[PATCH] audit: always enable syscall auditing when supported and audit is enabled
by Paul Moore
To the best of our knowledge, everyone who enables audit at compile
time also enables syscall auditing; this patch simplifies the Kconfig
menus by removing the option to disable syscall auditing when audit
is selected and the target arch supports it.
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore(a)redhat.com>
---
init/Kconfig | 11 +++--------
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/init/Kconfig b/init/Kconfig
index c24b6f7..d4663b1 100644
--- a/init/Kconfig
+++ b/init/Kconfig
@@ -299,20 +299,15 @@ config AUDIT
help
Enable auditing infrastructure that can be used with another
kernel subsystem, such as SELinux (which requires this for
- logging of avc messages output). Does not do system-call
- auditing without CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL.
+ logging of avc messages output). System call auditing is included
+ on architectures which support it.
config HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
bool
config AUDITSYSCALL
- bool "Enable system-call auditing support"
+ def_bool y
depends on AUDIT && HAVE_ARCH_AUDITSYSCALL
- default y if SECURITY_SELINUX
- help
- Enable low-overhead system-call auditing infrastructure that
- can be used independently or with another kernel subsystem,
- such as SELinux.
config AUDIT_WATCH
def_bool y
6 years
Limiting SECCOMP audit events
by Steve Grubb
Hello,
Over the last month, the amount of seccomp events in audit logs is sky-rocketing. I
have over a million events in the last 2 days. Most of this is generated by firefox and
qt webkit.
I am wondering if the audit package should ship a file for
/usr/lib/sysctl.d/60-auditd.conf
wherein it has
kernel.seccomp.actions_logged = kill_process kill_thread errno
Also, has anyone verified this sysctl is filtering audit events? Even with the above, I
have over a million events on a 4.14.3 kernel. Firefox alone is generating over
50,000 events per hour.
Thanks,
-Steve
6 years, 9 months
Differentiating audit rules in an LSM stack
by Casey Schaufler
The audit rule field types AUDIT_SUBJ_* and AUDIT_OBJ_* are
defined generically and used by both SELinux and Smack to identify
fields that are interesting to them. If SELinux and Smack are running
concurrently both modules will identify audit rules as theirs if
either has requested the field. Before I go off and create a clever
solution I think it wise to ask if anyone has thought about or has
strong opinions on how best to address this unfortunate situation.
We know that SELinux and Smack together is not an especially
interesting configuration. It is, however, a grand test case for
generality of the solution. Any module that wanted to audit fields
that are defined generically will have this sort of problem.
Thanks
7 years, 1 month
auditd and hidden ports
by Yectli Huerta
Hi,
unhide reports that there are ports that are not being seeing by ss. i
also used lsof and netstat and they don't show up.
[~] % sudo unhide-tcp
Unhide-tcp 20130526
Copyright © 2013 Yago Jesus & Patrick Gouin
License GPLv3+ : GNU GPL version 3 or later
http://www.unhide-forensics.info
Used options:
[*]Starting TCP checking
Found Hidden port that not appears in ss: 840
Found Hidden port that not appears in ss: 851
[*]Starting UDP checking
[~] %
i created auditd rules to monitor socket related system calls
% sudo auditctl -l
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S connect -F key=CONNECT
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S bind -F key=BIND
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S socket -F key=SOCKET
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S listen -F key=LISTEN
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S shutdown -F key=SHUTDOWN
-a always,exit -F arch=b64 -S close -F key=CLOSE
the problem is that when i search the log files, i don't see any
references to hidden ports 840 or 851. below is one entry where
unhide-tcp is trying to bind to port 39781, so i know auditd is
logging entries
type=SOCKADDR msg=audit(12/15/2017 16:17:32.935:11040116) : saddr=inet
host:0.0.0.0 serv:39781
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(12/15/2017 16:17:32.935:11040116) : arch=x86_64
syscall=bind success=yes exit=0 a0=0x3 a1=0x7ffc212a92f0 a2=0x10
a3=0x0 items=0 ppid=21752 pid=21753 auid=*** uid=root gid=root
euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=root sgid=root fsgid=root tty=pts1
ses=225 comm=unhide-tcp exe=/usr/sbin/unhide-tcp
subj=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 key=BIND
do any of you have any suggestions?
thanks,
yah
7 years, 1 month
[trivial PATCH] treewide: Align function definition open/close braces
by Joe Perches
Some functions definitions have either the initial open brace and/or
the closing brace outside of column 1.
