the watch is still in effect but just on another unknown inode.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
kernel/audit_watch.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit_watch.c b/kernel/audit_watch.c
index 712469a3103ac..54b30c9bd8b13 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_watch.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c
@@ -316,8 +316,6 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct audit_parent *parent,
if (oentry->rule.exe)
audit_remove_mark(oentry->rule.exe);
- audit_watch_log_rule_change(r, owatch, "updated_rules");
-
call_rcu(&oentry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
}
--
2.25.1
5 years, 1 month
[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.14 043/127] audit: CONFIG_CHANGE don't log internal bookkeeping as an event
by Sasha Levin
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit 70b3eeed49e8190d97139806f6fbaf8964306cdb ]
Common Criteria calls out for any action that modifies the audit trail to
be recorded. That usually is interpreted to mean insertion or removal of
rules. It is not required to log modification of the inode information
since the watch is still in effect. Additionally, if the rule is a never
rule and the underlying file is one they do not want events for, they
get an event for this bookkeeping update against their wishes.
Since no device/inode info is logged at insertion and no device/inode
information is logged on update, there is nothing meaningful being
communicated to the admin by the CONFIG_CHANGE updated_rules event. One
can assume that the rule was not "modified" because it is still watching
the intended target. If the device or inode cannot be resolved, then
audit_panic is called which is sufficient.
The correct resolution is to drop logging config_update events since
the watch is still in effect but just on another unknown inode.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
kernel/audit_watch.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit_watch.c b/kernel/audit_watch.c
index 35f1d706bd5b4..ac87820cc0825 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_watch.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c
@@ -316,8 +316,6 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct audit_parent *parent,
if (oentry->rule.exe)
audit_remove_mark(oentry->rule.exe);
- audit_watch_log_rule_change(r, owatch, "updated_rules");
-
call_rcu(&oentry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
}
--
2.25.1
5 years, 1 month
[PATCH AUTOSEL 4.19 072/206] audit: CONFIG_CHANGE don't log internal bookkeeping as an event
by Sasha Levin
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit 70b3eeed49e8190d97139806f6fbaf8964306cdb ]
Common Criteria calls out for any action that modifies the audit trail to
be recorded. That usually is interpreted to mean insertion or removal of
rules. It is not required to log modification of the inode information
since the watch is still in effect. Additionally, if the rule is a never
rule and the underlying file is one they do not want events for, they
get an event for this bookkeeping update against their wishes.
Since no device/inode info is logged at insertion and no device/inode
information is logged on update, there is nothing meaningful being
communicated to the admin by the CONFIG_CHANGE updated_rules event. One
can assume that the rule was not "modified" because it is still watching
the intended target. If the device or inode cannot be resolved, then
audit_panic is called which is sufficient.
The correct resolution is to drop logging config_update events since
the watch is still in effect but just on another unknown inode.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
kernel/audit_watch.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit_watch.c b/kernel/audit_watch.c
index 4f7262eba73d8..50952d6d81209 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_watch.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c
@@ -317,8 +317,6 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct audit_parent *parent,
if (oentry->rule.exe)
audit_remove_mark(oentry->rule.exe);
- audit_watch_log_rule_change(r, owatch, "updated_rules");
-
call_rcu(&oentry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
}
--
2.25.1
5 years, 1 month
[PATCH AUTOSEL 5.4 120/330] audit: CONFIG_CHANGE don't log internal bookkeeping as an event
by Sasha Levin
From: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
[ Upstream commit 70b3eeed49e8190d97139806f6fbaf8964306cdb ]
Common Criteria calls out for any action that modifies the audit trail to
be recorded. That usually is interpreted to mean insertion or removal of
rules. It is not required to log modification of the inode information
since the watch is still in effect. Additionally, if the rule is a never
rule and the underlying file is one they do not want events for, they
get an event for this bookkeeping update against their wishes.
Since no device/inode info is logged at insertion and no device/inode
information is logged on update, there is nothing meaningful being
communicated to the admin by the CONFIG_CHANGE updated_rules event. One
can assume that the rule was not "modified" because it is still watching
the intended target. If the device or inode cannot be resolved, then
audit_panic is called which is sufficient.
