[PATCH] audit: always enable syscall auditing when supported and audit is enabled
by Paul Moore
To the best of our knowledge, everyone who enables audit at compile
time also enables syscall auditing; this patch simplifies the Kconfig
menus by removing the option to disable syscall auditing when audit
is selected and the target arch supports it.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore(a)redhat.com>
---
init/Kconfig | 11 +++--------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index c24b6f7..d4663b1 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -299,20 +299,15 @@ config AUDIT
help
Enable auditing infrastructure that can be used with another
kernel subsystem, such as SELinux (which requires this for
- logging of avc messages output). Does not do system-call
- auditing without CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL.
+ logging of avc messages output). System call auditing is included
+ on architectures which support it.
config HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
bool
config AUDITSYSCALL
- bool "Enable system-call auditing support"
+ def_bool y
depends on AUDIT && HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
- default y if SECURITY_SELINUX
- help
- Enable low-overhead system-call auditing infrastructure that
- can be used independently or with another kernel subsystem,
- such as SELinux.
config AUDIT_WATCH
def_bool y
5 years, 9 months
[PATCH ALT4 V3 1/2] audit: show fstype:pathname for entries with anonymous parents
by Richard Guy Briggs
Tracefs or debugfs were causing hundreds to thousands of null PATH
records to be associated with the init_module and finit_module SYSCALL
records on a few modules when the following rule was in place for
startup:
-a always,exit -F arch=x86_64 -S init_module -F key=mod-load
This happens because the parent inode is not found in the task's
audit_names list and hence treats it as anonymous. This gives us no
information other than a numerical device number that may no longer be
visible upon log inspeciton, and an inode number.
Fill in the filesystem type, filesystem magic number and full pathname
from the filesystem mount point on previously null PATH records from
entries that have an anonymous parent from the child dentry using
dentry_path_raw().
Make the dentry argument of __audit_inode_child() non-const so that we
can take a reference to it in the case of an anonymous parent with
dget() and dget_parent() to be able to later print a partial path from
the host filesystem rather than null.
Since all we are given is an inode of the parent and the dentry of the
child, finding the path from the mount point to the root of the
filesystem is more challenging that would involve searching all
vfsmounts from "/" until a matching dentry is found for that
filesystem's root dentry. Even if one is found, there may be more than
one mount point. At this point the gain seems marginal since
knowing the filesystem type and path are a significant help in tracking
down the source of the PATH records and being to address them.
Sample output:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1488317694.446:143): proctitle=2F7362696E2F6D6F6470726F6265002D71002D2D006E66737634
type=PATH msg=audit(1488317694.446:143): item=797 name=tracefs(74726163):/events/nfs4/nfs4_setclientid/format inode=15969 dev=00:09 mode=0100444 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t:s0 nametype=CREATE
type=PATH msg=audit(1488317694.446:143): item=796 name=tracefs(74726163):/events/nfs4/nfs4_setclientid inode=15964 dev=00:09 mode=040755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t:s0 nametype=PARENT
...
type=PATH msg=audit(1488317694.446:143): item=1 name=tracefs(74726163):/events/nfs4 inode=15571 dev=00:09 mode=040755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t:s0 nametype=CREATE
type=PATH msg=audit(1488317694.446:143): item=0 name=tracefs(74726163):/events inode=119 dev=00:09 mode=040755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 obj=system_u:object_r:tracefs_t:s0 nametype=PARENT
type=UNKNOWN[1330] msg=audit(1488317694.446:143): name="nfsv4"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1488317694.446:143): arch=c000003e syscall=313 success=yes exit=0 a0=1 a1=55d5a35ce106 a2=0 a3=1 items=798 ppid=6 pid=528 auid=4294967295 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) ses=4294967295 comm="modprobe" exe="/usr/bin/kmod" subj=system_u:system_r:insmod_t:s0 key="mod-load"
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/8
Test case: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/42
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
---
v3:
fix audit_buffer leak and dname error allocation leak audit_log_name
only put audit_name->dentry if it is being replaced
v2:
minor cosmetic changes and support fs filter patch
---
include/linux/audit.h | 8 ++++----
kernel/audit.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
kernel/audit.h | 1 +
kernel/auditsc.c | 8 +++++++-
4 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 2150bdc..1ef4ec8 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ extern void __audit_inode(struct filename *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
unsigned int flags);
extern void __audit_file(const struct file *);
extern void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
- const struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
const unsigned char type);
extern void __audit_seccomp(unsigned long syscall, long signr, int code);
extern void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t);
@@ -305,7 +305,7 @@ static inline void audit_inode_parent_hidden(struct filename *name,
AUDIT_INODE_PARENT | AUDIT_INODE_HIDDEN);
}
static inline void audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
- const struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
const unsigned char type) {
if (unlikely(!audit_dummy_context()))
__audit_inode_child(parent, dentry, type);
@@ -486,7 +486,7 @@ static inline void __audit_inode(struct filename *name,
unsigned int flags)
{ }
static inline void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
- const struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
const unsigned char type)
{ }
static inline void audit_inode(struct filename *name,
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ static inline void audit_inode_parent_hidden(struct filename *name,
const struct dentry *dentry)
{ }
static inline void audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
- const struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
const unsigned char type)
{ }
static inline void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 59e60e0..d6e6e4e 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
#include <linux/freezer.h>
#include <linux/pid_namespace.h>
#include <net/netns/generic.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include "audit.h"
@@ -2047,6 +2048,10 @@ void audit_copy_inode(struct audit_names *name, const struct dentry *dentry,
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
+ if (name->dentry) {
+ dput(name->dentry);
+ name->dentry = NULL;
+ }
audit_copy_fcaps(name, dentry);
}
@@ -2088,6 +2093,20 @@ void audit_log_name(struct audit_context *context, struct audit_names *n,
audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, n->name->name,
n->name_len);
}
+ } else if (n->dentry) {
+ char *fullpath;
+ const char *fullpathp = NULL;
+
+ fullpath = kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (fullpath)
+ fullpathp = dentry_path_raw(n->dentry, fullpath, PATH_MAX);
+ if (IS_ERR(fullpathp)) {
+ fullpathp = NULL;
+ kfree(fullpath);
+ }
+ audit_log_format(ab, " name=%s(0x%lx):%s",
+ n->dentry->d_sb->s_type->name ?: "?",
+ n->dentry->d_sb->s_magic, fullpathp ?: "?");
} else
audit_log_format(ab, " name=(null)");
diff --git a/kernel/audit.h b/kernel/audit.h
index b331d9b..c01defb 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.h
+++ b/kernel/audit.h
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ struct audit_names {
unsigned long ino;
dev_t dev;
+ struct dentry *dentry;
umode_t mode;
kuid_t uid;
kgid_t gid;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 4a42db5..11848df 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@
#include <linux/string.h>
#include <linux/uaccess.h>
#include <uapi/linux/limits.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
#include "audit.h"
@@ -881,6 +882,8 @@ static inline void audit_free_names(struct audit_context *context)
list_del(&n->list);
if (n->name)
putname(n->name);
+ if (n->dentry)
+ dput(n->dentry);
if (n->should_free)
kfree(n);
}
@@ -1861,7 +1864,7 @@ void __audit_file(const struct file *file)
* unsuccessful attempts.
