Audit plug-ins development
by Klaus Heinrich Kiwi
Steve,
I'm interested in developing an audit plug-in to forward events to z/OS
RACF (sort of a centralized AAA facility for IBM System Z systems).
I know that the [new] audit dispatcher and the whole audit infrastructure
isn't quite ready yet, but I'd like to start advancing things on my side.
What is your general idea for audit plug-ins deploymet? Would we be able to
contribute the plug-ins to the audit userspace so that they can be
available in the audit source package, and then maybe in a separate binary
package upon building? Can you give us some hints about how would you want
this code contributions and how would you want these blended in the audit
tree?
Thanks,
Klaus K.
--
.:klaus h kiwi <klausk(a)br.ibm.com>:.
17 years, 4 months
- 2
- 1
[PATCH][RFC] V2 Remove SELinux dependencies from linux-audit via LSM
by Casey Schaufler
From: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
This patch interposes LSM interfaces between the audit system
and SELinux. This helps make SELinux a cleaner LSM and clarifies
the interfaces provided by the audit system. The audit system
no longer requires SELinux functions or data structures, making
it available for use by other LSMs.
The audit system interfaces should now be useful to any LSM that
can provide secids and text string representations that match them.
The audit system uses secids only to map to those strings and
treats them as opaque data otherwise. Audit rule information that
is specific to an LSM is maintained through a void *.
The SELinux code uses LSM interfaces to access the audit system,
with the exception of audit_rule_update_callout(), which is
intended to be called at the descretion of an LSM to update the
LSM specific rules.
The LSM interface includes six new entries, four for audit and two
that supply secids from the LSM to networking and audit subsystems.
Also, there were several cases where SELinux code was being called
where LSM interfaces were more appropriate. These uses have been
repaired and the SELinux interfaces are no longer exported.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
---
I believe that I've addressed the comments from V1. Thank
you for your contributions.
diffstat -p1 -w 70 audit0805.patch
include/linux/audit.h | 55 +++++++++-
include/linux/security.h | 80 +++++++++++++++
include/linux/selinux.h | 138 --------------------------
kernel/audit.c | 43 +++-----
kernel/audit.h | 41 -------
kernel/auditfilter.c | 72 ++++---------
kernel/auditsc.c | 45 ++++----
net/netlink/af_netlink.c | 3
security/selinux/exports.c | 42 -------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 55 +++++++++-
security/selinux/include/security.h | 38 +++++++
security/selinux/ss/services.c | 19 +--
12 files changed, 293 insertions(+), 338 deletions(-)
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/include/linux/audit.h
linux-2.6.22-audit/include/linux/audit.h
--- linux-2.6.22-base/include/linux/audit.h 2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/include/linux/audit.h 2007-08-02 09:37:26.000000000
-0700
@@ -321,20 +321,63 @@ struct audit_rule { /* for AUDIT_LIST,
#ifdef __KERNEL__
#include <linux/sched.h>
-struct audit_sig_info {
- uid_t uid;
- pid_t pid;
- char ctx[0];
-};
-
struct audit_buffer;
struct audit_context;
+struct audit_parent;
struct inode;
struct netlink_skb_parms;
struct linux_binprm;
struct mq_attr;
struct mqstat;
+struct audit_sig_info {
+ uid_t uid;
+ pid_t pid;
+ char ctx[0];
+};
+
+struct audit_watch {
+ atomic_t count; /* reference count */
+ char *path; /* insertion path */
+ dev_t dev; /* associated superblock device */
+ unsigned long ino; /* associated inode number */
+ struct audit_parent *parent; /* associated parent */
+ struct list_head wlist; /* entry in parent->watches list */
+ struct list_head rules; /* associated rules */
+};
+
+struct audit_field {
+ u32 type;
+ u32 val;
+ u32 op;
+ char *se_str;
+ void *se_rule;
+};
+
+struct audit_krule {
+ int vers_ops;
+ u32 flags;
+ u32 listnr;
+ u32 action;
+ u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE];
+ u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */
+ u32 field_count;
+ char *filterkey; /* ties events to rules */
+ struct audit_field *fields;
+ struct audit_field *arch_f; /* quick access to arch field */
+ struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */
+ struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */
+ struct list_head rlist; /* entry in audit_watch.rules list */
+};
+
+struct audit_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+ struct audit_krule rule;
+};
+
+extern int audit_rule_update_callout(void);
+
#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/include/linux/security.h
linux-2.6.22-audit/include/linux/security.h
--- linux-2.6.22-base/include/linux/security.h 2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000
-0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/include/linux/security.h 2007-08-02 10:27:11.000000000
-0700
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@
#include <net/flow.h>
struct ctl_table;
+struct audit_krule;
/*
* These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
@@ -1328,6 +1329,14 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*setprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t
size);