The correct resolution is to drop logging config_update events since
the watch is still in effect but just on another unknown inode.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal(a)kernel.org>
---
kernel/audit_watch.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit_watch.c b/kernel/audit_watch.c
index 4508d5e0cf696..8a8fd732ff6d0 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_watch.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c
@@ -302,8 +302,6 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct audit_parent *parent,
if (oentry->rule.exe)
audit_remove_mark(oentry->rule.exe);
- audit_watch_log_rule_change(r, owatch, "updated_rules");
-
call_rcu(&oentry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
}
--
2.25.1
5 years, 1 month
[PATCH v20 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor
by Casey Schaufler
This patchset provides the changes required for
the AppArmor security module to stack safely with any other.
v20: Rebase to 5.9-rc1
Change the BPF security module to use the lsmblob data. (patch 0002)
Repair length logic in subject label processing (patch 0015)
Handle -EINVAL from the empty BPF setprocattr hook (patch 0020)
Correct length processing in append_ctx() (patch 0022)
v19: Rebase to 5.8-rc6
Incorporate feedback from v18
- Revert UDS SO_PEERSEC implementation to use lsmblobs
directly, rather than allocating as needed. The correct
treatment of out-of-memory conditions in the later case
is difficult to define. (patch 0005)
- Use a size_t in append_ctx() (patch 0021)
- Fix a memory leak when creating compound contexts. (patch 0021)
Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0013)
Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0020)
Fix build error when CONFIG_SECURITY isn't set (patch 0021)
v18: Rebase to 5.8-rc3
Incorporate feedback from v17
- Null pointer checking in UDS (patch 0005)
Match changes in IMA code (patch 0012)
Fix the behavior of LSM context supplimental audit
records so that there's always exactly one when it's
appropriate for there to be one. This is a substantial
change that requires extention of the audit_context beyond
syscall events. (patch 0020)
v17: Rebase to 5.7-rc4
v16: Rebase to 5.6
Incorporate feedback from v15 - Thanks Stephen, Mimi and Paul
- Generally improve commit messages WRT scaffolding
- Comment ima_lsm_isset() (patch 0002)
- Some question may remain on IMA warning (patch 0002)
- Mark lsm_slot as __lsm_ro_after_init not __init_data (patch 0002)
- Change name of lsmblob variable in ima_match_rules() (patch 0003)
- Instead of putting a struct lsmblob into the unix_skb_parms
structure put a pointer to an allocated instance. There is
currently only space for 5 u32's in unix_skb_parms and it is
likely to get even tighter. Fortunately, the lifecycle
management of the allocated lsmblob is simple. (patch 0005)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0005)
- Improved commentary on secmark labeling scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Reduced secmark related labeling scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Replace use of the zeroth entry of an lsmblob in scaffolding
with a function lsmblob_value() to hopefully make it less
obscure. (patch 0006)
- Convert security_secmark_relabel_packet to use lsmblob as
this reduces much of the most contentious scaffolding. (patch 0006)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0006)
- Added BUILD_BUG_ON() for CIPSO tag 6. (patch 0018)
- Reworked audit subject information. Instead of adding fields in
the middle of existing records add a new record to the event. When
a separate record is required use subj="?". (patch 0020)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0020)
- Reworked audit object information. Instead of adding fields in
the middle of existing records add a new record to the event. When
a separate record is required use obj="?". (patch 0021)
- Dropped Acks due to the above change (patch 0021)
- Enhanced documentation (patch 0022)
- Removed unnecessary error code check in security_getprocattr()
(patch 0021)
v15: Rebase to 5.6-rc1
- Revise IMA data use (patch 0002)
Incorporate feedback from v14
- Fix lockdown module registration naming (patch 0002)
- Revise how /proc/self/attr/context is gathered. (patch 0022)