*/
void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
- const struct dentry *dentry,
+ struct dentry *dentry,
const unsigned char type)
{
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
@@ -1917,6 +1920,7 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
if (!n)
return;
audit_copy_inode(n, NULL, parent);
+ n->dentry = dget_parent(dentry);
}
if (!found_child) {
@@ -1938,6 +1942,8 @@ void __audit_inode_child(struct inode *parent,
audit_copy_inode(found_child, dentry, inode);
else
found_child->ino = AUDIT_INO_UNSET;
+ if (!found_parent)
+ found_child->dentry = dget(dentry);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__audit_inode_child);
--
1.7.1
6 years, 11 months
[PATCH V3] filter: add filesystem filter with fstype
by Richard Guy Briggs
Tracefs or debugfs were causing hundreds to thousands of PATH records to
be associated with the init_module and finit_module SYSCALL records on a
few modules when the following rule was in place for startup:
-a always,exit -F arch=x86_64 -S init_module -F key=mod-load
Add the new "filesystem" filter list anchored in __audit_inode_child() to
filter out PATH records from uninteresting filesystem types, "fstype",
keying on their kernel hexadecimal 4-octet magic identifier.
An example rule would look like:
-a never,filesystem -F fstype=0x74726163 -F key=ignore_tracefs
-a never,filesystem -F fstype=0x64626720 -F key=ignore_debugfs
Note: "always,filesystem" will log the PATH record anyways and add latency.
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/8
See: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-userspace/issues/15
Test case: https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-testsuite/issues/42
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
---
v3:
Update feature bitmap macros to reflect filter name change.
v2:
Change filter name from "path" to "filesystem".
Rebase onto other patches accepted upstream.
docs/audit_add_rule_data.3 | 3 +++
lib/errormsg.h | 5 +++++
lib/fieldtab.h | 2 ++
lib/flagtab.h | 10 ++++++----
lib/libaudit.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--
lib/libaudit.h | 10 ++++++++++
lib/private.h | 1 +
src/auditctl-listing.c | 6 ++++--
src/auditctl.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
9 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs/audit_add_rule_data.3 b/docs/audit_add_rule_data.3
index a0802c0..1e7540c 100644
--- a/docs/audit_add_rule_data.3
+++ b/docs/audit_add_rule_data.3
@@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT - Apply rule at syscall exit. This is the main filter that is
.TP
\(bu
AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE - Apply rule at audit_log_start. This is the exclude filter which discards any records that match.
+.TP
+\(bu
+AUDIT_FILTER_FS - Apply rule when adding PATH auxiliary records to SYSCALL events. This is the filesystem filter. This is used to ignore PATH records that are not of interest.
.LP
.PP
diff --git a/lib/errormsg.h b/lib/errormsg.h
index 91d8252..ef54589 100644
--- a/lib/errormsg.h
+++ b/lib/errormsg.h
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
* Authors:
* Zhang Xiliang <zhangxiliang(a)cn.fujitsu.com>
* Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
+ * Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
*/
struct msg_tab {
@@ -66,6 +67,8 @@ struct msg_tab {
#define EAU_FIELDNOFILTER 31
#define EAU_FILTERMISSING 32
#define EAU_COMPINCOMPAT 33
+#define EAU_FIELDUNAVAIL 34
+#define EAU_FILTERNOSUPPORT 35
static const struct msg_tab err_msgtab[] = {
{ -EAU_OPMISSING, 2, "-F missing operation for" },
{ -EAU_FIELDUNKNOWN, 2, "-F unknown field:" },
@@ -100,5 +103,7 @@ static const struct msg_tab err_msgtab[] = {
{ -EAU_FIELDNOFILTER, 1, "must be used with exclude, user, or exit filter" },
{ -EAU_FILTERMISSING, 0, "filter is missing from rule" },
{ -EAU_COMPINCOMPAT, 2, "-C incompatible comparison" },
+ { -EAU_FIELDUNAVAIL, 1, "field is not valid for the filter" },
+ { -EAU_FILTERNOSUPPORT, 1, "filter is not supported ty kernel" },
};
#endif
diff --git a/lib/fieldtab.h b/lib/fieldtab.h
index 0c5e39d..c425d5b 100644
--- a/lib/fieldtab.h
+++ b/lib/fieldtab.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
*
* Authors:
* Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
+ * Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
*/
_S(AUDIT_PID, "pid" )
@@ -56,6 +57,7 @@ _S(AUDIT_WATCH, "path" )
_S(AUDIT_PERM, "perm" )
_S(AUDIT_DIR, "dir" )
_S(AUDIT_FILETYPE, "filetype" )
+_S(AUDIT_FSTYPE, "fstype" )
_S(AUDIT_OBJ_UID, "obj_uid" )
_S(AUDIT_OBJ_GID, "obj_gid" )
_S(AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE, "field_compare" )
diff --git a/lib/flagtab.h b/lib/flagtab.h
index 4b04692..7a618e0 100644
--- a/lib/flagtab.h
+++ b/lib/flagtab.h
@@ -18,8 +18,10 @@
*
* Authors:
* Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
+ * Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
*/
-_S(AUDIT_FILTER_TASK, "task" )
-_S(AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT, "exit" )
-_S(AUDIT_FILTER_USER, "user" )
-_S(AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE, "exclude" )
+_S(AUDIT_FILTER_TASK, "task" )
+_S(AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT, "exit" )
+_S(AUDIT_FILTER_USER, "user" )
+_S(AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE, "exclude" )
+_S(AUDIT_FILTER_FS, "filesystem")
diff --git a/lib/libaudit.c b/lib/libaudit.c
index 18cd384..58134a2 100644
--- a/lib/libaudit.c
+++ b/lib/libaudit.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
* Authors:
* Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
* Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith(a)redhat.com>
+ * Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
*/
#include "config.h"
@@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ int _audit_permadded = 0;
int _audit_archadded = 0;
int _audit_syscalladded = 0;
int _audit_exeadded = 0;
+int _audit_filterfsadded = 0;
unsigned int _audit_elf = 0U;
static struct libaudit_conf config;
@@ -1466,6 +1468,23 @@ int audit_rule_fieldpair_data(struct audit_rule_data **rulep, const char *pair,
}
}
+ /* FS filter can be used only with FSTYPE field */
+ if (flags == AUDIT_FILTER_FS) {
+ uint32_t features = audit_get_features();
+ if ((features & AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_FILTER_FS) == 0) {