int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+ void (*inode_getsecid) (const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+ void (*ipc_getsecid) (const struct kern_ipc_perm *p, u32 *secid);
+ int (*audit_rule_supplied) (struct audit_krule *rule);
+ int (*audit_rule_match) (u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule,
+ struct audit_context *actx);
+ int (*audit_rule_init) (u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule);
+ void (*audit_rule_free) (void *rule);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
int (*unix_stream_connect) (struct socket * sock,
@@ -2122,6 +2131,44 @@ static inline void security_release_secc
return security_ops->release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
}
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode,
+ u32 *secid)
+{
+ security_ops->inode_getsecid(inode, secid);
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *p, u32 *secid)
+{
+ security_ops->ipc_getsecid(p, secid);
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_supplied(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+ return security_ops->audit_rule_supplied(rule);
+}
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *rule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ return security_ops->audit_rule_match(sid, field, op, rule, actx);
+}
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ void **rule)
+{
+ return security_ops->audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, rule);
+}
+
+static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *rule)
+{
+ security_ops->audit_rule_free(rule);
+ return;
+}
+
+
/* prototypes */
extern int security_init (void);
extern int register_security (struct security_operations *ops);
@@ -2796,6 +2843,39 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secc
static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
}
+
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode,
+ u32 *secid);
+{
+}
+
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *p, u32 *secid)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_supplied(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *rule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ void **rule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_audit_rule_free(void *rule)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/include/linux/selinux.h
linux-2.6.22-audit/include/linux/selinux.h
--- linux-2.6.22-base/include/linux/selinux.h 2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000
-0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/include/linux/selinux.h 2007-08-02 12:32:33.000000000
-0700
@@ -14,101 +14,9 @@
#ifndef _LINUX_SELINUX_H
#define _LINUX_SELINUX_H
-struct selinux_audit_rule;
-struct audit_context;
-struct inode;
-struct kern_ipc_perm;
-
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX
/**
- * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure.
- * @field: the field this rule refers to
- * @op: the operater the rule uses
- * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
- * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
- *
- * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure
- * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with
- * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
- */
-int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- struct selinux_audit_rule **rule);
-
-/**
- * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
- * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed
- *
- * This will free all memory associated with the given rule.
- * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed.
- */
-void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule);
-
-/**
- * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
- * @sid: the context ID to check
- * @field: the field this rule refers to
- * @op: the operater the rule uses
- * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against
- * @actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check
- *
- * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
- * -errno on failure.
- */
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
- struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
- struct audit_context *actx);
-
-/**
- * selinux_audit_set_callback - set the callback for policy reloads.
- * @callback: the function to call when the policy is reloaded
- *
- * This sets the function callback function that will update the rules
- * upon policy reloads. This callback should rebuild all existing rules
- * using selinux_audit_rule_init().
- */
-void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void));
-
-/**
- * selinux_sid_to_string - map a security context ID to a string
- * @sid: security context ID to be converted.
- * @ctx: address of context string to be returned
- * @ctxlen: length of returned context string.
- *
- * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the context
- * string will be allocated internally, and the caller must call
- * kfree() on it after use.
- */
-int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen);
-
-/**
- * selinux_get_inode_sid - get the inode's security context ID
- * @inode: inode structure to get the sid from.
- * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
- *
- * Returns nothing
- */
-void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid);
-
-/**
- * selinux_get_ipc_sid - get the ipc security context ID
- * @ipcp: ipc structure to get the sid from.
- * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
- *
- * Returns nothing
- */
-void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid);
-
-/**
- * selinux_get_task_sid - return the SID of task
- * @tsk: the task whose SID will be returned
- * @sid: pointer to security context ID to be filled in.
- *
- * Returns nothing
- */
-void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid);
-
-/**
* selinux_string_to_sid - map a security context string to a security ID
* @str: the security context string to be mapped
* @sid: ID value returned via this.
@@ -132,52 +40,6 @@ int selinux_relabel_packet_permission(u3
#else
-static inline int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op,
- char *rulestr,
- struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
-{
- return -ENOTSUPP;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
-{
- return;
-}
-
-static inline int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
- struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
- struct audit_context *actx)
-{
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
-{
- return;
-}
-
-static inline int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
-{
- *ctx = NULL;
- *ctxlen = 0;
- return 0;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid)
-{
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32
*sid)
-{
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
-static inline void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid)
-{
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
static inline int selinux_string_to_sid(const char *str, u32 *sid)
{
*sid = 0;
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/kernel/audit.c linux-2.6.22-audit/kernel/audit.c
--- linux-2.6.22-base/kernel/audit.c 2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/kernel/audit.c 2007-08-02 13:15:02.000000000 -0700
@@ -55,7 +55,6 @@
#include <net/netlink.h>
#include <linux/skbuff.h>
#include <linux/netlink.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/inotify.h>
#include <linux/freezer.h>
@@ -252,12 +251,12 @@ static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limi
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if ((rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
+ if ((rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u"
" subj=%s res=%d",
limit, old, loginuid, ctx, res);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
} else
res = 0; /* Something weird, deny request */
}
@@ -287,12 +286,12 @@ static int audit_set_backlog_limit(int l
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if ((rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
+ if ((rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u"
" subj=%s res=%d",
limit, old, loginuid, ctx, res);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
} else
res = 0; /* Something weird, deny request */
}
@@ -325,12 +324,12 @@ static int audit_set_enabled(int state,
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if ((rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
+ if ((rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u"
" subj=%s res=%d",
state, old, loginuid, ctx, res);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
} else
res = 0; /* Something weird, deny request */
}
@@ -365,12 +364,12 @@ static int audit_set_failure(int state,
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if ((rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
+ if ((rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u"
" subj=%s res=%d",
state, old, loginuid, ctx, res);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
} else
res = 0; /* Something weird, deny request */
}
@@ -590,7 +589,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_PID) {
int old = audit_pid;
if (sid) {
- if ((err = selinux_sid_to_string(
+ if ((err = security_secid_to_secctx(
sid, &ctx, &len)))
return err;
else
@@ -599,7 +598,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
"audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid=%u subj=%s",
status_get->pid, old,
loginuid, ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
} else
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_pid=%d old=%d by auid=%u",
@@ -628,7 +627,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
"user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u",
pid, uid, loginuid);
if (sid) {
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
sid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab,
" ssid=%u", sid);
@@ -636,7 +635,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
} else
audit_log_format(ab,
" subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
audit_log_format(ab, " msg='%.1024s'",
(char *)data);
@@ -657,7 +656,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
"pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u",
pid, uid, loginuid);
if (sid) {
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
sid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab,
" ssid=%u", sid);
@@ -665,7 +664,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
} else
audit_log_format(ab,
" subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
audit_log_format(ab, " audit_enabled=%d res=0",
audit_enabled);
@@ -691,7 +690,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
"pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u",
pid, uid, loginuid);
if (sid) {
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
sid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab,
" ssid=%u", sid);
@@ -699,7 +698,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
} else
audit_log_format(ab,
" subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
audit_log_format(ab, " audit_enabled=%d res=0",
audit_enabled);
@@ -714,18 +713,18 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
loginuid, sid);
break;
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
- err = selinux_sid_to_string(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
if (err)
return err;
sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
if (!sig_data) {
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return -ENOMEM;
}
sig_data->uid = audit_sig_uid;
sig_data->pid = audit_sig_pid;
memcpy(sig_data->ctx, ctx, len);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
audit_send_reply(NETLINK_CB(skb).pid, seq, AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO,
0, 0, sig_data, sizeof(*sig_data) + len);
kfree(sig_data);
@@ -805,10 +804,6 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
audit_initialized = 1;
audit_enabled = audit_default;
- /* Register the callback with selinux. This callback will be invoked
- * when a new policy is loaded. */
- selinux_audit_set_callback(&selinux_audit_rule_update);
-
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "initialized");
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/kernel/auditfilter.c linux-2.6.22-audit/kernel/auditfilter.c
--- linux-2.6.22-base/kernel/auditfilter.c 2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/kernel/auditfilter.c 2007-08-02 13:16:06.000000000 -0700
@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@
#include <linux/netlink.h>
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/inotify.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include "audit.h"
/*
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@
* Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist
* data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access
* contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque
- * selinux rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
+ * LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures
* must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist.