Move those braces to column 1.
This allows various function analyzers like gnu complexity to work
properly for these modified functions.
Miscellanea:
o Remove extra trailing ; and blank line from xfs_agf_verify
Signed-off-by: Joe Perches <joe(a)perches.com>
---
git diff -w shows no difference other than the above 'Miscellanea'
(this is against -next, but it applies against Linus' tree
with a couple offsets)
arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_32.h | 2 +-
drivers/acpi/custom_method.c | 2 +-
drivers/acpi/fan.c | 2 +-
drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc.c | 2 +-
drivers/media/i2c/msp3400-kthreads.c | 2 +-
drivers/message/fusion/mptsas.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/netxen/netxen_nic_init.c | 2 +-
drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/xmit.c | 2 +-
drivers/platform/x86/eeepc-laptop.c | 2 +-
drivers/rtc/rtc-ab-b5ze-s3.c | 2 +-
drivers/scsi/dpt_i2o.c | 2 +-
drivers/scsi/sym53c8xx_2/sym_glue.c | 2 +-
fs/locks.c | 2 +-
fs/ocfs2/stack_user.c | 2 +-
fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_alloc.c | 5 ++---
fs/xfs/xfs_export.c | 2 +-
kernel/audit.c | 6 +++---
kernel/trace/trace_printk.c | 4 ++--
lib/raid6/sse2.c | 14 +++++++-------
sound/soc/fsl/fsl_dma.c | 2 +-
20 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_32.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_32.h
index 97c46b8169b7..d4d4883080fa 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_32.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/atomic64_32.h
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ static inline long long atomic64_read(const atomic64_t *v)
long long r;
alternative_atomic64(read, "=&A" (r), "c" (v) : "memory");
return r;
- }
+}
/**
* atomic64_add_return - add and return
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
index c68e72414a67..e967c1173ba3 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/custom_method.c
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ static void __exit acpi_custom_method_exit(void)
{
if (cm_dentry)
debugfs_remove(cm_dentry);
- }
+}
module_init(acpi_custom_method_init);
module_exit(acpi_custom_method_exit);
diff --git a/drivers/acpi/fan.c b/drivers/acpi/fan.c
index 6cf4988206f2..3563103590c6 100644
--- a/drivers/acpi/fan.c
+++ b/drivers/acpi/fan.c
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ fan_set_cur_state(struct thermal_cooling_device *cdev, unsigned long state)
return fan_set_state_acpi4(device, state);
else
return fan_set_state(device, state);
- }
+}
static const struct thermal_cooling_device_ops fan_cooling_ops = {
.get_max_state = fan_get_max_state,
diff --git a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc.c b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc.c
index d1488d5ee028..1e0d1e7c5324 100644
--- a/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc.c
+++ b/drivers/gpu/drm/amd/display/dc/core/dc.c
@@ -461,7 +461,7 @@ static void disable_dangling_plane(struct dc *dc, struct dc_state *context)
******************************************************************************/
struct dc *dc_create(const struct dc_init_data *init_params)
- {
+{
struct dc *dc = kzalloc(sizeof(*dc), GFP_KERNEL);
unsigned int full_pipe_count;
diff --git a/drivers/media/i2c/msp3400-kthreads.c b/drivers/media/i2c/msp3400-kthreads.c