+ return -EAU_FILTERNOSUPPORT;
+ } else {
+ switch(field) {
+ case AUDIT_FSTYPE:
+ _audit_filterfsadded = 1;
+ case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
+ break;
+ default:
+ return -EAU_FIELDUNAVAIL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
rule->fields[rule->field_count] = field;
rule->fieldflags[rule->field_count] = op;
switch (field)
@@ -1580,7 +1599,8 @@ int audit_rule_fieldpair_data(struct audit_rule_data **rulep, const char *pair,
}
if (field == AUDIT_FILTERKEY &&
!(_audit_syscalladded || _audit_permadded ||
- _audit_exeadded))
+ _audit_exeadded ||
+ _audit_filterfsadded))
return -EAU_KEYDEP;
vlen = strlen(v);
if (field == AUDIT_FILTERKEY &&
@@ -1715,7 +1735,7 @@ int audit_rule_fieldpair_data(struct audit_rule_data **rulep, const char *pair,
return -EAU_EXITONLY;
/* fallthrough */
default:
- if (field == AUDIT_INODE) {
+ if (field == AUDIT_INODE || field == AUDIT_FSTYPE) {
if (!(op == AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL ||
op == AUDIT_EQUAL))
return -EAU_OPEQNOTEQ;
@@ -1727,6 +1747,8 @@ int audit_rule_fieldpair_data(struct audit_rule_data **rulep, const char *pair,
if (!isdigit((char)*(v)))
return -EAU_FIELDVALNUM;
+ if (field == AUDIT_FSTYPE && flags != AUDIT_FILTER_FS)
+ return -EAU_FIELDUNAVAIL;
if (field == AUDIT_INODE)
rule->values[rule->field_count] =
strtoul(v, NULL, 0);
diff --git a/lib/libaudit.h b/lib/libaudit.h
index e5c7a4d..70646cd 100644
--- a/lib/libaudit.h
+++ b/lib/libaudit.h
@@ -277,6 +277,9 @@ extern "C" {
#define AUDIT_KEY_SEPARATOR 0x01
/* These are used in filter control */
+#ifndef AUDIT_FILTER_FS
+#define AUDIT_FILTER_FS 0x06 /* FS record filter in __audit_inode_child */
+#endif
#define AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE
#define AUDIT_FILTER_MASK 0x07 /* Mask to get actual filter */
#define AUDIT_FILTER_UNSET 0x80 /* This value means filter is unset */
@@ -305,6 +308,9 @@ extern "C" {
#ifndef AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_LOST_RESET
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_LOST_RESET 0x00000020
#endif
+#ifndef AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_FILTER_FS
+#define AUDIT_FEATURE_BITMAP_FILTER_FS 0x00000040
+#endif
/* Defines for interfield comparison update */
#ifndef AUDIT_OBJ_UID
@@ -324,6 +330,10 @@ extern "C" {
#define AUDIT_SESSIONID 25
#endif
+#ifndef AUDIT_FSTYPE
+#define AUDIT_FSTYPE 26
+#endif
+
#ifndef AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID 1
#endif
diff --git a/lib/private.h b/lib/private.h
index cde1906..bd5e8b3 100644
--- a/lib/private.h
+++ b/lib/private.h
@@ -139,6 +139,7 @@ extern int _audit_permadded;
extern int _audit_archadded;
extern int _audit_syscalladded;
extern int _audit_exeadded;
+extern int _audit_filterfsadded;
extern unsigned int _audit_elf;
#ifdef __cplusplus
diff --git a/src/auditctl-listing.c b/src/auditctl-listing.c
index 3bc8e71..50bc0b8 100644
--- a/src/auditctl-listing.c
+++ b/src/auditctl-listing.c
@@ -91,7 +91,8 @@ static int is_watch(const struct audit_rule_data *r)
if (((r->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_MASK) != AUDIT_FILTER_USER) &&
((r->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_MASK) != AUDIT_FILTER_TASK) &&
- ((r->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_MASK) != AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE)) {
+ ((r->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_MASK) != AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE) &&
+ ((r->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_MASK) != AUDIT_FILTER_FS)) {
for (i = 0; i < (AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE-1); i++) {
if (r->mask[i] != (uint32_t)~0) {
all = 0;
@@ -139,7 +140,8 @@ static int print_syscall(const struct audit_rule_data *r, unsigned int *sc)
/* Rules on the following filters do not take a syscall */
if (((r->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_MASK) == AUDIT_FILTER_USER) ||
((r->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_MASK) == AUDIT_FILTER_TASK) ||
- ((r->flags &AUDIT_FILTER_MASK) == AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE))
+ ((r->flags &AUDIT_FILTER_MASK) == AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE) ||
+ ((r->flags &AUDIT_FILTER_MASK) == AUDIT_FILTER_FS))
return 0;
/* See if its all or specific syscalls */
diff --git a/src/auditctl.c b/src/auditctl.c
index 04765f4..b99c957 100644
--- a/src/auditctl.c
+++ b/src/auditctl.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
* Authors:
* Steve Grubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
* Rickard E. (Rik) Faith <faith(a)redhat.com>
+ * Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
*/
#include "config.h"
@@ -74,6 +75,7 @@ static int reset_vars(void)
_audit_permadded = 0;
_audit_archadded = 0;
_audit_exeadded = 0;
+ _audit_filterfsadded = 0;
_audit_elf = 0;
add = AUDIT_FILTER_UNSET;
del = AUDIT_FILTER_UNSET;
@@ -151,6 +153,8 @@ static int lookup_filter(const char *str, int *filter)
*filter = AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT;
else if (strcmp(str, "user") == 0)
*filter = AUDIT_FILTER_USER;
+ else if (strcmp(str, "filesystem") == 0)
+ *filter = AUDIT_FILTER_FS;
else if (strcmp(str, "exclude") == 0) {
*filter = AUDIT_FILTER_EXCLUDE;
exclude = 1;
@@ -760,6 +764,13 @@ static int setopt(int count, int lineno, char *vars[])
audit_msg(LOG_ERR,
"Error: syscall auditing being added to user list");
return -1;
+ } else if (((add & (AUDIT_FILTER_MASK|AUDIT_FILTER_UNSET)) ==
+ AUDIT_FILTER_FS || (del &
+ (AUDIT_FILTER_MASK|AUDIT_FILTER_UNSET)) ==
+ AUDIT_FILTER_FS)) {
+ audit_msg(LOG_ERR,
+ "Error: syscall auditing being added to filesystem list");
+ return -1;
} else if (exclude) {
audit_msg(LOG_ERR,
"Error: syscall auditing cannot be put on exclude list");
@@ -936,8 +947,9 @@ static int setopt(int count, int lineno, char *vars[])
break;
case 'k':
if (!(_audit_syscalladded || _audit_permadded ||
- _audit_exeadded) || (add==AUDIT_FILTER_UNSET &&
- del==AUDIT_FILTER_UNSET)) {
+ _audit_exeadded ||
+ _audit_filterfsadded) ||
+ (add==AUDIT_FILTER_UNSET && del==AUDIT_FILTER_UNSET)) {
audit_msg(LOG_ERR,
"key option needs a watch or syscall given prior to it");
retval = -1;
--
1.7.1
7 years
why I have lost messages on boot even with very big backlog while I hunting only 2 syscalls?
by Lev Olshvang
Hello list !