- Revise access modes on /proc/self/attr/context. (patch 0022)
- Revise documentation on LSM external interfaces. (patch 0022)
v14: Rebase to 5.5-rc5
Incorporate feedback from v13
- Use an array of audit rules (patch 0002)
- Significant change, removed Acks (patch 0002)
- Remove unneeded include (patch 0013)
- Use context.len correctly (patch 0015)
- Reorder code to be more sensible (patch 0016)
- Drop SO_PEERCONTEXT as it's not needed yet (patch 0023)
v13: Rebase to 5.5-rc2
Incorporate feedback from v12
- Print lsmblob size with %z (Patch 0002)
- Convert lockdown LSM initialization. (Patch 0002)
- Restore error check in nft_secmark_compute_secid (Patch 0006)
- Correct blob scaffolding in ima_must_appraise() (Patch 0009)
- Make security_setprocattr() clearer (Patch 0013)
- Use lsm_task_display more widely (Patch 0013)
- Use passed size in lsmcontext_init() (Patch 0014)
- Don't add a smack_release_secctx() hook (Patch 0014)
- Don't print warning in security_release_secctx() (Patch 0014)
- Don't duplicate the label in nfs4_label_init_security() (Patch 0016)
- Remove reviewed-by as code has significant change (Patch 0016)
- Send the entire lsmblob for Tag 6 (Patch 0019)
- Fix description of socket_getpeersec_stream parameters (Patch 0023)
- Retain LSMBLOB_FIRST. What was I thinking? (Patch 0023)
- Add compound context to LSM documentation (Patch 0023)
v12: Rebase to 5.5-rc1
Fixed a couple of incorrect contractions in the text.
v11: Rebase to 5.4-rc6
Incorporate feedback from v10
- Disambiguate reading /proc/.../attr/display by restricting
all use of the interface to the current process.
- Fix a merge error in AppArmor's display attribute check
v10: Ask the security modules if the display can be changed.
v9: There is no version 9
v8: Incorporate feedback from v7
- Minor clean-up in display value management
- refactor "compound" context creation to use a common
append_ctx() function.
v7: Incorporate feedback from v6
- Make setting the display a privileged operation. The
availability of compound contexts reduces the need for
setting the display.
v6: Incorporate feedback from v5
- Add subj_<lsm>= and obj_<lsm>= fields to audit records
- Add /proc/.../attr/context to get the full context in
lsmname\0value\0... format as suggested by Simon McVittie
- Add SO_PEERCONTEXT for getsockopt() to get the full context
in the same format, also suggested by Simon McVittie.
- Add /sys/kernel/security/lsm_display_default to provide
the display default value.
v5: Incorporate feedback from v4
- Initialize the lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx()
- Clear the lsmcontext in all security_release_secctx() cases
- Don't use the "display" on strictly internal context
interfaces.
- The SELinux binder hooks check for cases where the context
"display" isn't compatible with SELinux.
v4: Incorporate feedback from v3
- Mark new lsm_<blob>_alloc functions static
- Replace the lsm and slot fields of the security_hook_list
with a pointer to a LSM allocated lsm_id structure. The
LSM identifies if it needs a slot explicitly. Use the
lsm_id rather than make security_add_hooks return the
slot value.
- Validate slot values used in security.c
- Reworked the "display" process attribute handling so that
it works right and doesn't use goofy list processing.
- fix display value check in dentry_init_security
- Replace audit_log of secids with '?' instead of deleting
the audit log
v3: Incorporate feedback from v2
- Make lsmblob parameter and variable names more
meaningful, changing "le" and "l" to "blob".
- Improve consistency of constant naming.
- Do more sanity checking during LSM initialization.
- Be a bit clearer about what is temporary scaffolding.
- Rather than clutter security_getpeersec_dgram with
otherwise unnecessary checks remove the apparmor
stub, which does nothing useful.
Patch 0001 moves management of the sock security blob
from the individual modules to the infrastructure.
Patches 0002-0012 replace system use of a "secid" with
a structure "lsmblob" containing information from the
security modules to be held and reused later. At this
point lsmblob contains an array of u32 secids, one "slot"
for each of the security modules compiled into the
kernel that used secids. A "slot" is allocated when
a security module requests one.
