[PATCH 1/1] Added exe field to audit core dump signal log
by Paul Davies C
Currently when the coredump signals are logged by the audit system , the
actual path to the executable is not logged. Without details of exe , the
system admin may not have an exact idea on what program failed.
This patch changes the audit_log_task() so that the path to the exe is also
logged.
Signed-off-by: Paul Davies C <pauldaviesc(a)gmail.com>
---
kernel/auditsc.c | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index 9845cb3..988de72 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -2353,6 +2353,7 @@ static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
kuid_t auid, uid;
kgid_t gid;
unsigned int sessionid;
+ struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
auid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
@@ -2366,6 +2367,12 @@ static void audit_log_task(struct audit_buffer *ab)
audit_log_task_context(ab);
audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
+ if (mm) {
+ down_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ if (mm->exe_file)
+ audit_log_d_path(ab, " exe=", &mm->exe_file->f_path);
+ up_read(&mm->mmap_sem);
+ }
}
static void audit_log_abend(struct audit_buffer *ab, char *reason, long signr)
--
1.7.9.5
9 years, 3 months
[PATCH] netlink: have netlink per-protocol bind function return an error code.
by Richard Guy Briggs
Have the netlink per-protocol optional bind function return an int error code
rather than void to signal a failure.
This will enable netlink protocols to perform extra checks including
capabilities and permissions verifications when updating memberships in
multicast groups.
In netlink_bind() and netlink_setsockopt() the call to the per-protocol bind
function was moved above the multicast group update to prevent any access to
the multicast socket groups before checking with the per-protocol bind
function. This will enable the per-protocol bind function to be used to check
permissions which could be denied before making them available, and to avoid
the messy job of undoing the addition should the per-protocol bind function
fail.
The netfilter subsystem seems to be the only one currently using the
per-protocol bind function.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
---
In particular, the audit subsystem (NETLINK_AUDIT protocol) could benefit by
being able to check specific capabilities for each multicast group before
granting membership to the requesting socket. Currently, all NETLINK_AUDIT
sockets must have the capability CAP_NET_ADMIN. No other capabilities are
required to join a multicast group. This capability is too broad allowing
access to this socket by many applications that must not have access to this
information. It is proposed to add capability CAP_AUDIT_READ to allow this
access while dropping the exessively broad capability CAP_NET_ADMIN.
There has also been some interest expressed by IETF ForCES folk.
---
include/linux/netlink.h | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c | 3 ++-
net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++-------------
net/netlink/af_netlink.h | 4 ++--
4 files changed, 22 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/netlink.h b/include/linux/netlink.h
index 7a6c396..4402653 100644
--- a/include/linux/netlink.h
+++ b/include/linux/netlink.h
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ struct netlink_kernel_cfg {
unsigned int flags;
void (*input)(struct sk_buff *skb);
struct mutex *cb_mutex;
- void (*bind)(int group);
+ int (*bind)(int group);
bool (*compare)(struct net *net, struct sock *sk);
};
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
index 75619f9..10a4cf5 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
@@ -392,7 +392,7 @@ static void nfnetlink_rcv(struct sk_buff *skb)
}
#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES
-static void nfnetlink_bind(int group)
+static int nfnetlink_bind(int group)
{
const struct nfnetlink_subsystem *ss;
int type = nfnl_group2type[group];
@@ -403,6 +403,7 @@ static void nfnetlink_bind(int group)
if (!ss) {