A very technical question
I have Ubuntu 16.10 Virtual Box , auditd 2.7.8
I have audit=1 parameter in grub.cfg
I see that /proc/cmdline indeed sees it
I see that auditd is started with PID 564
root 312 2 0 23:12 ? 00:00:00 [kauditd]
root 564 1 0 23:12 ? 00:00:00 /sbin/auditd
And I have 15 lost messages ???
auditctl -s
enabled 1
failure 1
pid 564
rate_limit 0
backlog_limit 16384
lost 15
backlog 0
backlog_wait_time 30
loginuid_immutable 0 unlocked
auditctl -l
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S execve,execveat -F key=exec
Do I understand correctly that auiditd is indeed started by systemd before other services, except 2 that is listed in auditd.service dependencuies - local-fs and some temp setup of systemd ?
Regards,
Lev
7 years, 1 month
[PATCH v6 1/1] audit: Record fanotify access control decisions
by Steve Grubb
Hello,
The fanotify interface allows user space daemons to make access
control decisions. Under common criteria requirements, we need to
optionally record decisions based on policy. This patch adds a bit mask,
FAN_AUDIT, that a user space daemon can 'or' into the response decision
which will tell the kernel that it made a decision and record it.
It would be used something like this in user space code:
response.response = FAN_DENY | FAN_AUDIT;
write(fd, &response, sizeof(struct fanotify_response));
When the syscall ends, the audit system will record the decision as a
AUDIT_FANOTIFY auxiliary record to denote that the reason this event
occurred is the result of an access control decision from fanotify
rather than DAC or MAC policy.
A sample event looks like this:
type=PATH msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): item=0 name="./evil-ls"
inode=1319561 dev=fc:03 mode=0100755 ouid=1000 ogid=1000 rdev=00:00
obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL
type=CWD msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): cwd="/home/sgrubb"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): arch=c000003e syscall=2
success=no exit=-1 a0=32cb3fca90 a1=0 a2=43 a3=8 items=1 ppid=901
pid=959 auid=1000 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=1000 suid=1000
fsuid=1000 egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts1 ses=3 comm="bash"
exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:
s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=FANOTIFY msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): resp=2
Prior to using the audit flag, the developer needs to call
fanotify_init or'ing in FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT to ensure that the kernel
supports auditing. The calling process must also have the CAP_AUDIT_WRITE
capability.
* This v6 update adds empty inline audit_fanotify function for when
CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL is not defined.
Signed-off-by: sgrubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il(a)gmail.com>
---
fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c | 8 +++++++-
fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
fs/notify/fdinfo.c | 3 +++
include/linux/audit.h | 10 ++++++++++
include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h | 3 +++
kernel/auditsc.c | 6 ++++++
8 files changed, 46 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c
index 2fa99ae..1968d21 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/sched/user.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/wait.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include "fanotify.h"
@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ static int fanotify_get_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
fsnotify_finish_user_wait(iter_info);
out:
/* userspace responded, convert to something usable */
- switch (event->response) {
+ switch (event->response & ~FAN_AUDIT) {
case FAN_ALLOW:
ret = 0;
break;
@@ -86,6 +87,11 @@ static int fanotify_get_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
default:
ret = -EPERM;
}
+
+ /* Check if the response should be audited */
+ if (event->response & FAN_AUDIT)
+ audit_fanotify(event->response & ~FAN_AUDIT);
+
event->response = 0;
pr_debug("%s: group=%p event=%p about to return ret=%d\n", __func__,
diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
index 907a481..ea3c458 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static int process_access_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
* userspace can send a valid response or we will clean it up after the
* timeout
*/
- switch (response) {
+ switch (response & ~FAN_AUDIT) {
case FAN_ALLOW:
case FAN_DENY:
break;
@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ static int process_access_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
if (fd < 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ if ((response & FAN_AUDIT) && !group->fanotify_data.audit_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
event = dequeue_event(group, fd);
if (!event)
return -ENOENT;
@@ -721,7 +724,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fanotify_init, unsigned int, flags, unsigned int, event_f_flags)
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+ if (flags & ~(FAN_ALL_INIT_FLAGS | FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT))
+#else
if (flags & ~FAN_ALL_INIT_FLAGS)
+#endif
return -EINVAL;
if (event_f_flags & ~FANOTIFY_INIT_ALL_EVENT_F_BITS)
@@ -805,6 +812,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fanotify_init, unsigned int, flags, unsigned int, event_f_flags)
group->fanotify_data.max_marks = FANOTIFY_DEFAULT_MAX_MARKS;
}
+ if (flags & FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT) {
+ fd = -EPERM;
+ if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
+ goto out_destroy_group;
+ group->fanotify_data.audit_enabled = true;
+ }
+
fd = anon_inode_getfd("[fanotify]", &fanotify_fops, group, f_flags);
if (fd < 0)
goto out_destroy_group;
diff --git a/fs/notify/fdinfo.c b/fs/notify/fdinfo.c
index dd63aa9..ed311e3 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fdinfo.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fdinfo.c
@@ -156,6 +156,9 @@ void fanotify_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *f)
if (group->fanotify_data.max_marks == UINT_MAX)
flags |= FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS;
+ if (group->fanotify_data.audit_enabled)
+ flags |= FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT;
+
seq_printf(m, "fanotify flags:%x event-flags:%x\n",
flags, group->fanotify_data.f_flags);
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 2150bdc..9095617 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ extern int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
extern void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
extern void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags);
extern void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name);
+extern void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response);
static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
@@ -456,6 +457,12 @@ static inline void audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
__audit_log_kern_module(name);
}
+static inline void audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
+{
+ if (!audit_dummy_context())
+ __audit_fanotify(response);
+}
+
extern int audit_n_rules;
extern int audit_signals;
#else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
@@ -572,6 +579,9 @@ static inline void audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
{
}
+static inline void audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
+{ }
+
static inline void audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *t)
{ }
#define audit_n_rules 0
diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h b/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h
index c6c6931..f4131f2 100644
--- a/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h
+++ b/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ struct fsnotify_group {
int f_flags;
unsigned int max_marks;
struct user_struct *user;
+ bool audit_enabled;
} fanotify_data;
#endif /* CONFIG_FANOTIFY */
};
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 0714a66..221f8b7 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE 1328 /* audit log listing feature changes */
#define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329 /* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */
#define AUDIT_KERN_MODULE 1330 /* Kernel Module events */
+#define AUDIT_FANOTIFY 1331 /* Fanotify access decision */
#define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
#define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h b/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h
index 030508d..5dda19a 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#define FAN_UNLIMITED_QUEUE 0x00000010
#define FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS 0x00000020
+#define FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT 0x00000040
#define FAN_ALL_INIT_FLAGS (FAN_CLOEXEC | FAN_NONBLOCK | \
FAN_ALL_CLASS_BITS | FAN_UNLIMITED_QUEUE |\
@@ -99,6 +100,8 @@ struct fanotify_response {
/* Legit userspace responses to a _PERM event */
#define FAN_ALLOW 0x01
#define FAN_DENY 0x02
+#define FAN_AUDIT 0x10 /* Bit mask to create audit record for result */
+
/* No fd set in event */
#define FAN_NOFD -1
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 3260ba2..e046de8 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2390,6 +2390,12 @@ void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
}
+void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
+{
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response);
+}
+
static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
kuid_t auid, uid;
--
2.9.5
7 years, 1 month
[PATCH V2 1/1] audit: Record fanotify access control decisions
by Steve Grubb
Hello,
The fanotify interface allows user space daemons to make access
control decisions. Under common criteria requirements, we need to
optionally record decisions based on policy. This patch adds a bit mask,
FAN_AUDIT, that a user space daemon can 'or' into the response decision
which will tell the kernel that it made a decision and record it.
