[PATCH] audit: always enable syscall auditing when supported and audit is enabled
by Paul Moore
To the best of our knowledge, everyone who enables audit at compile
time also enables syscall auditing; this patch simplifies the Kconfig
menus by removing the option to disable syscall auditing when audit
is selected and the target arch supports it.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore(a)redhat.com>
---
init/Kconfig | 11 +++--------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index c24b6f7..d4663b1 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -299,20 +299,15 @@ config AUDIT
help
Enable auditing infrastructure that can be used with another
kernel subsystem, such as SELinux (which requires this for
- logging of avc messages output). Does not do system-call
- auditing without CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL.
+ logging of avc messages output). System call auditing is included
+ on architectures which support it.
config HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
bool
config AUDITSYSCALL
- bool "Enable system-call auditing support"
+ def_bool y
depends on AUDIT && HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
- default y if SECURITY_SELINUX
- help
- Enable low-overhead system-call auditing infrastructure that
- can be used independently or with another kernel subsystem,
- such as SELinux.
config AUDIT_WATCH
def_bool y
5 years, 9 months
[RFC PATCH 0/3] simplify struct audit_krule reveals bug
by Richard Guy Briggs
In the process of trying to track down a potential bug altering the
registered arch for a syscall rule, a simplification of struct
audit_krule that removes a seemingly unnecessary member has revealed a
surprising NULL pointer dereference.
The struct audit_field *arch_f member should not be necessary since it
is the first field present if it is present at all, and is only
necessary for syscall rules, so iterating over the fields to find it is
simple and only happens when adding or deleting a rule. Shrinking the
struct audit_krule seemed to be a good idea, but appears to have openned
a can of worms. The first patch triggered this OOPS:
BUG: unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at 0000000000000009
IP: audit_match_signal+0x42/0x120
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
Modules linked in: sunrpc 8139too i2c_piix4 pcspkr virtio_balloon 8139cp i2c_core mii sch_fq_codel floppy serio_raw ata_generic pata_acpi
CPU: 1 PID: 325 Comm: auditctl Not tainted 4.15.0-bz1462178-arch-changed+ #636
Hardware name: Red Hat KVM, BIOS 0.5.1 01/01/2011
RIP: 0010:audit_match_signal+0x42/0x120
RSP: 0018:ffffc900003dfc08 EFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000003 RBX: ffff880036588000 RCX: 0000000000000003
RDX: ffff88003c7f02e0 RSI: ffff88003c7f02a0 RDI: ffff880036588000
RBP: ffff88003671de00 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffff880036a0b190 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff880036588178 R14: ffff880036588000 R15: ffffffff8247f880
FS: 00007fa53c6d9740(0000) GS:ffff88003e400000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000000000000009 CR3: 00000000347ba000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
Call Trace:
audit_rule_change+0xb32/0xce0
audit_receive_msg+0x163/0x1090
? netlink_deliver_tap+0x90/0x350
? kvm_sched_clock_read+0x5/0x10
? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
audit_receive+0x4d/0xa0
netlink_unicast+0x195/0x250
netlink_sendmsg+0x2fe/0x3f0
sock_sendmsg+0x32/0x60
SYSC_sendto+0xda/0x140
? syscall_trace_enter+0x2dc/0x400
? return_from_SYSCALL_64+0x10/0x75
do_syscall_64+0x83/0x360
entry_SYSCALL64_slow_path+0x25/0x25
RIP: 0033:0x7fa53bbb1607
RSP: 002b:00007fff33f48c78 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000002c
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000444 RCX: 00007fa53bbb1607
RDX: 0000000000000444 RSI: 00007fff33f48cb0 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 0000000000000431 R08: 00007fff33f48c9c R09: 000000000000000c
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000003
R13: 00007fff33f48cb0 R14: 00007fff33f48c9c R15: 00000000000003f3
Code: 01 00 00 83 3e 0b 0f 84 ef 00 00 00 31 c0 eb 0f 48 63 d0 48 c1 e2 05 48 01 f2 83 3a 0b 74 7d 83 c0 01 39 c8 75 ea 4d 85 c0 74 79 <41> 8b 78 08 e8 25 ff ed ff 85 c0 74 31 83 f8 01 75 58 48 8b 0d
RIP: audit_match_signal+0x42/0x120 RSP: ffffc900003dfc08
CR2: 0000000000000009
The second patch surprisingly fixes the OOPS.