request_module("nfnetlink-subsys-%d", type);
}
+ return 0;
}
#endif
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
index bca50b9..4224dc5 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
@@ -1198,7 +1198,7 @@ static int netlink_create(struct net *net, struct socket *sock, int protocol,
struct module *module = NULL;
struct mutex *cb_mutex;
struct netlink_sock *nlk;
- void (*bind)(int group);
+ int (*bind)(int group);
int err = 0;
sock->state = SS_UNCONNECTED;
@@ -1441,6 +1441,17 @@ static int netlink_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
if (!nladdr->nl_groups && (nlk->groups == NULL || !(u32)nlk->groups[0]))
return 0;
+ if (nlk->netlink_bind && nladdr->nl_groups) {
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nlk->ngroups; i++)
+ if (test_bit(i, (long unsigned int *)&nladdr->nl_groups)) {
+ err = nlk->netlink_bind(i);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
+
netlink_table_grab();
netlink_update_subscriptions(sk, nlk->subscriptions +
hweight32(nladdr->nl_groups) -
@@ -1449,15 +1460,6 @@ static int netlink_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr,
netlink_update_listeners(sk);
netlink_table_ungrab();
- if (nlk->netlink_bind && nlk->groups[0]) {
- int i;
-
- for (i=0; i<nlk->ngroups; i++) {
- if (test_bit(i, nlk->groups))
- nlk->netlink_bind(i);
- }
- }
-
return 0;
}
@@ -2095,14 +2097,16 @@ static int netlink_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, int level, int optname,
return err;
if (!val || val - 1 >= nlk->ngroups)
return -EINVAL;
+ if (nlk->netlink_bind) {
+ err = nlk->netlink_bind(val);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
netlink_table_grab();
netlink_update_socket_mc(nlk, val,
optname == NETLINK_ADD_MEMBERSHIP);
netlink_table_ungrab();
- if (nlk->netlink_bind)
- nlk->netlink_bind(val);
-
err = 0;
break;
}
diff --git a/net/netlink/af_netlink.h b/net/netlink/af_netlink.h
index acbd774..0edb8d5 100644
--- a/net/netlink/af_netlink.h
+++ b/net/netlink/af_netlink.h
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ struct netlink_sock {
struct mutex *cb_mutex;
struct mutex cb_def_mutex;
void (*netlink_rcv)(struct sk_buff *skb);
- void (*netlink_bind)(int group);
+ int (*netlink_bind)(int group);
struct module *module;
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLINK_MMAP
struct mutex pg_vec_lock;
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ struct netlink_table {
unsigned int groups;
struct mutex *cb_mutex;
struct module *module;
- void (*bind)(int group);
+ int (*bind)(int group);
bool (*compare)(struct net *net, struct sock *sock);
int registered;
};
--
1.7.1
10 years
[PATCH 1/7] audit: implement generic feature setting and retrieving
by Eric Paris
The audit_status structure was not designed with extensibility in mind.
Define a new AUDIT_SET_FEATURE message type which takes a new structure
of bits where things can be enabled/disabled/locked one at a time. This
structure should be able to grow in the future while maintaining forward
and backward compatibility (based loosly on the ideas from capabilities
and prctl)
This does not actually add any features, but is just infrastructure to
allow new on/off types of audit system features.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 2 +
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 16 +++++++
kernel/audit.c | 110 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
3 files changed, 127 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 729a4d1..7b31bec 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -73,6 +73,8 @@ struct audit_field {
void *lsm_rule;
};
+extern int is_audit_feature_set(int which);
+
extern int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list);
extern int audit_classify_syscall(int abi, unsigned syscall);
extern int audit_classify_arch(int arch);
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
index b7cb978..a053243 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/audit.h
@@ -68,6 +68,9 @@
#define AUDIT_MAKE_EQUIV 1015 /* Append to watched tree */
#define AUDIT_TTY_GET 1016 /* Get TTY auditing status */