index 4dd01e9f553b..dc6cb8d475b3 100644
--- a/drivers/media/i2c/msp3400-kthreads.c
+++ b/drivers/media/i2c/msp3400-kthreads.c
@@ -885,7 +885,7 @@ static int msp34xxg_modus(struct i2c_client *client)
}
static void msp34xxg_set_source(struct i2c_client *client, u16 reg, int in)
- {
+{
struct msp_state *state = to_state(i2c_get_clientdata(client));
int source, matrix;
diff --git a/drivers/message/fusion/mptsas.c b/drivers/message/fusion/mptsas.c
index 345f6035599e..69a62d23514b 100644
--- a/drivers/message/fusion/mptsas.c
+++ b/drivers/message/fusion/mptsas.c
@@ -2968,7 +2968,7 @@ mptsas_exp_repmanufacture_info(MPT_ADAPTER *ioc,
mutex_unlock(&ioc->sas_mgmt.mutex);
out:
return ret;
- }
+}
static void
mptsas_parse_device_info(struct sas_identify *identify,
diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/netxen/netxen_nic_init.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/netxen/netxen_nic_init.c
index 3dd973475125..0ea141ece19e 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/netxen/netxen_nic_init.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/qlogic/netxen/netxen_nic_init.c
@@ -603,7 +603,7 @@ static struct uni_table_desc *nx_get_table_desc(const u8 *unirom, int section)
static int
netxen_nic_validate_header(struct netxen_adapter *adapter)
- {
+{
const u8 *unirom = adapter->fw->data;
struct uni_table_desc *directory = (struct uni_table_desc *) &unirom[0];
u32 fw_file_size = adapter->fw->size;
diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/xmit.c b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/xmit.c
index bd438062a6db..baedc7186b10 100644
--- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/xmit.c
+++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/xmit.c
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ ath_tid_pull(struct ath_atx_tid *tid)
}
return skb;
- }
+}
static struct sk_buff *ath_tid_dequeue(struct ath_atx_tid *tid)
{
diff --git a/drivers/platform/x86/eeepc-laptop.c b/drivers/platform/x86/eeepc-laptop.c
index 5a681962899c..4c38904a8a32 100644
--- a/drivers/platform/x86/eeepc-laptop.c
+++ b/drivers/platform/x86/eeepc-laptop.c
@@ -492,7 +492,7 @@ static void eeepc_platform_exit(struct eeepc_laptop *eeepc)
* potentially bad time, such as a timer interrupt.
*/
static void tpd_led_update(struct work_struct *work)
- {
+{
struct eeepc_laptop *eeepc;
eeepc = container_of(work, struct eeepc_laptop, tpd_led_work);
diff --git a/drivers/rtc/rtc-ab-b5ze-s3.c b/drivers/rtc/rtc-ab-b5ze-s3.c
index a319bf1e49de..ef5c16dfabfa 100644
--- a/drivers/rtc/rtc-ab-b5ze-s3.c
+++ b/drivers/rtc/rtc-ab-b5ze-s3.c
@@ -648,7 +648,7 @@ static int abb5zes3_rtc_set_alarm(struct device *dev, struct rtc_wkalrm *alarm)
ret);
return ret;
- }
+}
/* Enable or disable battery low irq generation */
static inline int _abb5zes3_rtc_battery_low_irq_enable(struct regmap *regmap,
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/dpt_i2o.c b/drivers/scsi/dpt_i2o.c
index fd172b0890d3..a00d822e3142 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/dpt_i2o.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/dpt_i2o.c
@@ -3524,7 +3524,7 @@ static int adpt_i2o_systab_send(adpt_hba* pHba)
#endif
return ret;
- }
+}
/*============================================================================
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/sym53c8xx_2/sym_glue.c b/drivers/scsi/sym53c8xx_2/sym_glue.c