It would be used something like this in user space code:
response.response = FAN_DENY | FAN_AUDIT;
write(fd, &response, sizeof(struct fanotify_response));
When the syscall ends, the audit system will record the decision as a
AUDIT_FANOTIFY auxiliary record to denote that the reason this event
occurred is the result of an access control decision from fanotify
rather than DAC or MAC policy.
A sample event looks like this:
type=PATH msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): item=0 name="./evil-ls"
inode=1319561 dev=fc:03 mode=0100755 ouid=1000 ogid=1000 rdev=00:00
obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL
type=CWD msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): cwd="/home/sgrubb"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): arch=c000003e syscall=2
success=no exit=-1 a0=32cb3fca90 a1=0 a2=43 a3=8 items=1 ppid=901
pid=959 auid=1000 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=1000 suid=1000
fsuid=1000 egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts1 ses=3 comm="bash"
exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:
s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=FANOTIFY msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): resp=2
Prior to using the audit flag, the developer needs to call
fanotify_init or'ing in FAN_AUDIT_ENABLE to ensure that the kernel
supports auditing. The calling process must also have the CAP_AUDIT_WRITE
capability.
Signed-off-by: sgrubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
---
fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c | 8 +++++++-
fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c | 17 ++++++++++++++++-
include/linux/audit.h | 7 +++++++
include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h | 3 +++
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h | 5 ++++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 6 ++++++
7 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c
index 2fa99ae..1968d21 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/sched/user.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/wait.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include "fanotify.h"
@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ static int fanotify_get_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
fsnotify_finish_user_wait(iter_info);
out:
/* userspace responded, convert to something usable */
- switch (event->response) {
+ switch (event->response & ~FAN_AUDIT) {
case FAN_ALLOW:
ret = 0;
break;
@@ -86,6 +87,11 @@ static int fanotify_get_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
default:
ret = -EPERM;
}
+
+ /* Check if the response should be audited */
+ if (event->response & FAN_AUDIT)
+ audit_fanotify(event->response & ~FAN_AUDIT);
+
event->response = 0;
pr_debug("%s: group=%p event=%p about to return ret=%d\n", __func__,
diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
index 907a481..37e2b60 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static int process_access_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
* userspace can send a valid response or we will clean it up after the
* timeout
*/
- switch (response) {
+ switch (response & ~FAN_AUDIT) {
case FAN_ALLOW:
case FAN_DENY:
break;
@@ -190,6 +190,11 @@ static int process_access_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
if (fd < 0)
return -EINVAL;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+ if ((response & FAN_AUDIT) && (group->audit_enabled == 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+#endif
+
event = dequeue_event(group, fd);
if (!event)
return -ENOENT;
@@ -805,6 +810,16 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fanotify_init, unsigned int, flags, unsigned int, event_f_flags)
group->fanotify_data.max_marks = FANOTIFY_DEFAULT_MAX_MARKS;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+ if (flags & FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT) {
+ fd = -EPERM;
+ if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
+ goto out_destroy_group;
+ group->audit_enabled = 1;
+ } else
+ group->audit_enabled = 0;
+#endif
+
fd = anon_inode_getfd("[fanotify]", &fanotify_fops, group, f_flags);
if (fd < 0)
goto out_destroy_group;
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 2150bdc..bf55732 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ extern int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
extern void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
extern void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags);
extern void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name);
+extern void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response);
static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
@@ -456,6 +457,12 @@ static inline void audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
__audit_log_kern_module(name);
}
+static inline void audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
+{
+ if (!audit_dummy_context())
+ __audit_fanotify(response);
+}
+
extern int audit_n_rules;
extern int audit_signals;
#else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h b/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h
index c6c6931..470d02b 100644
--- a/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h
+++ b/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h
@@ -193,6 +193,9 @@ struct fsnotify_group {
} fanotify_data;
#endif /* CONFIG_FANOTIFY */
};
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+ unsigned int audit_enabled;
+#endif
};
/* when calling fsnotify tell it if the data is a path or inode */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 0714a66..221f8b7 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE 1328 /* audit log listing feature changes */
#define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329 /* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */
#define AUDIT_KERN_MODULE 1330 /* Kernel Module events */
+#define AUDIT_FANOTIFY 1331 /* Fanotify access decision */
#define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
#define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h b/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h
index 030508d..46bb431 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h
@@ -35,10 +35,11 @@
#define FAN_UNLIMITED_QUEUE 0x00000010
#define FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS 0x00000020
+#define FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT 0x00000040
#define FAN_ALL_INIT_FLAGS (FAN_CLOEXEC | FAN_NONBLOCK | \
FAN_ALL_CLASS_BITS | FAN_UNLIMITED_QUEUE |\
- FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS)
+ FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS | FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT)
/* flags used for fanotify_modify_mark() */
#define FAN_MARK_ADD 0x00000001
@@ -99,6 +100,8 @@ struct fanotify_response {
/* Legit userspace responses to a _PERM event */
#define FAN_ALLOW 0x01
#define FAN_DENY 0x02
+#define FAN_AUDIT 0x10 /* Bit mask to create audit record for result */
+
/* No fd set in event */
#define FAN_NOFD -1
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 3260ba2..e046de8 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2390,6 +2390,12 @@ void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
}
+void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
+{
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response);
+}
+
static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
kuid_t auid, uid;
--
2.9.5
7 years, 1 month
[PATCH v5 1/1] audit: Record fanotify access control decisions
by Steve Grubb
Hello,
The fanotify interface allows user space daemons to make access
control decisions. Under common criteria requirements, we need to
optionally record decisions based on policy. This patch adds a bit mask,
FAN_AUDIT, that a user space daemon can 'or' into the response decision
which will tell the kernel that it made a decision and record it.
