empty checkpoint file
by Richard Guy Briggs
Hi Burn,
It was suggested I specifically bring your attention to this request
since you had instigated the feature. Would it be possible to have an
empty checkpoint file created when the search failed so that there was a
mark in time to continue the search later?
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/32
"ausearch --checkpoint should create empty checkpoint file with
date/time stamp when no events found"
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Sr. S/W …
[View More]Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
[View Less]
7 years
[PATCH ghak21 V3 0/2] audit: address ANOM_LINK excess records
by Richard Guy Briggs
This V3 is a supplement to patches 1 and 2 of v1 already merged.
Audit link denied events were being unexpectedly produced in a disjoint
way when audit was disabled, and when they were expected, there were
duplicate PATH records. This patchset addresses both issues for
symlinks and hardlinks.
This was introduced with
commit b24a30a7305418ff138ff51776fc555ec57c011a
("audit: fix event coverage of AUDIT_ANOM_LINK")
commit a51d9eaa41866ab6b4b6ecad7b621f8b66ece0dc
("fs: add link restriction …
[View More]audit reporting")
Here are the resulting events:
symlink:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:21:49.578:310) : proctitle=ls ./my-passwd
type=PATH msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:21:49.578:310) : item=0 name=./my-passwd inode=17090 dev=00:27 mode=link,777 ouid=rgb ogid=rgb rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=CWD msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:21:49.578:310) : cwd=/tmp
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:21:49.578:310) : arch=x86_64 syscall=stat success=no exit=EACCES(Permission denied) a0=0x7ffd79950dda a1=0x563f658a03c8 a2=0x563f658a03c8 a3=0x79950d00 items=2 ppid=552 pid=629 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=ls exe=/usr/bin/ls subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=ANOM_LINK msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:21:49.578:310) : op=follow_link ppid=552 pid=629 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=ls exe=/usr/bin/ls subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 res=no
----
hardlink:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:24:39.813:314) : proctitle=ln test test-ln
type=PATH msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:24:39.813:314) : item=1 name=/tmp inode=13529 dev=00:27 mode=dir,sticky,777 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PATH msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:24:39.813:314) : item=0 name=test inode=18112 dev=00:27 mode=file,700 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=CWD msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:24:39.813:314) : cwd=/tmp
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:24:39.813:314) : arch=x86_64 syscall=linkat success=no exit=EPERM(Operation not permitted) a0=0xffffff9c a1=0x7ffccba77629 a2=0xffffff9c a3=0x7ffccba7762e items=2 ppid=605 pid=638 auid=rgb uid=rgb gid=rgb euid=rgb suid=rgb fsuid=rgb egid=rgb sgid=rgb fsgid=rgb tty=pts0 ses=4 comm=ln exe=/usr/bin/ln subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=ANOM_LINK msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:24:39.813:314) : op=linkat ppid=605 pid=638 auid=rgb uid=rgb gid=rgb euid=rgb suid=rgb fsuid=rgb egid=rgb sgid=rgb fsgid=rgb tty=pts0 ses=4 comm=ln exe=/usr/bin/ln subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 res=no
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/21
See also: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/51
Changelog:
v3:
- rebase on previously accepted 1/4 and 2/4 patches and drop them
- drop parent record audit_log_symlink_denied()
v2:
- remove now supperfluous struct path * parameter from audit_log_link_denied()
- refactor audit_log_symlink_denied() to properly free memory (pathname, filename)
Richard Guy Briggs (2):
audit: remove path param from link denied function
audit: add refused symlink to audit_names
fs/namei.c | 3 ++-
include/linux/audit.h | 6 ++----
kernel/audit.c | 3 +--
3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--
1.8.3.1
[View Less]
7 years
Re: [PATCH] audit: set TIF_AUDIT_SYSCALL only if audit filter has been populated
by Paul Moore
On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 6:41 PM, Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com> wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 7, 2018 at 11:48 AM, Jiri Kosina <jikos(a)kernel.org> wrote:
>> On Wed, 7 Mar 2018, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
>>> Wow, this was a long time ago.
