Duplicate settings?
by Leam Hall
If /etc/audit/auditd.conf encounters conflicting duplicate settings,
what happens? Takes the first, takes the last, or what? For example:
space_left = 25
space_left = 100
Thanks!
4 years, 11 months
PCI System level object
by MAUPERTUIS, PHILIPPE
Hi,
Redhat is providing audit rules sample for PCI DSS.
For the requirement 10.2.7 it is written :
## 10.2.7 Creation and deletion of system-level objects
## This requirement seems to be database table related and not audit
However the PCI glossary defines system level objects as :
System-level object:
Anything on a system component that is required for its operation, including but not limited to database tables, stored procedures, application executables and configuration files, system configuration files, static and shared libraries and DLLs, system executables, device drivers and device configuration files,and third-party components.
It seems It should be covered by the FIM solution and not by audit.
However loading and unloading kernel modules should probably be covered by auditd.
Could you tell me which events are generated in that case ?
Are there any others events that should consider for this requirement
Regards
Philippe
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4 years, 11 months
[PATCH v13 26/25] Audit: Multiple LSM support in audit rules
by Casey Schaufler
With multiple possible security modules supporting audit rule
it is necessary to keep separate data for each module in the
audit rules. This affects IMA as well, as it re-uses the audit
rule list mechanisms.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: linux-integrity(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-audit(a)redhat.com
---
include/linux/audit.h | 4 +++-
include/linux/security.h | 8 +++----
kernel/auditfilter.c | 26 +++++++++++----------
kernel/auditsc.c | 12 +++++-----
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 36 +++++++++++++++++++----------
security/security.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
6 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 2ce0e8da3922..d4213c471801 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/ptrace.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
#define AUDIT_INO_UNSET ((unsigned long)-1)
@@ -64,8 +65,9 @@ struct audit_field {
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
struct {
+ bool lsm_isset;
char *lsm_str;
- void *lsm_rule;
+ void *lsm_rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
};
};
u32 op;
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 26967055a002..0bf71dd74a9c 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1887,8 +1887,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule);
-void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
+ void **lsmrule);
+void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule);
#else
@@ -1904,12 +1904,12 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
}
static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field,
- u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+ u32 op, void **lsmrule)
{
return 0;
}
-static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
{ }
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index bf28bb599b6d..0f351d1f6ef9 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f)
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
kfree(f->lsm_str);
- security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule);
+ security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rules);
}
}
@@ -517,7 +517,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
- (void **)&f->lsm_rule);
+ f->lsm_rules);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
@@ -528,8 +528,10 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data,
if (err) {
kfree(str);
goto exit_free;
- } else
+ } else {
+ f->lsm_isset = true;
f->lsm_str = str;
+ }
break;
case AUDIT_WATCH:
str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val);
@@ -767,7 +769,7 @@ static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b)
return 0;
}
-/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be
+/* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rules is opaque, so must be
* re-initialized. */
static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
struct audit_field *sf)
@@ -781,9 +783,9 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df,
return -ENOMEM;
df->lsm_str = lsm_str;
- /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */
+ /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rules */
ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str,
- (void **)&df->lsm_rule);
+ df->lsm_rules);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
@@ -835,7 +837,7 @@ struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old)
new->tree = old->tree;
memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount);
- /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because
+ /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rules fields, because
* the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */
for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) {
switch (new->fields[i].type) {
@@ -1354,11 +1356,11 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_isset) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &blob);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&blob, f->type,
- f->op, f->lsm_rule);
+ f->op, f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_EXE:
@@ -1385,7 +1387,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
return ret;
}
-static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
+static int update_lsm_rules(struct audit_krule *r)
{
struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule);
struct audit_entry *nentry;
@@ -1417,7 +1419,7 @@ static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r)
return err;
}
-/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules.
+/* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rules field of all applicable rules.