It would be used something like this in user space code:
response.response = FAN_DENY | FAN_AUDIT;
write(fd, &response, sizeof(struct fanotify_response));
When the syscall ends, the audit system will record the decision as a
AUDIT_FANOTIFY auxiliary record to denote that the reason this event
occurred is the result of an access control decision from fanotify
rather than DAC or MAC policy.
A sample event looks like this:
type=PATH msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): item=0 name="./evil-ls"
inode=1319561 dev=fc:03 mode=0100755 ouid=1000 ogid=1000 rdev=00:00
obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL
type=CWD msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): cwd="/home/sgrubb"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): arch=c000003e syscall=2
success=no exit=-1 a0=32cb3fca90 a1=0 a2=43 a3=8 items=1 ppid=901
pid=959 auid=1000 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=1000 suid=1000
fsuid=1000 egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts1 ses=3 comm="bash"
exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:
s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=FANOTIFY msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): resp=2
Prior to using the audit flag, the developer needs to call
fanotify_init or'ing in FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT to ensure that the kernel
supports auditing. The calling process must also have the CAP_AUDIT_WRITE
capability.
Signed-off-by: sgrubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
---
fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c | 8 +++++++-
fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
fs/notify/fdinfo.c | 3 +++
include/linux/audit.h | 7 +++++++
include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h | 3 +++
kernel/auditsc.c | 6 ++++++
8 files changed, 43 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c
index 2fa99ae..1968d21 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/sched/user.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/wait.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include "fanotify.h"
@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ static int fanotify_get_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
fsnotify_finish_user_wait(iter_info);
out:
/* userspace responded, convert to something usable */
- switch (event->response) {
+ switch (event->response & ~FAN_AUDIT) {
case FAN_ALLOW:
ret = 0;
break;
@@ -86,6 +87,11 @@ static int fanotify_get_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
default:
ret = -EPERM;
}
+
+ /* Check if the response should be audited */
+ if (event->response & FAN_AUDIT)
+ audit_fanotify(event->response & ~FAN_AUDIT);
+
event->response = 0;
pr_debug("%s: group=%p event=%p about to return ret=%d\n", __func__,
diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
index 907a481..ea3c458 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static int process_access_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
* userspace can send a valid response or we will clean it up after the
* timeout
*/
- switch (response) {
+ switch (response & ~FAN_AUDIT) {
case FAN_ALLOW:
case FAN_DENY:
break;
@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ static int process_access_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
if (fd < 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ if ((response & FAN_AUDIT) && !group->fanotify_data.audit_enabled)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
event = dequeue_event(group, fd);
if (!event)
return -ENOENT;
@@ -721,7 +724,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fanotify_init, unsigned int, flags, unsigned int, event_f_flags)
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+ if (flags & ~(FAN_ALL_INIT_FLAGS | FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT))
+#else
if (flags & ~FAN_ALL_INIT_FLAGS)
+#endif
return -EINVAL;
if (event_f_flags & ~FANOTIFY_INIT_ALL_EVENT_F_BITS)
@@ -805,6 +812,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fanotify_init, unsigned int, flags, unsigned int, event_f_flags)
group->fanotify_data.max_marks = FANOTIFY_DEFAULT_MAX_MARKS;
}
+ if (flags & FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT) {
+ fd = -EPERM;
+ if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
+ goto out_destroy_group;
+ group->fanotify_data.audit_enabled = true;
+ }
+
fd = anon_inode_getfd("[fanotify]", &fanotify_fops, group, f_flags);
if (fd < 0)
goto out_destroy_group;
diff --git a/fs/notify/fdinfo.c b/fs/notify/fdinfo.c
index dd63aa9..ed311e3 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fdinfo.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fdinfo.c
@@ -156,6 +156,9 @@ void fanotify_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *f)
if (group->fanotify_data.max_marks == UINT_MAX)
flags |= FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS;
+ if (group->fanotify_data.audit_enabled)
+ flags |= FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT;
+
seq_printf(m, "fanotify flags:%x event-flags:%x\n",
flags, group->fanotify_data.f_flags);
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 2150bdc..bf55732 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ extern int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
extern void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
extern void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags);
extern void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name);
+extern void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response);
static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
@@ -456,6 +457,12 @@ static inline void audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
__audit_log_kern_module(name);
}
+static inline void audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
+{
+ if (!audit_dummy_context())
+ __audit_fanotify(response);
+}
+
extern int audit_n_rules;
extern int audit_signals;
#else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h b/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h
index c6c6931..f4131f2 100644
--- a/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h
+++ b/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ struct fsnotify_group {
int f_flags;
unsigned int max_marks;
struct user_struct *user;
+ bool audit_enabled;
} fanotify_data;
#endif /* CONFIG_FANOTIFY */
};
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 0714a66..221f8b7 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE 1328 /* audit log listing feature changes */
#define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329 /* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */
#define AUDIT_KERN_MODULE 1330 /* Kernel Module events */
+#define AUDIT_FANOTIFY 1331 /* Fanotify access decision */
#define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
#define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h b/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h
index 030508d..5dda19a 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#define FAN_UNLIMITED_QUEUE 0x00000010
#define FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS 0x00000020
+#define FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT 0x00000040
#define FAN_ALL_INIT_FLAGS (FAN_CLOEXEC | FAN_NONBLOCK | \
FAN_ALL_CLASS_BITS | FAN_UNLIMITED_QUEUE |\
@@ -99,6 +100,8 @@ struct fanotify_response {
/* Legit userspace responses to a _PERM event */
#define FAN_ALLOW 0x01
#define FAN_DENY 0x02
+#define FAN_AUDIT 0x10 /* Bit mask to create audit record for result */
+
/* No fd set in event */
#define FAN_NOFD -1
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 3260ba2..e046de8 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2390,6 +2390,12 @@ void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
}
+void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
+{
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response);
+}
+
static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
kuid_t auid, uid;
--
2.9.5
7 years, 1 month
[PATCH v4 1/1] audit: Record fanotify access control decisions
by Steve Grubb
Hello,
The fanotify interface allows user space daemons to make access
control decisions. Under common criteria requirements, we need to
optionally record decisions based on policy. This patch adds a bit mask,
FAN_AUDIT, that a user space daemon can 'or' into the response decision
which will tell the kernel that it made a decision and record it.