>>
>> Oh yeah; but it now resurfaced on our side, as we are of course receiving
>> a lot of requests with respect to making syscall performance great again
>> :)
>
> Ooof. I'm not sure I can handle making …
[View More]more things "great again" ;)
>
>>> From memory and a bit of email diving, there are two reasons.
>>>
>>> 1. The probably was partially solved (by Oleg, IIRC) by making auditctl
>>> -a task,never cause newly spawned tasks to not suck. Yes, it's a
>>> very partial solution. After considerable nagging, I got Fedora to
>>> default to -a task,never.
>>
>> Hm, right; that's a bit inconvenient, because it takes each and every
>> vendor having to realize this option, and put it in. Making kernel do the
>> right thing automatically sounds like a better option to me.
>
> This predates audit falling into my lap, but speaking generally I
> think it would be good if the kernel did The Right Thing, so long as
> it isn't too painful.
>
>>> 2. This patch, as is, may be a bit problematic. In particular, if one
>>> task changes the audit rules while another task is in the middle of
>>> the syscall, then it's too late to audit that syscall correctly.
>>> This could be seen as a bug or it could be seen as being just fine.
>>
>> I don't think this should be a problem, given the fact that the whole
>> timing/ordering is not predictable anyway due to scheduling.
>>
>> Paul, what do you think?
>
> I'm not overly concerned about the race condition between configuring
> the audit filters and syscalls that are currently in-flight; after all
> we have that now and "fixing" it would be pretty much impractical
> (impossible maybe?). Most serious audit users configure it during
> boot and let it run, frequent runtime changes are not common as far as
> I can tell.
>
> I just looked quickly at the patch and decided it isn't something I'm
> going to be able to carefully review in the time I've got left today,
> so it's going to have to wait until tomorrow and Friday ... however,
> speaking on general principle I don't have an objection to the ideas
> put forth here.
>
> Andy, if you've got any Reviewed-by/Tested-by/NACK/etc. you want to
> add, that would be good to have.
... and I just realized that linux-audit isn't on the To/CC line,
adding them now.
Link to the patch is below.
* https://marc.info/?t=152041887600003&r=1&w=2
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
[View Less]
7 years
Matching close() system calls
by Kerem Aksu
Hello,
I am trying to trace files by using this rule :
"-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S read,write,open,close -k file_op"
I can trace open() system calls with the "type=path" log occurred with the
same ID as the open() system call. I can learn which file is opened by that
open() system call.
But when it comes to other system calls I am unable to learn which file is
read, wrote or closed.
I tried to match arguments passed to system calls (a[0..3]) but those are
different than the arguments …
[View More]defined in linux man pages. I might
misunderstand these arguments.
How can I match these or any other (file) system calls with the files that
they used onto.
And when does a "type=PATH" log occurs?
Thanks.
[View Less]
7 years
[PATCH ghak21 V2 0/4] audit: address ANOM_LINK excess records
by Richard Guy Briggs
Audit link denied events were being unexpectedly produced in a disjoint
way when audit was disabled, and when they were expected, there were
duplicate PATH records. This patchset addresses both issues for
symlinks and hardlinks.