Adding debug output, the OOPS is consistently happenning in the 7th STIG rule
that includes an arch parameter, but the value that causes the OOPS
dereferences, copies and prints out fine:
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S adjtimex,settimeofday,stime -F key=time-change
ams_: i=0 f=00000000e5612893 type=11 op=0 val=40000003 key="time-change"
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S adjtimex,settimeofday -F key=time-change
ams_: i=0 f=00000000cf222aca type=11 op=0 val=c000003e key="time-change"
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change
ams_: i=0 f=00000000ad39bfc6 type=11 op=0 val=40000003 key="time-change"
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S clock_settime -F a0=0x0 -F key=time-change
ams_: i=0 f=00000000c9f83209 type=11 op=0 val=c000003e key="time-change"
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S sethostname,setdomainname -F key=system-locale
ams_: i=0 f=000000005a19d216 type=11 op=0 val=40000003 key="system-locale"
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S sethostname,setdomainname -F key=system-locale
ams_: i=0 f=000000003280e47a type=11 op=0 val=c000003e key="system-locale"
OOPS
-a always,exit -F arch=b32 -S chmod,fchmod,fchmodat -F auid>=1000 -F auid!=4294967295 -F key=perm_mod
ams_: i=0 f=000000008368170a type=11 op=0 val=40000003 key="perm_mod"
I'd let sleeping dogs lie, but I haven't tracked down the source of the
original rule that changes arch between addition and listing (nor reproduced it
yet since I don't have access to that HW arch), and it seems to reveal
potentially another bug.
Help! Any observations or hints?
Richard Guy Briggs (3):
audit: remove arch_f pointer from struct audit_krule
fixup! audit: remove arch_f pointer from struct audit_krule
debug! audit: remove arch_f pointer from struct audit_krule
include/linux/audit.h | 1 -
kernel/auditfilter.c | 18 +++++++++++++-----
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
--
1.8.3.1
5 years, 11 months
Limiting SECCOMP audit events
by Steve Grubb
Hello,
Over the last month, the amount of seccomp events in audit logs is sky-rocketing. I
have over a million events in the last 2 days. Most of this is generated by firefox and
qt webkit.
I am wondering if the audit package should ship a file for
/usr/lib/sysctl.d/60-auditd.conf
wherein it has
kernel.seccomp.actions_logged = kill_process kill_thread errno
Also, has anyone verified this sysctl is filtering audit events? Even with the above, I
have over a million events on a 4.14.3 kernel. Firefox alone is generating over
50,000 events per hour.
Thanks,
-Steve
6 years, 6 months
[RFC PATCH ghak21 0/4] audit: address ANOM_LINK excess records
by Richard Guy Briggs
Audit link denied events were being unexpectedly produced in a disjoint
way when audit was disabled, and when they were expected, there were
duplicate PATH records. This patchset addresses both issues for
symlinks and hardlinks.