It would be used something like this in user space code:
response.response = FAN_DENY | FAN_AUDIT;
write(fd, &response, sizeof(struct fanotify_response));
When the syscall ends, the audit system will record the decision as a
AUDIT_FANOTIFY auxiliary record to denote that the reason this event
occurred is the result of an access control decision from fanotify
rather than DAC or MAC policy.
A sample event looks like this:
type=PATH msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): item=0 name="./evil-ls"
inode=1319561 dev=fc:03 mode=0100755 ouid=1000 ogid=1000 rdev=00:00
obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL
type=CWD msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): cwd="/home/sgrubb"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): arch=c000003e syscall=2
success=no exit=-1 a0=32cb3fca90 a1=0 a2=43 a3=8 items=1 ppid=901
pid=959 auid=1000 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=1000 suid=1000
fsuid=1000 egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts1 ses=3 comm="bash"
exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:
s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=FANOTIFY msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): resp=2
Prior to using the audit flag, the developer needs to call
fanotify_init or'ing in FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT to ensure that the kernel
supports auditing. The calling process must also have the CAP_AUDIT_WRITE
capability.
Signed-off-by: sgrubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
---
fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c | 8 +++++++-
fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
fs/notify/fdinfo.c | 3 +++
include/linux/audit.h | 7 +++++++
include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h | 3 +++
kernel/auditsc.c | 6 ++++++
8 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c
index 2fa99ae..1968d21 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/sched/user.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/wait.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include "fanotify.h"
@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ static int fanotify_get_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
fsnotify_finish_user_wait(iter_info);
out:
/* userspace responded, convert to something usable */
- switch (event->response) {
+ switch (event->response & ~FAN_AUDIT) {
case FAN_ALLOW:
ret = 0;
break;
@@ -86,6 +87,11 @@ static int fanotify_get_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
default:
ret = -EPERM;
}
+
+ /* Check if the response should be audited */
+ if (event->response & FAN_AUDIT)
+ audit_fanotify(event->response & ~FAN_AUDIT);
+
event->response = 0;
pr_debug("%s: group=%p event=%p about to return ret=%d\n", __func__,
diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
index 907a481..3f6b509 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static int process_access_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
* userspace can send a valid response or we will clean it up after the
* timeout
*/
- switch (response) {
+ switch (response & ~FAN_AUDIT) {
case FAN_ALLOW:
case FAN_DENY:
break;
@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ static int process_access_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
if (fd < 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ if ((response & FAN_AUDIT) && (group->fanotify_data.audit_enabled == 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
event = dequeue_event(group, fd);
if (!event)
return -ENOENT;
@@ -721,7 +724,11 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fanotify_init, unsigned int, flags, unsigned int, event_f_flags)
if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+ if (flags & ~(FAN_ALL_INIT_FLAGS | FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT))
+#else
if (flags & ~FAN_ALL_INIT_FLAGS)
+#endif
return -EINVAL;
if (event_f_flags & ~FANOTIFY_INIT_ALL_EVENT_F_BITS)
@@ -805,6 +812,15 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fanotify_init, unsigned int, flags, unsigned int, event_f_flags)
group->fanotify_data.max_marks = FANOTIFY_DEFAULT_MAX_MARKS;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
+ if (flags & FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT) {
+ fd = -EPERM;
+ if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
+ goto out_destroy_group;
+ group->fanotify_data.audit_enabled = true;
+ }
+#endif
+
fd = anon_inode_getfd("[fanotify]", &fanotify_fops, group, f_flags);
if (fd < 0)
goto out_destroy_group;
diff --git a/fs/notify/fdinfo.c b/fs/notify/fdinfo.c
index dd63aa9..ed311e3 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fdinfo.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fdinfo.c
@@ -156,6 +156,9 @@ void fanotify_show_fdinfo(struct seq_file *m, struct file *f)
if (group->fanotify_data.max_marks == UINT_MAX)
flags |= FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS;
+ if (group->fanotify_data.audit_enabled)
+ flags |= FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT;
+
seq_printf(m, "fanotify flags:%x event-flags:%x\n",
flags, group->fanotify_data.f_flags);
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 2150bdc..bf55732 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ extern int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
extern void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
extern void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags);
extern void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name);
+extern void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response);
static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
@@ -456,6 +457,12 @@ static inline void audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
__audit_log_kern_module(name);
}
+static inline void audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
+{
+ if (!audit_dummy_context())
+ __audit_fanotify(response);
+}
+
extern int audit_n_rules;
extern int audit_signals;
#else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h b/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h
index c6c6931..f4131f2 100644
--- a/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h
+++ b/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h
@@ -190,6 +190,7 @@ struct fsnotify_group {
int f_flags;
unsigned int max_marks;
struct user_struct *user;
+ bool audit_enabled;
} fanotify_data;
#endif /* CONFIG_FANOTIFY */
};
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 0714a66..221f8b7 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE 1328 /* audit log listing feature changes */
#define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329 /* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */
#define AUDIT_KERN_MODULE 1330 /* Kernel Module events */
+#define AUDIT_FANOTIFY 1331 /* Fanotify access decision */
#define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
#define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h b/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h
index 030508d..5dda19a 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#define FAN_UNLIMITED_QUEUE 0x00000010
#define FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS 0x00000020
+#define FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT 0x00000040
#define FAN_ALL_INIT_FLAGS (FAN_CLOEXEC | FAN_NONBLOCK | \
FAN_ALL_CLASS_BITS | FAN_UNLIMITED_QUEUE |\
@@ -99,6 +100,8 @@ struct fanotify_response {
/* Legit userspace responses to a _PERM event */
#define FAN_ALLOW 0x01
#define FAN_DENY 0x02
+#define FAN_AUDIT 0x10 /* Bit mask to create audit record for result */
+
/* No fd set in event */
#define FAN_NOFD -1
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 3260ba2..e046de8 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2390,6 +2390,12 @@ void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
}
+void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
+{
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response);
+}
+
static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
kuid_t auid, uid;
--
2.9.5
7 years, 1 month
[PATCH v3 1/1] audit: Record fanotify access control decisions
by Steve Grubb
Hello,
The fanotify interface allows user space daemons to make access
control decisions. Under common criteria requirements, we need to
optionally record decisions based on policy. This patch adds a bit mask,
FAN_AUDIT, that a user space daemon can 'or' into the response decision
which will tell the kernel that it made a decision and record it.