This was introduced with
commit b24a30a7305418ff138ff51776fc555ec57c011a
("audit: fix event coverage of AUDIT_ANOM_LINK")
commit a51d9eaa41866ab6b4b6ecad7b621f8b66ece0dc
("fs: add link restriction audit reporting")
Here are the resulting events:
symlink:
type=…
[View More]PROCTITLE msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:21:49.578:310) : proctitle=ls ./my-passwd
type=PATH msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:21:49.578:310) : item=1 name=/tmp/ inode=13529 dev=00:27 mode=dir,sticky,777 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PATH msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:21:49.578:310) : item=0 name=./my-passwd inode=17090 dev=00:27 mode=link,777 ouid=rgb ogid=rgb rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=CWD msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:21:49.578:310) : cwd=/tmp
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:21:49.578:310) : arch=x86_64 syscall=stat success=no exit=EACCES(Permission denied) a0=0x7ffd79950dda a1=0x563f658a03c8 a2=0x563f658a03c8 a3=0x79950d00 items=2 ppid=552 pid=629 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=ls exe=/usr/bin/ls subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=ANOM_LINK msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:21:49.578:310) : op=follow_link ppid=552 pid=629 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=ls exe=/usr/bin/ls subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 res=no
----
hardlink:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:24:39.813:314) : proctitle=ln test test-ln
type=PATH msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:24:39.813:314) : item=1 name=/tmp inode=13529 dev=00:27 mode=dir,sticky,777 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PATH msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:24:39.813:314) : item=0 name=test inode=18112 dev=00:27 mode=file,700 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=CWD msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:24:39.813:314) : cwd=/tmp
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:24:39.813:314) : arch=x86_64 syscall=linkat success=no exit=EPERM(Operation not permitted) a0=0xffffff9c a1=0x7ffccba77629 a2=0xffffff9c a3=0x7ffccba7762e items=2 ppid=605 pid=638 auid=rgb uid=rgb gid=rgb euid=rgb suid=rgb fsuid=rgb egid=rgb sgid=rgb fsgid=rgb tty=pts0 ses=4 comm=ln exe=/usr/bin/ln subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=ANOM_LINK msg=audit(03/12/2018 02:24:39.813:314) : op=linkat ppid=605 pid=638 auid=rgb uid=rgb gid=rgb euid=rgb suid=rgb fsuid=rgb egid=rgb sgid=rgb fsgid=rgb tty=pts0 ses=4 comm=ln exe=/usr/bin/ln subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 res=no
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/21
See also: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/51
Richard Guy Briggs (4):
audit: make ANOM_LINK obey audit_enabled and audit_dummy_context
audit: link denied should not directly generate PATH record
audit: add refused symlink to audit_names
audit: add parent of refused symlink to audit_names
fs/namei.c | 5 +++--
include/linux/audit.h | 9 +++++----
kernel/audit.c | 43 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
--
1.8.3.1
[View Less]
7 years
audit events w/o audit rules?
by Todd Heberlein
I am using a Linux system (RHEL 6.9) with no audit rules set:
$ sudo auditctl -l
No rules
but some data is still populating the audit log file
/var/log/audit/audit.log
Are there processes (or kernel code) that generate their own audit events that bypass the configured audit rules?
Thanks,
Todd
7 years, 1 month
[RFC PATCH ghak21 0/4] audit: address ANOM_LINK excess records
by Richard Guy Briggs
Audit link denied events were being unexpectedly produced in a disjoint
way when audit was disabled, and when they were expected, there were
duplicate PATH records. This patchset addresses both issues for
symlinks and hardlinks.
This was introduced with
commit b24a30a7305418ff138ff51776fc555ec57c011a
("audit: fix event coverage of AUDIT_ANOM_LINK")
commit a51d9eaa41866ab6b4b6ecad7b621f8b66ece0dc
("fs: add link restriction audit reporting")
Here are the resulting events:
symlink:
type=…
[View More]PROCTITLE msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:21.635:238) : proctitle=cat my-passwd
type=PATH msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:21.635:238) : item=1 name=/tmp/my-passwd inode=17618 dev=00:27 mode=link,777 ouid=rgb ogid=rgb rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PATH msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:21.635:238) : item=0 name=/tmp inode=13446 dev=00:27 mode=dir,sticky,777 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=CWD msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:21.635:238) : cwd=/tmp
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:21.635:238) : arch=x86_64 syscall=openat success=no exit=EACCES(Permission denied) a0=0xffffff9c a1=0x7ffc6c1acdda
a2=O_RDONLY a3=0x0 items=2 ppid=549 pid=606 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=
cat exe=/usr/bin/cat subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=ANOM_LINK msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:21.635:238) : op=follow_link ppid=549 pid=606 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=roo