index 791a2182de53..7320d5fe4cbc 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/sym53c8xx_2/sym_glue.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/sym53c8xx_2/sym_glue.c
@@ -1393,7 +1393,7 @@ static struct Scsi_Host *sym_attach(struct scsi_host_template *tpnt, int unit,
scsi_host_put(shost);
return NULL;
- }
+}
/*
diff --git a/fs/locks.c b/fs/locks.c
index 21b4dfa289ee..d2399d001afe 100644
--- a/fs/locks.c
+++ b/fs/locks.c
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ static const struct lock_manager_operations lease_manager_ops = {
* Initialize a lease, use the default lock manager operations
*/
static int lease_init(struct file *filp, long type, struct file_lock *fl)
- {
+{
if (assign_type(fl, type) != 0)
return -EINVAL;
diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/stack_user.c b/fs/ocfs2/stack_user.c
index dae9eb7c441e..d2fb97b173da 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/stack_user.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/stack_user.c
@@ -398,7 +398,7 @@ static int ocfs2_control_do_setnode_msg(struct file *file,
static int ocfs2_control_do_setversion_msg(struct file *file,
struct ocfs2_control_message_setv *msg)
- {
+{
long major, minor;
char *ptr = NULL;
struct ocfs2_control_private *p = file->private_data;
diff --git a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_alloc.c b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_alloc.c
index 0da80019a917..217108f765d5 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_alloc.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_alloc.c
@@ -2401,7 +2401,7 @@ static bool
xfs_agf_verify(
struct xfs_mount *mp,
struct xfs_buf *bp)
- {
+{
struct xfs_agf *agf = XFS_BUF_TO_AGF(bp);
if (xfs_sb_version_hascrc(&mp->m_sb)) {
@@ -2449,8 +2449,7 @@ xfs_agf_verify(
be32_to_cpu(agf->agf_refcount_level) > XFS_BTREE_MAXLEVELS))
return false;
- return true;;
-
+ return true;
}
static void
diff --git a/fs/xfs/xfs_export.c b/fs/xfs/xfs_export.c
index fe1bfee35898..7d5c355d78b5 100644
--- a/fs/xfs/xfs_export.c
+++ b/fs/xfs/xfs_export.c
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ xfs_nfs_get_inode(
struct super_block *sb,
u64 ino,
u32 generation)
- {
+{
xfs_mount_t *mp = XFS_M(sb);
xfs_inode_t *ip;
int error;
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 227db99b0f19..d97e8f0f73ca 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -443,15 +443,15 @@ static int audit_set_failure(u32 state)
* Drop any references inside the auditd connection tracking struct and free
* the memory.
*/
- static void auditd_conn_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
- {
+static void auditd_conn_free(struct rcu_head *rcu)
+{
struct auditd_connection *ac;
ac = container_of(rcu, struct auditd_connection, rcu);
put_pid(ac->pid);
put_net(ac->net);
kfree(ac);
- }
+}
/**
* auditd_set - Set/Reset the auditd connection state
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_printk.c b/kernel/trace/trace_printk.c
index ad1d6164e946..50f44b7b2b32 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_printk.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_printk.c
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ struct notifier_block module_trace_bprintk_format_nb = {
};
int __trace_bprintk(unsigned long ip, const char *fmt, ...)