#define AUDIT_TTY_SET 1017 /* Set TTY auditing status */
+#define AUDIT_SET_FEATURE 1018 /* Turn an audit feature on or off */
+#define AUDIT_GET_FEATURE 1019 /* Get which features are enabled */
+#define AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE 1020 /* audit log listing feature changes */
#define AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG 1100 /* Userspace messages mostly uninteresting to kernel */
#define AUDIT_USER_AVC 1107 /* We filter this differently */
@@ -369,6 +372,19 @@ struct audit_status {
__u32 backlog; /* messages waiting in queue */
};
+struct audit_features {
+#define AUDIT_FEATURE_VERSION 1
+ __u32 vers;
+ __u32 mask; /* which bits we are dealing with */
+ __u32 features; /* which feature to enable/disable */
+ __u32 lock; /* which features to lock */
+};
+
+#define AUDIT_LAST_FEATURE -1
+
+#define audit_feature_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= AUDIT_LAST_FEATURE)
+#define AUDIT_FEATURE_TO_MASK(x) (1 << ((x) & 31)) /* mask for __u32 */
+
struct audit_tty_status {
__u32 enabled; /* 1 = enabled, 0 = disabled */
__u32 log_passwd; /* 1 = enabled, 0 = disabled */
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index f2f4666..3acbbc8 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -140,6 +140,15 @@ static struct task_struct *kauditd_task;
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(kauditd_wait);
static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(audit_backlog_wait);
+static struct audit_features af = {.vers = AUDIT_FEATURE_VERSION,
+ .mask = -1,
+ .features = 0,
+ .lock = 0,};
+
+static char *audit_feature_names[0] = {
+};
+
+
/* Serialize requests from userspace. */
DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_cmd_mutex);
@@ -584,6 +593,8 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
case AUDIT_GET:
case AUDIT_SET:
+ case AUDIT_GET_FEATURE:
+ case AUDIT_SET_FEATURE:
case AUDIT_LIST_RULES:
case AUDIT_ADD_RULE:
case AUDIT_DEL_RULE:
@@ -628,6 +639,94 @@ static int audit_log_common_recv_msg(struct audit_buffer **ab, u16 msg_type)
return rc;
}
+int is_audit_feature_set(int i)
+{
+ return af.features & AUDIT_FEATURE_TO_MASK(i);
+}
+
+
+static int audit_get_feature(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ u32 seq;
+
+ seq = nlmsg_hdr(skb)->nlmsg_seq;
+
+ audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).portid, seq, AUDIT_GET, 0, 0,
+ &af, sizeof(af));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void audit_log_feature_change(int which, u32 old_feature, u32 new_feature,
+ u32 old_lock, u32 new_lock, int res)
+{
+ struct audit_buffer *ab;
+
+ ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_FEATURE_CHANGE);
+ audit_log_format(ab, "feature=%s new=%d old=%d old_lock=%d new_lock=%d res=%d",
+ audit_feature_names[which], !!old_feature, !!new_feature,
+ !!old_lock, !!new_lock, res);
+ audit_log_end(ab);
+}
+
+static int audit_set_feature(struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct audit_features *uaf;
+ int i;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(AUDIT_LAST_FEATURE + 1 > sizeof(audit_feature_names)/sizeof(audit_feature_names[0]));
+ uaf = nlmsg_data(nlmsg_hdr(skb));
+
+ /* if there is ever a version 2 we should handle that here */
+
+ for (i = 0; i <= AUDIT_LAST_FEATURE; i++) {
+ u32 feature = AUDIT_FEATURE_TO_MASK(i);
+ u32 old_feature, new_feature, old_lock, new_lock;
+
+ /* if we are not changing this feature, move along */
+ if (!(feature & uaf->mask))
+ continue;
+
+ old_feature = af.features & feature;
+ new_feature = uaf->features & feature;
+ new_lock = (uaf->lock | af.lock) & feature;
+ old_lock = af.lock & feature;
+
+ /* are we changing a locked feature? */
+ if ((af.lock & feature) && (new_feature != old_feature)) {
+ audit_log_feature_change(i, old_feature, new_feature,
+ old_lock, new_lock, 0);
+ return -EPERM;
+ }
+ }
+ /* nothing invalid, do the changes */
+ for (i = 0; i <= AUDIT_LAST_FEATURE; i++) {
+ u32 feature = AUDIT_FEATURE_TO_MASK(i);
+ u32 old_feature, new_feature, old_lock, new_lock;
+
+ /* if we are not changing this feature, move along */