t sgid=root fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=cat exe=/usr/bin/cat subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 res=no
----
hardlink:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:25.373:239) : proctitle=ln test test-ln
type=PATH msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:25.373:239) : item=1 name=/tmp inode=13446 dev=00:27 mode=dir,sticky,777 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PATH msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:25.373:239) : item=0 name=test inode=17619 dev=00:27 mode=file,700 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=CWD msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:25.373:239) : cwd=/tmp
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:25.373:239) : arch=x86_64 syscall=linkat success=no exit=EPERM(Operation not permitted) a0=0xffffff9c a1=0x7fffe6c3f628 a2=0xffffff9c a3=0x7fffe6c3f62d items=2 ppid=578 pid=607 auid=rgb uid=rgb gid=rgb euid=rgb suid=rgb fsuid=rgb egid=rgb sgid=rgb fsgid=rgb tty=pts0 ses=3 comm=ln exe=/usr/bin/ln subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=ANOM_LINK msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:25.373:239) : op=linkat ppid=578 pid=607 auid=rgb uid=rgb gid=rgb euid=rgb suid=rgb fsuid=rgb egid=rgb sgid=rgb fsgid=rgb tty=pts0 ses=3 comm=ln exe=/usr/bin/ln subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 res=no
The remaining problem is how to address this when syscall logging is
disabled since it needs a parent path record and/or a CWD record to
complete it. It could also use a proctitle record too. In fact, it
looks like we need a way to have multiple auxiliary records to support
an arbitrary record. Comments please.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/21
See also: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/51
Richard Guy Briggs (4):
audit: make ANOM_LINK obey audit_enabled and audit_dummy_context
audit: link denied should not directly generate PATH record
audit: add refused symlink to audit_names
audit: add parent of refused symlink to audit_names
fs/namei.c | 10 ++++++++++
kernel/audit.c | 13 ++-----------
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--
1.8.3.1
[View Less]
7 years, 1 month
Audit roadmap and new development
by Steve Grubb
Hello,
I wanted to take a few minutes to chat about the future audit roadmap.
The release of audit-2.8.3 represents a breaking point. Its time for
changes. Some of these changes are going to modify configuration files.
And new things that may not be compatible with the old will be
introduced. So, I have created a 2.8_maintenance branch on github. This
will be a lightly maintained branch that preserves the old way. I don't
know if there will ever be an audit-2.8.4 release. But if there is, it
…
[View More]will be from this branch.
Looking towards the future, here's what to expect. The next release
will be called audit-3.0. This is to reflect a break with the old. The
first new thing under development is a TLS transport mechanism for
remote logging. Next, performance improvements will looked into to see
if we can get auparse running more efficiently. Also look for container
support to land in the near future. And another big change...audispd
will be going away. Its functionality will be done by auditd directly.
This will eliminate one place where events get dropped and also speed
up the time between event arrival and a plugin seeing it. This will be
important because there is a new IDS/IPS plugin that is under
development. (Some of you may have seen it in action at DevConf 2018.)
It will need events faster, more reliably, and a faster performing
auparse library.
I expect these to roll out over several releases. I would not expect
these features to land in any stable distro. I would expect these to
show up in the development and new versions of distros because of the
breakage. I look to have all of this work completed by sometime this
summer. Who knows...maybe sooner.
Thoughts?
-Steve
[View Less]
7 years, 1 month
audit 2.8.3 released
by Steve Grubb
Hello,
I've just released a new version of the audit daemon. It can be
downloaded from http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/audit. It will also be
in rawhide soon. The ChangeLog is:
- Correct msg function name in lru debug code
- Fix a segfault in auditd when dns resolution isn't available
- Make a reload legacy service for auditd
- In auparse python bindings, expose some new types that were missing
- In normalizer, pickup subject kind for user_login events
- Fix interpretation of unknown ioctcmds …
[View More](#1540507)
- Add ANOM_LOGIN_SERVICE, RESP_ORIGIN_BLOCK, & RESP_ORIGIN_BLOCK_TIMED
events
- In auparse_normalize for USER_LOGIN events, map acct for subj_kind
- Fix logging of IPv6 addresses in DAEMON_ACCEPT events (#1534748)
- Do not rotate auditd logs when num_logs < 2 (brozs)
This is a bugfix release. The changelog is pretty self explanatory.
SHA256: 744945caee27a472f0cc7ecb067f1f33d606e5aebcf9660e701a58f9d3668a1a
Please let me know if you run across any problems with this release.
-Steve
[View Less]
7 years, 1 month