This was introduced with
commit b24a30a7305418ff138ff51776fc555ec57c011a
("audit: fix event coverage of AUDIT_ANOM_LINK")
commit a51d9eaa41866ab6b4b6ecad7b621f8b66ece0dc
("fs: add link restriction audit reporting")
Here are the resulting events:
symlink:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:21.635:238) : proctitle=cat my-passwd
type=PATH msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:21.635:238) : item=1 name=/tmp/my-passwd inode=17618 dev=00:27 mode=link,777 ouid=rgb ogid=rgb rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PATH msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:21.635:238) : item=0 name=/tmp inode=13446 dev=00:27 mode=dir,sticky,777 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=CWD msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:21.635:238) : cwd=/tmp
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:21.635:238) : arch=x86_64 syscall=openat success=no exit=EACCES(Permission denied) a0=0xffffff9c a1=0x7ffc6c1acdda
a2=O_RDONLY a3=0x0 items=2 ppid=549 pid=606 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=
cat exe=/usr/bin/cat subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=ANOM_LINK msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:21.635:238) : op=follow_link ppid=549 pid=606 auid=root uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=roo
t sgid=root fsgid=root tty=ttyS0 ses=1 comm=cat exe=/usr/bin/cat subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 res=no
----
hardlink:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:25.373:239) : proctitle=ln test test-ln
type=PATH msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:25.373:239) : item=1 name=/tmp inode=13446 dev=00:27 mode=dir,sticky,777 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tmp_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PATH msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:25.373:239) : item=0 name=test inode=17619 dev=00:27 mode=file,700 ouid=root ogid=root rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_tmp_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=CWD msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:25.373:239) : cwd=/tmp
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:25.373:239) : arch=x86_64 syscall=linkat success=no exit=EPERM(Operation not permitted) a0=0xffffff9c a1=0x7fffe6c3f628 a2=0xffffff9c a3=0x7fffe6c3f62d items=2 ppid=578 pid=607 auid=rgb uid=rgb gid=rgb euid=rgb suid=rgb fsuid=rgb egid=rgb sgid=rgb fsgid=rgb tty=pts0 ses=3 comm=ln exe=/usr/bin/ln subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=ANOM_LINK msg=audit(02/14/2018 04:40:25.373:239) : op=linkat ppid=578 pid=607 auid=rgb uid=rgb gid=rgb euid=rgb suid=rgb fsuid=rgb egid=rgb sgid=rgb fsgid=rgb tty=pts0 ses=3 comm=ln exe=/usr/bin/ln subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 res=no
The remaining problem is how to address this when syscall logging is
disabled since it needs a parent path record and/or a CWD record to
complete it. It could also use a proctitle record too. In fact, it
looks like we need a way to have multiple auxiliary records to support
an arbitrary record. Comments please.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/21
See also: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/51
Richard Guy Briggs (4):
audit: make ANOM_LINK obey audit_enabled and audit_dummy_context
audit: link denied should not directly generate PATH record
audit: add refused symlink to audit_names
audit: add parent of refused symlink to audit_names
fs/namei.c | 10 ++++++++++
kernel/audit.c | 13 ++-----------
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
--
1.8.3.1
6 years, 7 months
[PATCH] audit: do not panic kernel on invalid audit parameter
by Greg Edwards
If you pass in an invalid audit kernel boot parameter, e.g. 'audit=off',
the kernel panics very early in boot with no output on the console
indicating the problem.
This seems overly harsh. Instead, print the error indicating an invalid
audit parameter value and leave auditing disabled.
Fixes: 80ab4df62706 ("audit: don't use simple_strtol() anymore")
Signed-off-by: Greg Edwards <gedwards(a)ddn.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 227db99b0f19..d8af7682d6a3 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1572,8 +1572,10 @@ static int __init audit_enable(char *str)
{
long val;
- if (kstrtol(str, 0, &val))
- panic("audit: invalid 'audit' parameter value (%s)\n", str);
+ if (kstrtol(str, 0, &val)) {
+ pr_err("invalid 'audit' parameter value (%s)\n", str);
+ val = AUDIT_OFF;
+ }
audit_default = (val ? AUDIT_ON : AUDIT_OFF);
if (audit_default == AUDIT_OFF)
--
2.14.3
6 years, 7 months
[PATCH 0/2] audit boot parameter cleanups
by Greg Edwards
One of our CI tests was booting upstream kernels with the "audit=off" kernel
parameter. This was our error; it should have been "audit=0". However,
in 4.15 the verification of the boot parameter got more strict in 80ab4df62706
("audit: don't use simple_strtol() anymore"), and our errant boot parameter
value starting panic'ing the system.
The problem is this happens so early in boot, the console isn't initialized yet
and you don't see the panic message. You have no idea what the problem is
unless you add an "earlyprintk" boot option, e.g.
earlyprintk=serial,ttyS0,115200n8.
Fix this by having the boot parameter setup function just save the boot
parameter value, and process it later from a call in audit_init(). The console
is initialized by this point, and you can see any panic messages without having
to use an earlyprintk option.
Additionally, add "on" and "off" as valid audit boot parameter values.