+ if (!(feature & uaf->mask))
+ continue;
+
+ old_feature = af.features & feature;
+ new_feature = uaf->features & feature;
+ old_lock = af.lock & feature;
+ new_lock = (uaf->lock | af.lock) & feature;
+
+ if (new_feature != old_feature)
+ audit_log_feature_change(i, old_feature, new_feature,
+ old_lock, new_lock, 1);
+
+ if (new_feature)
+ af.features |= feature;
+ else
+ af.features &= ~feature;
+ af.lock |= new_lock;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
{
u32 seq;
@@ -699,7 +798,16 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_buff *skb, struct nlmsghdr *nlh)
if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_BACKLOG_LIMIT)
err = audit_set_backlog_limit(status_get->backlog_limit);
break;
- case AUDIT_USER:
+ case AUDIT_GET_FEATURE:
+ err = audit_get_feature(skb);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ break;
+ case AUDIT_SET_FEATURE:
+ err = audit_set_feature(skb);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ break;
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG:
case AUDIT_FIRST_USER_MSG2 ... AUDIT_LAST_USER_MSG2:
if (!audit_enabled && msg_type != AUDIT_USER_AVC)
--
1.8.2.1
10 years, 2 months
[PATCH 0/4] arm64: Add audit support
by AKASHI Takahiro
This patchset adds audit support on arm64.
The implementation is just like in other architectures,
and so I think little explanation is needed.
I verified this patch with some commands on both 64-bit rootfs
and 32-bit rootfs(, but only in little-endian):
# auditctl -a exit,always -S openat -F path=/etc/inittab
# auditctl -a exit,always -F dir=/tmp -F perm=rw
# auditctl -a task,always
# autrace /bin/ls
What else?
(Thanks to Clayton for his cross-compiling patch)
I'd like to discuss about the following issues:
(issues)
* AUDIT_ARCH_*
Why do we need to distiguish big-endian and little-endian? [2/4]
* AArch32
We need to add a check for identifying the endian in 32-bit tasks. [3/4]
* syscall no in AArch32
Currently all the definitions are added in unistd32.h with
"ifdef __AARCH32_AUDITSYSCALL" to use asm-generic/audit_*.h. [3/4]
"ifdef" is necessary to avoid a conflict with 64-bit definitions.
Do we need a more sophisticated way?
* TIF_AUDITSYSCALL
Most architectures, except x86, do not check TIF_AUDITSYSCALL. Why not? [4/4]
* Userspace audit package
There are some missing syscall definitions in lib/aarch64_table.h.
There is no support for AUDIT_ARCH_ARM (I mean LE. armeb is BE).
AKASHI Takahiro (4):
audit: Enable arm64 support
arm64: Add audit support
arm64: audit: Add AArch32 support
arm64: audit: Add audit hook in ptrace/syscall_trace
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 3 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/audit32.h | 12 ++
arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h | 5 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/syscall.h | 18 ++
arch/arm64/include/asm/thread_info.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/unistd32.h | 387 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 4 +
arch/arm64/kernel/audit.c | 77 +++++++
arch/arm64/kernel/audit32.c | 46 ++++
arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 3 +
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 12 ++
include/uapi/linux/audit.h | 2 +
init/Kconfig | 2 +-
13 files changed, 571 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 arch/arm64/include/asm/audit32.h
create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/audit.c
create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/audit32.c
--
1.7.9.5
10 years, 5 months
[PATCH] Support for auditing on the actions of a not-yet-executed process.
by Peter Moody
eg:
-a exit,always -F arch=b64 -S socket -F 'a0!=1' -F exe=/bin/bash -F success=1
to see instances of /bin/bash opening a non-local socket. Or
-a exit,always -F arch=b64 -S socket -F 'a0!=1' -F exe_children=/bin/bash -F success=1
to instances of /bin/bash, and any descendant processes, opening a non local socket.
proposed https://www.redhat.com/archives/linux-audit/2012-June/msg00002.html
and it seemed like there was interest.