* It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
* LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
@@ -1432,7 +1434,7 @@ int audit_update_lsm_rules(void)
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) {
- int res = update_lsm_rule(r);
+ int res = update_lsm_rules(r);
if (!err)
err = res;
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 28fea2e73040..b9f81ef64c39 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -638,7 +638,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
match for now to avoid losing information that
may be wanted. An error message will also be
logged upon error */
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_isset) {
if (need_sid) {
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &blob);
need_sid = 0;
@@ -646,7 +646,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
result = security_audit_rule_match(&blob,
f->type,
f->op,
- f->lsm_rule);
+ f->lsm_rules);
}
break;
case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
@@ -656,21 +656,21 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
/* The above note for AUDIT_SUBJ_USER...AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR
also applies here */
- if (f->lsm_rule) {
+ if (f->lsm_isset) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
result = security_audit_rule_match(
&name->oblob,
f->type,
f->op,
- f->lsm_rule);
+ f->lsm_rules);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
if (security_audit_rule_match(
&n->oblob,
f->type,
f->op,
- f->lsm_rule)) {
+ f->lsm_rules)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -681,7 +681,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
break;
if (security_audit_rule_match(&ctx->ipc.oblob,
f->type, f->op,
- f->lsm_rule))
+ f->lsm_rules))
++result;
}
break;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 1c617ae74558..227993b8422d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
bool (*fowner_op)(kuid_t, kuid_t); /* uid_eq(), uid_gt(), uid_lt() */
int pcr;
struct {
- void *rule; /* LSM file metadata specific */
+ void *rules[LSMBLOB_ENTRIES];
void *args_p; /* audit value */
int type; /* audit type */
} lsm[MAX_LSM_RULES];
@@ -82,6 +82,16 @@ struct ima_rule_entry {
struct ima_template_desc *template;
};
+static inline bool ima_lsm_isset(void *rules[])
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; i++)
+ if (rules[i])
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
/*
* Without LSM specific knowledge, the default policy can only be
* written in terms of .action, .func, .mask, .fsmagic, .uid, and .fowner
@@ -252,9 +262,11 @@ __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup);
static void ima_lsm_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
{
int i;
+ int r;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- kfree(entry->lsm[i].rule);
+ for (r = 0; r < LSMBLOB_ENTRIES; r++)
+ kfree(entry->lsm[i].rules[r]);
kfree(entry->lsm[i].args_p);
}
kfree(entry);
@@ -277,7 +289,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
memset(nentry->lsm, 0, sizeof_field(struct ima_rule_entry, lsm));
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- if (!entry->lsm[i].rule)
+ if (!ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[i].rules))
continue;
nentry->lsm[i].type = entry->lsm[i].type;
@@ -289,7 +301,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry)
result = security_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
nentry->lsm[i].args_p,
- &nentry->lsm[i].rule);
+ nentry->lsm[i].rules);
if (result == -EINVAL)
pr_warn("ima: rule for LSM \'%d\' is undefined\n",
entry->lsm[i].type);
@@ -329,7 +341,7 @@ static void ima_lsm_update_rules(void)
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, e, &ima_policy_rules, list) {
needs_update = 0;
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- if (entry->lsm[i].rule) {
+ if (ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[i].rules)) {
needs_update = 1;
break;
}
@@ -415,7 +427,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
int rc = 0;
struct lsmblob blob;
- if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
+ if (!ima_lsm_isset(rule->lsm[i].rules))
continue;
switch (i) {
@@ -426,7 +438,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rule->lsm[i].rules);
break;
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
@@ -434,7 +446,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
rc = security_filter_rule_match(&blob,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
- rule->lsm[i].rule);
+ rule->lsm[i].rules);
default:
break;
}
@@ -811,7 +823,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
{
int result;
- if (entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule)
+ if (ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules))
return -EINVAL;
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p = match_strdup(args);
@@ -822,8 +834,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry,
result = security_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type,
Audit_equal,
entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p,
- &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule);
- if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) {
+ entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules);
+ if (!ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rules)) {
kfree(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -1470,7 +1482,7 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
}
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
- if (entry->lsm[i].rule) {
+ if (ima_lsm_isset(entry->lsm[i].rules)) {
switch (i) {
case LSM_OBJ_USER:
seq_printf(m, pt(Opt_obj_user),
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e94de64e114c..4be490512ed2 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -2831,7 +2831,24 @@ int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule)
{
- return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, 0, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ bool one_is_good = false;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int trc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_init, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ trc = hp->hook.audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr,
+ &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (trc == 0)
+ one_is_good = true;
+ else
+ rc = trc;
+ }
+ if (one_is_good)
+ return 0;
+ return rc;
}
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
@@ -2839,13 +2856,19 @@ int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return call_int_hook(audit_rule_known, 0, krule);
}
-void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
+void security_audit_rule_free(void **lsmrule)
{
- call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.audit_rule_free, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ hp->hook.audit_rule_free(lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ }
}
int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+ void **lsmrule)
{
struct security_hook_list *hp;
int rc;
@@ -2854,7 +2877,8 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsmblob *blob, u32 field, u32 op,
if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
continue;
rc = hp->hook.audit_rule_match(blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot],
- field, op, lsmrule);
+ field, op,
+ &lsmrule[hp->lsmid->slot]);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
}
--
2.20.1
4 years, 11 months
[PATCH] audit: fix external header definitions for gcc10
by Tony Jones
Header definitions need to be external when building with -fno-common (which is default in GCC 10).