- {
+{
int ret;
va_list ap;
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ int __trace_bprintk(unsigned long ip, const char *fmt, ...)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__trace_bprintk);
int __ftrace_vbprintk(unsigned long ip, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
- {
+{
if (unlikely(!fmt))
return 0;
diff --git a/lib/raid6/sse2.c b/lib/raid6/sse2.c
index 1d2276b007ee..8191e1d0d2fb 100644
--- a/lib/raid6/sse2.c
+++ b/lib/raid6/sse2.c
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ static void raid6_sse21_gen_syndrome(int disks, size_t bytes, void **ptrs)
static void raid6_sse21_xor_syndrome(int disks, int start, int stop,
size_t bytes, void **ptrs)
- {
+{
u8 **dptr = (u8 **)ptrs;
u8 *p, *q;
int d, z, z0;
@@ -200,9 +200,9 @@ static void raid6_sse22_gen_syndrome(int disks, size_t bytes, void **ptrs)
kernel_fpu_end();
}
- static void raid6_sse22_xor_syndrome(int disks, int start, int stop,
+static void raid6_sse22_xor_syndrome(int disks, int start, int stop,
size_t bytes, void **ptrs)
- {
+{
u8 **dptr = (u8 **)ptrs;
u8 *p, *q;
int d, z, z0;
@@ -265,7 +265,7 @@ static void raid6_sse22_gen_syndrome(int disks, size_t bytes, void **ptrs)
asm volatile("sfence" : : : "memory");
kernel_fpu_end();
- }
+}
const struct raid6_calls raid6_sse2x2 = {
raid6_sse22_gen_syndrome,
@@ -366,9 +366,9 @@ static void raid6_sse24_gen_syndrome(int disks, size_t bytes, void **ptrs)
kernel_fpu_end();
}
- static void raid6_sse24_xor_syndrome(int disks, int start, int stop,
+static void raid6_sse24_xor_syndrome(int disks, int start, int stop,
size_t bytes, void **ptrs)
- {
+{
u8 **dptr = (u8 **)ptrs;
u8 *p, *q;
int d, z, z0;
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ static void raid6_sse24_gen_syndrome(int disks, size_t bytes, void **ptrs)
}
asm volatile("sfence" : : : "memory");
kernel_fpu_end();
- }
+}
const struct raid6_calls raid6_sse2x4 = {
diff --git a/sound/soc/fsl/fsl_dma.c b/sound/soc/fsl/fsl_dma.c
index 0c11f434a374..ec619f51d336 100644
--- a/sound/soc/fsl/fsl_dma.c
+++ b/sound/soc/fsl/fsl_dma.c
@@ -879,7 +879,7 @@ static const struct snd_pcm_ops fsl_dma_ops = {
};
static int fsl_soc_dma_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
- {
+{
struct dma_object *dma;
struct device_node *np = pdev->dev.of_node;
struct device_node *ssi_np;
7 years, 1 month
Unique audit record type ranges for individual LSMs
by Tyler Hicks
Hello - The AppArmor project would like for AppArmor audit records to be
supported by the audit-userspace tools, such as ausearch, but it
requires some coordination between the linux-security-module and
linux-audit lists. This was raised as a feature request years ago in
Ubuntu and more recently in Debian:
https://launchpad.net/bugs/1117804
https://bugs.debian.org/872726
The quick summary of the problem at hand is that the audit-userspace
project requires that each LSM use a unique record type range for audit
records while the kernel's common_lsm_audit() function uses the same
record type (1400) for all records. SELinux, AppArmor, and SMACK are all
using common_lsm_audit() today and, therefore, the 1400-1499 range.
While it will be potentially painful to switch, the AppArmor project is
considering to use a unique range in order for audit-userspace to
support AppArmor audit records. IMHO, SMACK would be free to continue
using 1400-1499 as long as they don't need audit-userspace support and
SELinux would continue using 1400-1499.
Steve Grubb previously told me that he intends 1500-1599 to be used by
AppArmor:
https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2014-May/msg00119.html
John Johansen tells me that AppArmor previously used the 1500-1599 range
before AppArmor was upstreamed.
There's a conflicting comment in the kernel stating that 1500-1599 is to
by used by kernel LSPP events. As far as I can tell, there were never
any kernel LSPP events that used the range. Steve is the one that added
that comment so I think it is a safe range for AppArmor to use:
https://git.kernel.org/linus/90d526c074ae5db484388da56c399acf892b6c17
Considering audit-userspace's stance, does the LSM community agree that
common_lsm_audit() should be modified to accept an audit record type
parameter to pass on to audit_log_start()?
If so, does everyone agree that 1500-1599 would be acceptable for
AppArmor to use?
Tyler
7 years, 1 month
audit 2.8.2 released
by Steve Grubb
Hello,
I've just released a new version of the audit daemon. It can be downloaded
from http://people.redhat.com/sgrubb/audit. It will also be in rawhide
soon. The ChangeLog is:
- Update tables for 4.14 kernel
- Fixup ipv6 server side binding
- AVC report from aureport was missing result column header (#1511606)
- Add SOFTWARE_UPDATE event
- In ausearch/report pickup any path and new-disk fields as a file
- Fix value returned by auditctl --reset-lost (Richard Guy Briggs)
- In auparse, fix expr_create_timestamp_comparison_ex to be numeric field
- Fix building on old systems without linux/fanotify.h
- Fix shell portability issues reported by shellcheck
- Auditd validate_email should not use gethostbyname
This is a bug fix release that corrects several things in the 2.8 series. IPv6
support was not binding to an IPv6 socket on the server side. auditctl --
reset-lost is intended to return the current value of the lost events value.