Signed-off-by: Peter Moody <pmoody(a)google.com>
---
trunk/lib/errormsg.h | 2 +-
trunk/lib/fieldtab.h | 2 ++
trunk/lib/libaudit.c | 11 +++++++++++
trunk/lib/libaudit.h | 7 ++++++-
4 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/trunk/lib/errormsg.h b/trunk/lib/errormsg.h
index 4d996d5..cd595ec 100644
--- a/trunk/lib/errormsg.h
+++ b/trunk/lib/errormsg.h
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static const struct msg_tab err_msgtab[] = {
{ -15, 2, "-F unknown errno -"},
{ -16, 2, "-F unknown file type - " },
{ -17, 1, "can only be used with exit and entry filter list" },
- { -18, 1, "" }, // Unused
+ { -18, 1, "only takes = operator" },
{ -19, 0, "Key field needs a watch or syscall given prior to it" },
{ -20, 2, "-F missing value after operation for" },
{ -21, 2, "-F value should be number for" },
diff --git a/trunk/lib/fieldtab.h b/trunk/lib/fieldtab.h
index c0432cc..245b541 100644
--- a/trunk/lib/fieldtab.h
+++ b/trunk/lib/fieldtab.h
@@ -66,3 +66,5 @@ _S(AUDIT_ARG3, "a3" )
_S(AUDIT_FILTERKEY, "key" )
_S(AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE, "field_compare" )
+_S(AUDIT_EXE, "exe" )
+_S(AUDIT_EXE_CHILDREN, "exe_children" )
diff --git a/trunk/lib/libaudit.c b/trunk/lib/libaudit.c
index 20eaf5f..06eed86 100644
--- a/trunk/lib/libaudit.c
+++ b/trunk/lib/libaudit.c
@@ -1400,6 +1400,17 @@ int audit_rule_fieldpair_data(struct audit_rule_data **rulep, const char *pair,
else
return -21;
break;
+ case AUDIT_EXE_CHILDREN:
+ case AUDIT_EXE:
+ {
+ struct stat buf;
+ if ((stat(v, &buf)) < 0)
+ return -2;
+ if (op != AUDIT_EQUAL)
+ return -18;
+ rule->values[rule->field_count] = (unsigned long)buf.st_ino;
+ }
+ break;
case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR...AUDIT_INODE:
case AUDIT_SUCCESS:
if (flags != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT)
diff --git a/trunk/lib/libaudit.h b/trunk/lib/libaudit.h
index 89dd588..2c8a802 100644
--- a/trunk/lib/libaudit.h
+++ b/trunk/lib/libaudit.h
@@ -243,6 +243,12 @@ extern "C" {
#ifndef AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE
#define AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE 111
#endif
+#ifndef AUDIT_EXE
+#define AUDIT_EXE 112
+#endif
+#ifndef AUDIT_EXE_CHILDREN
+#define AUDIT_EXE_CHILDREN 113
+#endif
#ifndef AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID
#define AUDIT_COMPARE_UID_TO_OBJ_UID 1
@@ -524,4 +530,3 @@ extern void audit_rule_free_data(struct audit_rule_data *rule);
#endif
#endif
-
--
1.7.7.3
10 years, 6 months
[PATCH 1/4] SH: define syscall_get_arch() for superh
by Eric Paris
This patch defines syscall_get_arch() for the superh platform. It does
so in both syscall_32.h and syscall_64.h. I'm not certain if the
implementation in syscall_64.h couldn't just be used in syscall.h as I
can't really track the setting of CONFIG_64BIT...
This way is safe, but we might be able to combine these if a superh
person were able to review...