(.text+0x0): multiple definition of `event_node_list'; ausearch.o (symbol from plugin):(.text+0x0): first defined here
[ 60s] /usr/lib64/gcc/x86_64-suse-linux/9/../../../../x86_64-suse-linux/bin/ld: ausearch-time.o (symbol from plugin): in function `lookup_time':
Fixes: ff25054df7ed
---
src/ausearch-common.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/ausearch-common.h b/src/ausearch-common.h
index 6669203..3040547 100644
--- a/src/ausearch-common.h
+++ b/src/ausearch-common.h
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ extern pid_t event_pid;
extern int event_exact_match;
extern uid_t event_uid, event_euid, event_loginuid;
extern const char *event_tuid, *event_teuid, *event_tauid;
-slist *event_node_list;
+extern slist *event_node_list;
extern const char *event_comm;
extern const char *event_filename;
extern const char *event_hostname;
--
2.21.0
4 years, 11 months
[PATCH 1/1] audit: CONFIG_CHANGE don't log internal bookkeeping as an event
by Steve Grubb
Common Criteria calls out for any action that modifies the audit trail to
be recorded. That usually is interpreted to mean insertion or removal of
rules. It is not required to log modification of the inode information
since the watch is still in effect. Additionally, if the rule is a never
rule and the underlying file is one they do not want events for, they
get an event for this bookkeeping update against their wishes.
Since no device/inode info is logged at insertion and no device/inode
information is logged on update, there is nothing meaningful being
communicated to the admin by the CONFIG_CHANGE updated_rules event. One
can assume that the rule was not "modified" because it is still watching
the intended target. If the device or inode cannot be resolved, then
audit_panic is called which is sufficient.
The correct resolution is to drop logging config_update events since
the watch is still in effect but just on another unknown inode.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
---
kernel/audit_watch.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit_watch.c b/kernel/audit_watch.c
index 4508d5e0cf69..8a8fd732ff6d 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_watch.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c
@@ -302,8 +302,6 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct audit_parent
*parent,
if (oentry->rule.exe)
audit_remove_mark(oentry->rule.exe);
- audit_watch_log_rule_change(r, owatch, "updated_rules");
-
call_rcu(&oentry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
}
--
2.24.1
4 years, 11 months
[PATCH 1/1] audit: CONFIG_CHANGE don't log internal bookkeeping as an event
by Steve Grubb
Common Criteria calls out for any action that modifies the audit trail to
be recorded. That usually is interpreted to mean insertion or removal of
rules. It is not required to log modification of the inode information
since the watch is still in effect. Additionally, if the rule is a never
rule and the underlying file is one they do not want events for, they
get an event for this bookkeeping update against their wishes.
Since no device/inode info is logged at insertion and no device/inode
information is logged on update, there is nothing meaningful being
communicated to the admin by the CONFIG_CHANGE updated_rules event. One
can assume that the rule was not "modified" because it is still watching
the intended target. If the device or inode cannot be resolved, then
audit_panic is called which is sufficient.
I think the correct resolution is to drop logging config_update events
since the watch is still in effect but just on another unknown inode.
Signed-off-by: Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
---
kernel/audit_watch.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit_watch.c b/kernel/audit_watch.c
index 4508d5e0cf69..8a8fd732ff6d 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_watch.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_watch.c
@@ -302,8 +302,6 @@ static void audit_update_watch(struct audit_parent *parent,
if (oentry->rule.exe)
audit_remove_mark(oentry->rule.exe);
- audit_watch_log_rule_change(r, owatch, "updated_rules");
-
call_rcu(&oentry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu);
}
--
2.24.1
4 years, 11 months
USER_MGMT event
by MAUPERTUIS, PHILIPPE
Hi,
On a RHEL8 server, when playing around with usermod and chsh, I noticed that
usermod -c 'root@xxx' root generates a user_mgmt event
But
chsh -s /usr/bin/tlog-rec-session root didn't.
Is that the expected behavior ?
I was expecting an event for both.
Should I open a ticket at redhat for this ?
Regards
Philippe
equensWorldline is a registered trade mark and trading name owned by the Worldline Group through its holding company.
This e-mail and the documents attached are confidential and intended solely for the addressee. If you receive this e-mail in error, you are not authorized to copy, disclose, use or retain it. Please notify the sender immediately and delete this email from your systems. As emails may be intercepted, amended or lost, they are not secure. EquensWorldline and the Worldline Group therefore can accept no liability for any errors or their content. Although equensWorldline and the Worldline Group endeavours to maintain a virus-free network, we do not warrant that this transmission is virus-free and can accept no liability for any damages resulting from any virus transmitted. The risks are deemed to be accepted by everyone who communicates with equensWorldline and the Worldline Group by email
4 years, 11 months
Config_change events
by MAUPERTUIS, PHILIPPE
Hi,
When I issue a service auditd restart, I get the following events :
[root@xxxxxxxx ~]# ausearch -k 10.5.5-modification-audit -ts recent --format raw
node=xxxxxxxx type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1577725960.912:8745): auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 op=remove_rule key="10.5.5-modification-audit" list=4 res=1AUID="unset"
node=xxxxxxxx type=CONFIG_CHANGE msg=audit(1577725960.947:8777): auid=4294967295 ses=4294967295 op=add_rule key="10.5.5-modification-audit" list=4 res=1AUID="unset"
How can I link this event to the daemon_start daemon_end events ?
How can I trace the CONFIG_CHANGE events to a user action ?
Are the Daemon_start and daemon_end events specifically linked to auditd ?
Thanks for the clarification
Philippe
equensWorldline is a registered trade mark and trading name owned by the Worldline Group through its holding company.
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4 years, 11 months