It was returning the netlink sequence number. This is now corrected. The new
ausearch test suite detected a bug in auparse_search functions that was
introdiced in 2.8, the date was not considered a numeric field and thus could
not match dates. This is fixed. It was also discovered that on older systems
without fanotify.h, the build would fail. And lastly, validate_email was using
gethostby name which validated against IPv4 addresses which is wrong given
that IPv6 support was introduced. This has also been fixed.
SHA256: 67b59b2b77afee9ed87afa4d80ffc8e6f3a1f4bbedd5f2871f387c952147bcba
Please let me know if you run across any problems with this release.
-Steve
7 years, 1 month
RFC(v2): Audit Kernel Container IDs
by Richard Guy Briggs
Containers are a userspace concept. The kernel knows nothing of them.
The Linux audit system needs a way to be able to track the container
provenance of events and actions. Audit needs the kernel's help to do
this.
Since the concept of a container is entirely a userspace concept, a
registration from the userspace container orchestration system initiates
this. This will define a point in time and a set of resources
associated with a particular container with an audit container ID.
The registration is a pseudo filesystem (proc, since PID tree already
exists) write of a u8[16] UUID representing the container ID to a file
representing a process that will become the first process in a new
container. This write might place restrictions on mount namespaces
required to define a container, or at least careful checking of
namespaces in the kernel to verify permissions of the orchestrator so it
can't change its own container ID. A bind mount of nsfs may be
necessary in the container orchestrator's mntNS.
Note: Use a 128-bit scalar rather than a string to make compares faster
and simpler.
Require a new CAP_CONTAINER_ADMIN to be able to carry out the
registration. At that time, record the target container's user-supplied
container identifier along with the target container's first process
(which may become the target container's "init" process) process ID
(referenced from the initial PID namespace), all namespace IDs (in the
form of a nsfs device number and inode number tuple) in a new auxilliary
record AUDIT_CONTAINER with a qualifying op=$action field.
Issue a new auxilliary record AUDIT_CONTAINER_INFO for each valid
container ID present on an auditable action or event.
Forked and cloned processes inherit their parent's container ID,
referenced in the process' task_struct.
Mimic setns(2) and return an error if the process has already initiated
threading or forked since this registration should happen before the
process execution is started by the orchestrator and hence should not
yet have any threads or children. If this is deemed overly restrictive,
switch all threads and children to the new containerID.
Trust the orchestrator to judiciously use and restrict CAP_CONTAINER_ADMIN.
Log the creation of every namespace, inheriting/adding its spawning
process' containerID(s), if applicable. Include the spawning and
spawned namespace IDs (device and inode number tuples).
[AUDIT_NS_CREATE, AUDIT_NS_DESTROY] [clone(2), unshare(2), setns(2)]
Note: At this point it appears only network namespaces may need to track
container IDs apart from processes since incoming packets may cause an
auditable event before being associated with a process.
Log the destruction of every namespace when it is no longer used by any
process, include the namespace IDs (device and inode number tuples).
[AUDIT_NS_DESTROY] [process exit, unshare(2), setns(2)]
Issue a new auxilliary record AUDIT_NS_CHANGE listing (opt: op=$action)
the parent and child namespace IDs for any changes to a process'
namespaces. [setns(2)]
Note: It may be possible to combine AUDIT_NS_* record formats and
distinguish them with an op=$action field depending on the fields
required for each message type.
When a container ceases to exist because the last process in that
container has exited and hence the last namespace has been destroyed and
its refcount dropping to zero, log the fact.