Greg Edwards (2):
audit: move processing of "audit" boot param to audit_init()
audit: add "on"/"off" as valid boot parameter values
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 14 +++----
kernel/audit.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++---------
2 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
--
2.14.3
6 years, 8 months
[PATCH] libaudit: fix manpage listing incorrect function under NAME
by Richard Guy Briggs
Under the NAME section, the function listed is incorrect. Fix it.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
---
docs/audit_get_session.3 | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/docs/audit_get_session.3 b/docs/audit_get_session.3
index 9721412..d30da47 100644
--- a/docs/audit_get_session.3
+++ b/docs/audit_get_session.3
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
.TH "AUDIT_GET_SESSION" "3" "Dec 2016" "Red Hat" "Linux Audit API"
.SH NAME
-audit_getloginuid \- Get a program's login session id value
+audit_get_session \- Get a program's login session id value
.SH SYNOPSIS
.B #include <libaudit.h>
.sp
--
1.8.3.1
6 years, 8 months
[PATCH] audit: track the owner of the command mutex ourselves
by Paul Moore
From: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
Evidently the __mutex_owner() function was never intended for use
outside the core mutex code, so build a thing locking wrapper around
the mutex code which allows us to track the mutex owner.
One, arguably positive, side effect is that this allows us to hide
the audit_cmd_mutex inside of kernel/audit.c behind the lock/unlock
functions.
Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul(a)paul-moore.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 66 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
kernel/audit.h | 3 ++
kernel/audit_tree.c | 8 +++---
3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 5c2544984375..3c4f6f3d7041 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -181,9 +181,21 @@ static char *audit_feature_names[2] = {
"loginuid_immutable",
};
-
-/* Serialize requests from userspace. */
-DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_cmd_mutex);
+/**
+ * struct audit_ctl_mutex - serialize requests from userspace
+ * @lock: the mutex used for locking
+ * @owner: the task which owns the lock
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * This is the lock struct used to ensure we only process userspace requests
+ * in an orderly fashion. We can't simply use a mutex/lock here because we
+ * need to track lock ownership so we don't end up blocking the lock owner in
+ * audit_log_start() or similar.
+ */
+static struct audit_ctl_mutex {
+ struct mutex lock;
+ void *owner;
+} audit_cmd_mutex;
/* AUDIT_BUFSIZ is the size of the temporary buffer used for formatting
* audit records. Since printk uses a 1024 byte buffer, this buffer
@@ -227,6 +239,36 @@ int auditd_test_task(struct task_struct *task)
return rc;
}
+/**
+ * audit_ctl_lock - Take the audit control lock
+ */
+void audit_ctl_lock(void)
+{
+ mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex.lock);
+ audit_cmd_mutex.owner = current;
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_ctl_unlock - Drop the audit control lock
+ */
+void audit_ctl_unlock(void)
+{
+ audit_cmd_mutex.owner = NULL;
+ mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex.lock);
+}
+
+/**
+ * audit_ctl_owner_current - Test to see if the current task owns the lock
+ *
+ * Description:
+ * Return true if the current task owns the audit control lock, false if it
+ * doesn't own the lock.
+ */
+static bool audit_ctl_owner_current(void)
+{
+ return (current == audit_cmd_mutex.owner);
+}
+
/**
* auditd_pid_vnr - Return the auditd PID relative to the namespace
*
@@ -861,8 +903,8 @@ int audit_send_list(void *_dest)
struct sock *sk = audit_get_sk(dest->net);
/* wait for parent to finish and send an ACK */
- mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
- mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
+ audit_ctl_lock();
+ audit_ctl_unlock();
while ((skb = __skb_dequeue(&dest->q)) != NULL)
netlink_unicast(sk, skb, dest->portid, 0);
@@ -903,8 +945,8 @@ static int audit_send_reply_thread(void *arg)
struct audit_reply *reply = (struct audit_reply *)arg;
struct sock *sk = audit_get_sk(reply->net);
- mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
- mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
+ audit_ctl_lock();
+ audit_ctl_unlock();
/* Ignore failure. It'll only happen if the sender goes away,
because our timeout is set to infinite. */
@@ -1467,7 +1509,7 @@ static void audit_receive(struct sk_buff *skb)