The infrastructure is changed to use the slot number
to pass the correct secid to or from the security module
hooks.
It is important that the lsmblob be a fixed size entity
that does not have to be allocated. Several of the places
where it is used would have performance and/or locking
issues with dynamic allocation.
Patch 0013 provides a mechanism for a process to
identify which security module's hooks should be used
when displaying or converting a security context string.
A new interface /proc/self/attr/display contains the name
of the security module to show. Reading from this file
will present the name of the module, while writing to
it will set the value. Only names of active security
modules are accepted. Internally, the name is translated
to the appropriate "slot" number for the module which
is then stored in the task security blob. Setting the
display requires that all modules using the /proc interfaces
allow the transition. The "display" of other processess
can be neither read nor written. All suggested cases
for reading the display of a different process have race
conditions.
Patch 0014 Starts the process of changing how a security
context is represented. Since it is possible for a
security context to have been generated by more than one
security module it is now necessary to note which module
created a security context so that the correct "release"
hook can be called. There are several places where the
module that created a security context cannot be inferred.
This is achieved by introducing a "lsmcontext" structure
which contains the context string, its length and the
"slot" number of the security module that created it.
The security_release_secctx() interface is changed,
replacing the (string,len) pointer pair with a lsmcontext
pointer.
Patches 0015-0017 convert the security interfaces from
(string,len) pointer pairs to a lsmcontext pointer.
The slot number identifying the creating module is
added by the infrastructure. Where the security context
is stored for extended periods the data type is changed.
The Netlabel code is converted to save lsmblob structures
instead of secids in Patch 0018.
Patch 0019 adds checks to the binder hooks which verify
that if both ends of a transaction use the same "display".
Patches 0020-0021 add addition audit records for subject
and object LSM data when there are multiple security modules
with such data. The AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record is
used in conjuction with a "subj=?" field to identify the
subject data. The AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record is used in
conjuction with a "obj=?" field to identify the object data.
The AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS record identifies the security
module with the data: "subj_selinux=xyz_t subj_apparmor=abc".
The AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS record identifies the security
module with the data: "obj_selinux=xyz_t obj_apparmor=abc".
While AUDIT_MAC_TASK_CONTEXTS records will always contain
an entry for each possible security modules, AUDIT_MAC_OBJ_CONTEXTS
records will only contain entries for security modules for
which the object in question has data.
Patch 0022 adds a new interfaces for getting the
compound security contexts. /proc/self/attr/context
Finally, with all interference on the AppArmor hooks
removed, Patch 0023 removes the exclusive bit from
AppArmor. An unnecessary stub hook was also removed.
The Ubuntu project is using an earlier version of
this patchset in their distribution to enable stacking
for containers.
Performance measurements to date have the change
within the "noise". The sockperf and dbench results
are on the order of 0.2% to 0.8% difference, with
better performance being as common as worse. The
benchmarks were run with AppArmor and Smack on Ubuntu.
https://github.com/cschaufler/lsm-stacking.git#stack-5.8-rc6-a-v19
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
---
5 years, 1 month
-F perm in audit rules
by Gabriel Alford
Hello,
By default, does auditd audit read, write, execute, and attribute in audit
rules or do you need to specify
-F perm=wxra ?
For example,
-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/at -F perm=wrxa
vs
-a always,exit -F path=/usr/bin/at
Thanks and let me know if what I am asking doesn't make sense.
Gabriel Alford
Member of the technical staff
office of the chief technologist
red hat Public Sector
Red Hat
<https://www.redhat.com>
ralford(a)redhat.com T: 972-707-6483 <650-254-4391> M: 303-550-7234
<https://red.ht/sig> <https://red.ht/sig>
5 years, 1 month
Security Auditd Config for Enterprises
by Rohit Nambiar
Hi all!
Apologies if this topic has already been discussed before, I couldn't find
an easy way to sift through older archives.
Is there an auditd rule set which offers a reasonable level of security
visibility and has been tested on enterprise production systems? And if
such a rule set can be shared here?
I'm looking for a base document to deploy/modify for use within my
organization. Many thanks in advance.
Regards
5 years, 2 months