(This latter is likely needed for certification accountability.) A
container object may need a list of processes and/or namespaces.
A namespace cannot directly migrate from one container to another but
could be assigned to a newly spawned container. A namespace can be
moved from one container to another indirectly by having that namespace
used in a second process in another container and then ending all the
processes in the first container.
(v2)
- switch from u64 to u128 UUID
- switch from "signal" and "trigger" to "register"
- restrict registration to single process or force all threads and children into same container
- RGB
--
Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
Sr. S/W Engineer, Kernel Security, Base Operating Systems
Remote, Ottawa, Red Hat Canada
IRC: rgb, SunRaycer
Voice: +1.647.777.2635, Internal: (81) 32635
7 years, 1 month
Systemd Journald and audit logging causing journal issues
by Brad Zynda
Hello Everyone,
I am sending along an issue brought to the systemd-journald dev list
initially:
On 10/02/2017 11:40 AM, Lennart Poettering wrote:
> On Mo, 02.10.17 11:25, Brad Zynda (bradley.v.zynda(a)nasa.gov) wrote:
>
>> Sep 28 13:50:03 server systemd-journal[565]: Suppressed 73244 messages
>> from /system.slice/auditd.service
>
> The question is: why does auditd even log to the journal?
>
>> Now we are required to have full audit rules and does this look like at
>> rate limiting issue or an issue of journal not able to handle the
>> traffic to logging?
>
> journald detected that it got flooded with too many messages in too
> short a time from auditd. if this happens then something is almost
> certainly off with auditd, as auditd is not supposed to flood journald
> with messages, after all it maintains its own auditing log database.
>
> Please ping the auditd folks for help
>
> Lennart
>
_______________________________________________
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systemd-devel(a)lists.freedesktop.org
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Hey Everyone,
Not sure if this is a bug so:
systemctl status -l systemd-journald.service
● systemd-journald.service - Journal Service
Loaded: loaded (/usr/lib/systemd/system/systemd-journald.service;
static; vendor preset: disabled)
Active: active (running) since Tue 2017-09-26 20:01:16 UTC; 5 days ago
Docs: man:systemd-journald.service(8)
man:journald.conf(5)
Main PID: 565 (systemd-journal)
Status: "Processing requests..."
CGroup: /system.slice/systemd-journald.service
└─565 /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-journald
Sep 28 13:50:03 server systemd-journal[565]: Suppressed 73244 messages
from /system.slice/auditd.service
Sep 28 13:51:03 server systemd-journal[565]: Suppressed 98979 messages
from /system.slice/auditd.service
Sep 28 13:52:03 server systemd-journal[565]: Suppressed 109433 messages
from /system.slice/auditd.service
Sep 28 13:53:03 server systemd-journal[565]: Suppressed 99788 messages
from /system.slice/auditd.service
Sep 28 13:54:03 server systemd-journal[565]: Suppressed 111605 messages
from /system.slice/auditd.service
Sep 28 13:55:03 server systemd-journal[565]: Suppressed 111591 messages
from /system.slice/auditd.service
Sep 28 13:56:03 server systemd-journal[565]: Suppressed 107947 messages
from /system.slice/auditd.service
Sep 28 13:57:51 server systemd-journal[565]: Suppressed 32760 messages
from /system.slice/auditd.service