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com>
Cc: linux-sh(a)vger.kernel.org
---
arch/sh/include/asm/syscall_32.h | 10 ++++++++++
arch/sh/include/asm/syscall_64.h | 14 ++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 24 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/sh/include/asm/syscall_32.h b/arch/sh/include/asm/syscall_32.h
index 7d80df4..460e9c6 100644
--- a/arch/sh/include/asm/syscall_32.h
+++ b/arch/sh/include/asm/syscall_32.h
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
#ifndef __ASM_SH_SYSCALL_32_H
#define __ASM_SH_SYSCALL_32_H
+#include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/err.h>
@@ -93,4 +94,13 @@ static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
}
}
+static inline int syscall_get_arch(void)
+{
+ int arch = EM_SH;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ arch |= __AUDIT_ARCH_LE;
+#endif
+ return arch;
+}
#endif /* __ASM_SH_SYSCALL_32_H */
diff --git a/arch/sh/include/asm/syscall_64.h b/arch/sh/include/asm/syscall_64.h
index c3561ca..e03e77d 100644
--- a/arch/sh/include/asm/syscall_64.h
+++ b/arch/sh/include/asm/syscall_64.h
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
#ifndef __ASM_SH_SYSCALL_64_H
#define __ASM_SH_SYSCALL_64_H
+#include <uapi/linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/kernel.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <asm/ptrace.h>
@@ -61,4 +62,17 @@ static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
memcpy(®s->regs[2 + i], args, n * sizeof(args[0]));
}
+static inline int syscall_get_arch(void)
+{
+ int arch = EM_SH;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
+ arch |= __AUDIT_ARCH_64BIT;
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_LITTLE_ENDIAN
+ arch |= __AUDIT_ARCH_LE;
+#endif
+
+ return arch;
+}
#endif /* __ASM_SH_SYSCALL_64_H */
--
1.8.5.3
10 years, 6 months
[PATCH for v3.14] AUDIT: Allow login in non-init namespaces
by Eric Paris
It its possible to configure your PAM stack to refuse login if
audit messages (about the login) were unable to be sent. This is common
in many distros and thus normal configuration of many containers. The
PAM modules determine if audit is enabled/disabled in the kernel based
on the return value from sending an audit message on the netlink socket.
If userspace gets back ECONNREFUSED it believes audit is disabled in the
kernel. If it gets any other error else it refuses to let the login
proceed.
Just about ever since the introduction of namespaces the kernel audit
subsystem has returned EPERM if the task sending a message was not in
the init user or pid namespace. So many forms of containers have never
worked if audit was enabled in the kernel.
BUT if the container was not in net_init then the kernel network code
would send ECONNREFUSED (instead of the audit code sending EPERM). Thus
by pure accident/dumb luck/bug if an admin configured the PAM stack to
reject all logins that didn't talk to audit, but then ran the login
untility in the non-init_net namespace, it would work!! Clearly this
was a bug, but it is a bug some people expected.
With the introduction of network namespace support in 3.14-rc1 the two
bugs stopped cancelling each other out. Now, containers in the
non-init_net namespace refused to let users log in (just like PAM was
configfured!) Obviously some people were not happy that what used to
let users log in, now didn't!
This fix is kinda hacky. We return ECONNREFUSED for all non-init
relevant namespaces. That means that not only will the old broken
non-init_net setups continue to work, now the broken non-init_pid or
non-init_user setups will 'work'. They don't really work, since audit
isn't logging things. But it's what most users want.
In 3.15 we should have patches to support not only the non-init_net
(3.14) namespace but also the non-init_pid and non-init_user namespace.
So all will be right in the world. This just opens the doors wide open
on 3.14 and hopefully makes users happy, if not the audit system...
Reported-by: Andre Tomt <andre(a)tomt.net>
Reported-by: Adam Richter <adam_richter2004(a)yahoo.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com>
---
kernel/audit.c | 12 +++++++++++-
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c
index 3392d3e..95a20f3 100644
--- a/kernel/audit.c
+++ b/kernel/audit.c
@@ -608,9 +608,19 @@ static int audit_netlink_ok(struct sk_buff *skb, u16 msg_type)
int err = 0;
/* Only support the initial namespaces for now. */
+ /*
+ * We return ECONNREFUSED because it tricks userspace into thinking
+ * that audit was not configured into the kernel. Lots of users
+ * configure their PAM stack (because that's what the distro does)
+ * to reject login if unable to send messages to audit. If we return
+ * ECONNREFUSED the PAM stack thinks the kernel does not have audit
+ * configured in and will let login proceed. If we return EPERM
+ * userspace will reject all logins. This should be removed when we
+ * support non init namespaces!!