It would be used something like this in user space code:
response.response = FAN_DENY | FAN_AUDIT;
write(fd, &response, sizeof(struct fanotify_response));
When the syscall ends, the audit system will record the decision as a
AUDIT_FANOTIFY auxiliary record to denote that the reason this event
occurred is the result of an access control decision from fanotify
rather than DAC or MAC policy.
A sample event looks like this:
type=PATH msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): item=0 name="./evil-ls"
inode=1319561 dev=fc:03 mode=0100755 ouid=1000 ogid=1000 rdev=00:00
obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_t:s0 nametype=NORMAL
type=CWD msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): cwd="/home/sgrubb"
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): arch=c000003e syscall=2
success=no exit=-1 a0=32cb3fca90 a1=0 a2=43 a3=8 items=1 ppid=901
pid=959 auid=1000 uid=1000 gid=1000 euid=1000 suid=1000
fsuid=1000 egid=1000 sgid=1000 fsgid=1000 tty=pts1 ses=3 comm="bash"
exe="/usr/bin/bash" subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:
s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=(null)
type=FANOTIFY msg=audit(1504310584.332:290): resp=2
Prior to using the audit flag, the developer needs to call
fanotify_init or'ing in FAN_AUDIT_ENABLE to ensure that the kernel
supports auditing. The calling process must also have the CAP_AUDIT_WRITE
capability.
Signed-off-by: sgrubb <sgrubb(a)redhat.com>
---
fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c | 8 +++++++-
fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c | 12 +++++++++++-
include/linux/audit.h | 7 +++++++
include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 1 +
include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h | 5 ++++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 6 ++++++
7 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c
index 2fa99ae..1968d21 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <linux/sched/user.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/wait.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
#include "fanotify.h"
@@ -78,7 +79,7 @@ static int fanotify_get_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
fsnotify_finish_user_wait(iter_info);
out:
/* userspace responded, convert to something usable */
- switch (event->response) {
+ switch (event->response & ~FAN_AUDIT) {
case FAN_ALLOW:
ret = 0;
break;
@@ -86,6 +87,11 @@ static int fanotify_get_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
default:
ret = -EPERM;
}
+
+ /* Check if the response should be audited */
+ if (event->response & FAN_AUDIT)
+ audit_fanotify(event->response & ~FAN_AUDIT);
+
event->response = 0;
pr_debug("%s: group=%p event=%p about to return ret=%d\n", __func__,
diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
index 907a481..231db8b 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ static int process_access_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
* userspace can send a valid response or we will clean it up after the
* timeout
*/
- switch (response) {
+ switch (response & ~FAN_AUDIT) {
case FAN_ALLOW:
case FAN_DENY:
break;
@@ -190,6 +190,9 @@ static int process_access_response(struct fsnotify_group *group,
if (fd < 0)
return -EINVAL;
+ if ((response & FAN_AUDIT) && (group->audit_enabled == 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
event = dequeue_event(group, fd);
if (!event)
return -ENOENT;
@@ -805,6 +808,13 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(fanotify_init, unsigned int, flags, unsigned int, event_f_flags)
group->fanotify_data.max_marks = FANOTIFY_DEFAULT_MAX_MARKS;
}
+ if (flags & FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT) {
+ fd = -EPERM;
+ if (!capable(CAP_AUDIT_WRITE))
+ goto out_destroy_group;
+ group->audit_enabled = 1;
+ }
+
fd = anon_inode_getfd("[fanotify]", &fanotify_fops, group, f_flags);
if (fd < 0)
goto out_destroy_group;
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 2150bdc..bf55732 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -360,6 +360,7 @@ extern int __audit_log_bprm_fcaps(struct linux_binprm *bprm,
extern void __audit_log_capset(const struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
extern void __audit_mmap_fd(int fd, int flags);
extern void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name);
+extern void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response);
static inline void audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp)
{
@@ -456,6 +457,12 @@ static inline void audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
__audit_log_kern_module(name);
}
+static inline void audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
+{
+ if (!audit_dummy_context())
+ __audit_fanotify(response);
+}
+
extern int audit_n_rules;
extern int audit_signals;
#else /* CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL */
diff --git a/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h b/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h
index c6c6931..8f7ea68 100644
--- a/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h
+++ b/include/linux/fsnotify_backend.h
@@ -193,6 +193,7 @@ struct fsnotify_group {
} fanotify_data;
#endif /* CONFIG_FANOTIFY */
};
+ unsigned int audit_enabled;
};
/* when calling fsnotify tell it if the data is a path or inode */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index 0714a66..221f8b7 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -112,6 +112,7 @@
#define AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE 1328 /* audit log listing feature changes */
#define AUDIT_REPLACE 1329 /* Replace auditd if this packet unanswerd */
#define AUDIT_KERN_MODULE 1330 /* Kernel Module events */
+#define AUDIT_FANOTIFY 1331 /* Fanotify access decision */
#define AUDIT_AVC 1400 /* SE Linux avc denial or grant */
#define AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR 1401 /* Internal SE Linux Errors */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h b/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h
index 030508d..46bb431 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/fanotify.h
@@ -35,10 +35,11 @@
#define FAN_UNLIMITED_QUEUE 0x00000010
#define FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS 0x00000020
+#define FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT 0x00000040
#define FAN_ALL_INIT_FLAGS (FAN_CLOEXEC | FAN_NONBLOCK | \
FAN_ALL_CLASS_BITS | FAN_UNLIMITED_QUEUE |\
- FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS)
+ FAN_UNLIMITED_MARKS | FAN_ENABLE_AUDIT)
/* flags used for fanotify_modify_mark() */
#define FAN_MARK_ADD 0x00000001
@@ -99,6 +100,8 @@ struct fanotify_response {
/* Legit userspace responses to a _PERM event */
#define FAN_ALLOW 0x01
#define FAN_DENY 0x02
+#define FAN_AUDIT 0x10 /* Bit mask to create audit record for result */
+
/* No fd set in event */
#define FAN_NOFD -1
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 3260ba2..e046de8 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2390,6 +2390,12 @@ void __audit_log_kern_module(char *name)
context->type = AUDIT_KERN_MODULE;
}
+void __audit_fanotify(unsigned int response)
+{
+ audit_log(current->audit_context, GFP_KERNEL,
+ AUDIT_FANOTIFY, "resp=%u", response);
+}
+
static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
{
kuid_t auid, uid;
--
2.9.5
7 years, 1 month