Sep 28 17:21:40 server systemd-journal[565]: Suppressed 210 messages
from /system.slice/auditd.service
Oct 01 02:16:01 server systemd-journal[565]: Suppressed 1333 messages
from /system.slice/auditd.service
journalctl --verify
PASS: /run/log/journal/d28b0080ffe0432a974f36e4fb4bfa9b/system.journal
PASS:
/run/log/journal/d28b0080ffe0432a974f36e4fb4bfa9b/system@0d49221d68d04ef0b95d8203c5e96a46-000000000097f6c7-0005596b745b4d1c.journal
PASS:
/run/log/journal/d28b0080ffe0432a974f36e4fb4bfa9b/system@0d49221d68d04ef0b95d8203c5e96a46-000000000096a587-00055966f35ae59a.journal
PASS:
/run/log/journal/d28b0080ffe0432a974f36e4fb4bfa9b/system@0d49221d68d04ef0b95d8203c5e96a46-00000000009554f1-000559629c4cdb7e.journal
PASS:
/run/log/journal/d28b0080ffe0432a974f36e4fb4bfa9b/system@0d49221d68d04ef0b95d8203c5e96a46-0000000000940591-0005595e1811a2d1.journal
PASS:
/run/log/journal/d28b0080ffe0432a974f36e4fb4bfa9b/system@0d49221d68d04ef0b95d8203c5e96a46-000000000092b500-00055959f2de5ede.journal
PASS:
/run/log/journal/d28b0080ffe0432a974f36e4fb4bfa9b/system@0d49221d68d04ef0b95d8203c5e96a46-0000000000916479-0005595573137b74.journal
PASS:
/run/log/journal/d28b0080ffe0432a974f36e4fb4bfa9b/system@0d49221d68d04ef0b95d8203c5e96a46-0000000000901337-00055950d80cc3d8.journal
PASS:
/run/log/journal/d28b0080ffe0432a974f36e4fb4bfa9b/system@0d49221d68d04ef0b95d8203c5e96a46-00000000008ec2fb-0005594cad14b07a.journal
PASS:
/run/log/journal/d28b0080ffe0432a974f36e4fb4bfa9b/system@0d49221d68d04ef0b95d8203c5e96a46-00000000008d7373-0005594838683e58.journal
PASS:
/run/log/journal/d28b0080ffe0432a974f36e4fb4bfa9b/system@0d49221d68d04ef0b95d8203c5e96a46-00000000008c238e-00055943fe2072e3.journal
PASS:
/run/log/journal/d28b0080ffe0432a974f36e4fb4bfa9b/system@0d49221d68d04ef0b95d8203c5e96a46-00000000008ad1d9-0005593ff64a4f69.journal
PASS:
/run/log/journal/d28b0080ffe0432a974f36e4fb4bfa9b/system@0d49221d68d04ef0b95d8203c5e96a46-0000000000897f32-0005593e18c5758b.journal
journalctl --disk-usage
Archived and active journals take up 1.1G on disk.
Initially we saw:
16733 PATH
5070 SYSCALL
5024 CWD
3765 AVC
323 CRYPTO_KEY_USER
223 USER_START
222 USER_ACCT
222 CRED_ACQ
220 LOGIN
220 CRED_REFR
218 USER_END
218 CRED_DISP
46 USER_LOGIN
12 EXECVE
4 USER_AUTH
2 CRYPTO_SESSION
1 USER_ROLE_CHANGE
1 USER_CMD
1 SERVICE_STOP
1 SERVICE_START
1 BPRM_FCAPS
so we blocked type PATH in audit.rules
But we are still seeing 100K of dropped/suppressed messages.
Note: systemloglevel = INFO
Centos 7 1708 3.10.0-693.2.2.el7.x86_64
systemd.x86_64 219-42.el7_4.1
Now we are required to have full audit rules and does this look like at
rate limiting issue or an issue of journal not able to handle the
traffic to logging?
Error we are seeing from services that have silently failed, in this
case glassfish..
systemctl status -l glassfish
● glassfish.service - SYSV: GlassFish start and stop daemon
Loaded: loaded (/etc/rc.d/init.d/glassfish; bad; vendor preset: disabled)
Active: active (exited) since Tue 2017-09-26 20:01:36 UTC; 5 days ago
Docs: man:systemd-sysv-generator(8)
Process: 1328 ExecStart=/etc/rc.d/init.d/glassfish start (code=exited,
status=0/SUCCESS)
Warning: Journal has been rotated since unit was started. Log output is
incomplete or unavailable.
Eventually glassfish will fail but it wont kill the service so we never
get an nms service down trap from the OID.
Please let me know if further info is needed or if certain limits need
to be adjusted.
Thanks,
Brad Zynda
7 years, 2 months