+ */
if ((current_user_ns() != &init_user_ns) ||
(task_active_pid_ns(current) != &init_pid_ns))
- return -EPERM;
+ return -ECONNREFUSED;
switch (msg_type) {
case AUDIT_LIST:
--
1.8.5.3
10 years, 6 months
[PATCH] ausearch: Add checkpoint capability and have incomplete logs carry forward when processing multiple audit.log files
by Burn Alting
All,
Attached is a patch for review.
It is against revision 829 within http://svn.fedorahosted.org/svn/audit
This patch
- allows ausearch to checkpoint itself, in that, successive invocations
will only display new events. This is enabled via the --checkpoint fn
option. The mods to ausearch.8 describe the method of achieving this.
- fixes a minor annoyance/bug in that, when ausearch processes events
from multiple audit.log files, incomplete events are considered as
complete (and hence printed) when ausearch encounters an EOF on input
from all the log files being processed. Now, ausearch only flushes
incomplete events on the last log file being processed.
Regards
Burn Alting
10 years, 7 months
[PATCH] netlink: simplify nfnetlink_bind
by Richard Guy Briggs
Remove duplicity and simplify code flow by moving the rcu_read_unlock() above
the condition and let the flow control exit naturally at the end of the
function.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
---
net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c | 4 +---
1 files changed, 1 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
index 046aa13..75619f9 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nfnetlink.c
@@ -399,12 +399,10 @@ static void nfnetlink_bind(int group)
rcu_read_lock();
ss = nfnetlink_get_subsys(type);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
if (!ss) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
request_module("nfnetlink-subsys-%d", type);
- return;
}
- rcu_read_unlock();
}
#endif
--
1.7.1
10 years, 7 months
[PATCH 1/2] syscall_get_arch: remove useless function arguments
by Eric Paris
Every caller of syscall_get_arch() uses current for the task and no
implementors of the function need args. So just get rid of both of
those things. Admittedly, since these are inline functions we aren't
wasting stack space, but it just makes the prototypes better.
Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis(a)redhat.com>
Cc: linux-arm-kernel(a)lists.infradead.org
Cc: linux-mips(a)linux-mips.org
Cc: linux390(a)de.ibm.com
Cc: x86(a)kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-s390(a)vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-arch(a)vger.kernel.org
---
arch/arm/include/asm/syscall.h | 3 +--
arch/mips/include/asm/syscall.h | 2 +-
arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c | 2 +-
arch/s390/include/asm/syscall.h | 5 ++---
arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h | 8 +++-----
include/asm-generic/syscall.h | 4 +---
kernel/seccomp.c | 4 ++--
7 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm/include/asm/syscall.h b/arch/arm/include/asm/syscall.h
index 73ddd72..ed805f1 100644
--- a/arch/arm/include/asm/syscall.h
+++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/syscall.h
@@ -103,8 +103,7 @@ static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
memcpy(®s->ARM_r0 + i, args, n * sizeof(args[0]));
}
-static inline int syscall_get_arch(struct task_struct *task,
- struct pt_regs *regs)
+static inline int syscall_get_arch(void)
{
/* ARM tasks don't change audit architectures on the fly. */
return AUDIT_ARCH_ARM;
diff --git a/arch/mips/include/asm/syscall.h b/arch/mips/include/asm/syscall.h
index 81c8913..625e709 100644
--- a/arch/mips/include/asm/syscall.h
+++ b/arch/mips/include/asm/syscall.h
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ extern const unsigned long sys_call_table[];
extern const unsigned long sys32_call_table[];
extern const unsigned long sysn32_call_table[];
-static inline int __syscall_get_arch(void)
+static inline int syscall_get_arch(void)
{
int arch = EM_MIPS;
#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT
diff --git a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