nlh = nlmsg_hdr(skb);
len = skb->len;
- mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
+ audit_ctl_lock();
while (nlmsg_ok(nlh, len)) {
err = audit_receive_msg(skb, nlh);
/* if err or if this message says it wants a response */
@@ -1476,7 +1518,7 @@ static void audit_receive(struct sk_buff *skb)
nlh = nlmsg_next(nlh, &len);
}
- mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
+ audit_ctl_unlock();
}
/* Run custom bind function on netlink socket group connect or bind requests. */
@@ -1548,6 +1590,9 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS; i++)
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&audit_inode_hash[i]);
+ mutex_init(&audit_cmd_mutex.lock);
+ audit_cmd_mutex.owner = NULL;
+
pr_info("initializing netlink subsys (%s)\n",
audit_default ? "enabled" : "disabled");
register_pernet_subsys(&audit_net_ops);
@@ -1711,8 +1756,7 @@ struct audit_buffer *audit_log_start(struct audit_context *ctx, gfp_t gfp_mask,
* using a PID anchored in the caller's namespace
* 2. generator holding the audit_cmd_mutex - we don't want to block
* while holding the mutex */
- if (!(auditd_test_task(current) ||
- (current == __mutex_owner(&audit_cmd_mutex)))) {
+ if (!(auditd_test_task(current) || audit_ctl_owner_current())) {
long stime = audit_backlog_wait_time;
while (audit_backlog_limit &&
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index af5bc59487ed..214e14948370 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -341,4 +341,5 @@ extern struct list_head *audit_killed_trees(void);
#define audit_filter_inodes(t,c) AUDIT_DISABLED
#endif
-extern struct mutex audit_cmd_mutex;
+extern void audit_ctl_lock(void);
+extern void audit_ctl_unlock(void);
diff --git a/kernel/audit_tree.c b/kernel/audit_tree.c
index fd353120e0d9..67e6956c0b61 100644
--- a/kernel/audit_tree.c
+++ b/kernel/audit_tree.c
@@ -709,7 +709,7 @@ static int prune_tree_thread(void *unused)
schedule();
}
- mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
+ audit_ctl_lock();
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
while (!list_empty(&prune_list)) {
@@ -727,7 +727,7 @@ static int prune_tree_thread(void *unused)
}
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
- mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
+ audit_ctl_unlock();
}
return 0;
}
@@ -924,7 +924,7 @@ static void audit_schedule_prune(void)
*/
void audit_kill_trees(struct list_head *list)
{
- mutex_lock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
+ audit_ctl_lock();
mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex);
while (!list_empty(list)) {
@@ -942,7 +942,7 @@ void audit_kill_trees(struct list_head *list)
}
mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex);
- mutex_unlock(&audit_cmd_mutex);
+ audit_ctl_unlock();
}
/*
6 years, 8 months
[PATCH] audit: return on memory error to avoid null pointer dereference
by Richard Guy Briggs
If there is a memory allocation error when trying to change an audit
kernel feature value, the ignored allocation error will trigger a NULL
pointer dereference oops on subsequent use of that pointer. Return
instead.
Passes audit-testsuite.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/76
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 5c25449..2de74be 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -1059,6 +1059,8 @@ static void audit_log_feature_change(int which, u32 old_feature, u32 new_feature
return;
ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE);
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
audit_log_task_info(ab, current);
audit_log_format(ab, " feature=%s old=%u new=%u old_lock=%u new_lock=%u res=%d",
audit_feature_names[which], !!old_feature, !!new_feature,
--
1.8.3.1
6 years, 8 months
Re: [PATCH 4.10 070/111] audit: fix auditd/kernel connection state tracking
by Paul Moore
On Tue, Feb 20, 2018 at 7:37 AM, Peter Zijlstra <peterz(a)infradead.org> wrote:
> On Tue, Mar 28, 2017 at 02:30:56PM +0200, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
>> 4.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
>
>> + if (!(auditd_test_task(current) ||
>> + (current == __mutex_owner(&audit_cmd_mutex)))) {
>> + long stime = audit_backlog_wait_time;
>
> Since I cannot find the original email on lkml, NAK on this.
> __mutex_owner() is not a general purpose helper function.
Since this code also exists in the current kernel, I need to ask what
recommended alternatives exist for determining the mutex owner?
I imagine we could track the mutex owner separately in the audit
subsystem, but I'd much prefer to leverage an existing mechanism if
possible.
--
paul moore
www.paul-moore.com
6 years, 8 months