index b52e1d2..65ba622 100644
--- a/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/arch/mips/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ asmlinkage void syscall_trace_enter(struct pt_regs *regs)
if (unlikely(test_thread_flag(TIF_SYSCALL_TRACEPOINT)))
trace_sys_enter(regs, regs->regs[2]);
- audit_syscall_entry(__syscall_get_arch(),
+ audit_syscall_entry(syscall_get_arch(),
regs->regs[2],
regs->regs[4], regs->regs[5],
regs->regs[6], regs->regs[7]);
diff --git a/arch/s390/include/asm/syscall.h b/arch/s390/include/asm/syscall.h
index cd29d2f..bebc0bd 100644
--- a/arch/s390/include/asm/syscall.h
+++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/syscall.h
@@ -89,11 +89,10 @@ static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
regs->orig_gpr2 = args[0];
}
-static inline int syscall_get_arch(struct task_struct *task,
- struct pt_regs *regs)
+static inline int syscall_get_arch(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT
- if (test_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_31BIT))
+ if (test_tsk_thread_flag(current, TIF_31BIT))
return AUDIT_ARCH_S390;
#endif
return sizeof(long) == 8 ? AUDIT_ARCH_S390X : AUDIT_ARCH_S390;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h
index aea284b..7e6d0c4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/syscall.h
@@ -91,8 +91,7 @@ static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
memcpy(®s->bx + i, args, n * sizeof(args[0]));
}
-static inline int syscall_get_arch(struct task_struct *task,
- struct pt_regs *regs)
+static inline int syscall_get_arch(void)
{
return AUDIT_ARCH_I386;
}
@@ -221,8 +220,7 @@ static inline void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task,
}
}
-static inline int syscall_get_arch(struct task_struct *task,
- struct pt_regs *regs)
+static inline int syscall_get_arch(void)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
/*
@@ -234,7 +232,7 @@ static inline int syscall_get_arch(struct task_struct *task,
*
* x32 tasks should be considered AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64.
*/
- if (task_thread_info(task)->status & TS_COMPAT)
+ if (task_thread_info(current)->status & TS_COMPAT)
return AUDIT_ARCH_I386;
#endif
/* Both x32 and x86_64 are considered "64-bit". */
diff --git a/include/asm-generic/syscall.h b/include/asm-generic/syscall.h
index 5b09392..d401e54 100644
--- a/include/asm-generic/syscall.h
+++ b/include/asm-generic/syscall.h
@@ -144,8 +144,6 @@ void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
/**
* syscall_get_arch - return the AUDIT_ARCH for the current system call
- * @task: task of interest, must be in system call entry tracing
- * @regs: task_pt_regs() of @task
*
* Returns the AUDIT_ARCH_* based on the system call convention in use.
*
@@ -155,5 +153,5 @@ void syscall_set_arguments(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs,
* Architectures which permit CONFIG_HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER must
* provide an implementation of this.
*/
-int syscall_get_arch(struct task_struct *task, struct pt_regs *regs);
+int syscall_get_arch(void);
#endif /* _ASM_SYSCALL_H */
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c
index b7a1004..eda2da3 100644
--- a/kernel/seccomp.c
+++ b/kernel/seccomp.c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ u32 seccomp_bpf_load(int off)
if (off == BPF_DATA(nr))
return syscall_get_nr(current, regs);
if (off == BPF_DATA(arch))
- return syscall_get_arch(current, regs);
+ return syscall_get_arch();
if (off >= BPF_DATA(args[0]) && off < BPF_DATA(args[6])) {
unsigned long value;
int arg = (off - BPF_DATA(args[0])) / sizeof(u64);
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ static void seccomp_send_sigsys(int syscall, int reason)
info.si_code = SYS_SECCOMP;
info.si_call_addr = (void __user *)KSTK_EIP(current);
info.si_errno = reason;
- info.si_arch = syscall_get_arch(current, task_pt_regs(current));
+ info.si_arch = syscall_get_arch();
info.si_syscall = syscall;
force_sig_info(SIGSYS, &info, current);
}
--
1.8.5.3
10 years, 7 months