* An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may
* be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held.
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struc
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
kfree(f->se_str);
- selinux_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
+ security_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
}
kfree(e->rule.fields);
kfree(e->rule.filterkey);
@@ -588,12 +588,12 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to
goto exit_free;
entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
- err = selinux_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
- &f->se_rule);
+ err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
+ &f->se_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux "
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM "
"\'%s\' is invalid\n", str);
err = 0;
}
@@ -832,10 +832,10 @@ out:
return new;
}
-/* Duplicate selinux field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be
- * re-initialized. */
-static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
- struct audit_field *sf)
+/* Duplicate security module field information.
+ * The se_rule is opaque, so must be re-initialized. */
+static inline int audit_dupe_security_field(struct audit_field *df,
+ struct audit_field *sf)
{
int ret = 0;
char *se_str;
@@ -847,12 +847,12 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_fie
df->se_str = se_str;
/* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */
- ret = selinux_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
- &df->se_rule);
+ ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
+ &df->se_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
- printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for selinux \'%s\' is "
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is "
"invalid\n", df->se_str);
ret = 0;
}
@@ -861,7 +861,7 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_fie
}
/* Duplicate an audit rule. This will be a deep copy with the exception
- * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The selinux specific fields
+ * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The LSM specific fields
* will be updated in the copy. The point is to be able to replace the old
* rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule.
* The rlist element is undefined; list manipulations are handled apart from
@@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_ru
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
+ err = audit_dupe_security_field(&new->fields[i],
&old->fields[i]);
break;
case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
@@ -1210,7 +1210,7 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct
struct audit_entry *e;
struct audit_field *inode_f = entry->rule.inode_f;
struct audit_watch *watch = entry->rule.watch;
- struct nameidata *ndp, *ndw;
+ struct nameidata *ndp = NULL, *ndw = NULL;
int h, err, putnd_needed = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
int dont_count = 0;
@@ -1453,11 +1453,11 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
else
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
audit_log_format(ab, " op=%s rule key=", action);
if (rule->filterkey)
@@ -1695,38 +1695,12 @@ unlock_and_return:
return result;
}
-/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields. Returns 1 if there
- are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. */
-static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
- switch (f->type) {
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules.
- * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain selinux
+ * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
- * selinux field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
+ * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
* updated rule. */
-int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
+int audit_rule_update_callout(void)
{
struct audit_entry *entry, *n, *nentry;
struct audit_watch *watch;
@@ -1737,7 +1711,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
- if (!audit_rule_has_selinux(&entry->rule))
+ if (!security_audit_rule_supplied(&entry->rule))
continue;
watch = entry->rule.watch;
@@ -1747,7 +1721,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
* return value */
if (!err)
err = PTR_ERR(nentry);
- audit_panic("error updating selinux filters");
+ audit_panic("error updating LSM filters");
if (watch)
list_del(&entry->rule.rlist);
list_del_rcu(&entry->list);
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/kernel/audit.h linux-2.6.22-audit/kernel/audit.h
--- linux-2.6.22-base/kernel/audit.h 2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/kernel/audit.h 2007-08-01 21:55:27.000000000 -0700
@@ -55,46 +55,6 @@ enum audit_state {
/* Rule lists */
struct audit_parent;
-struct audit_watch {
- atomic_t count; /* reference count */
- char *path; /* insertion path */
- dev_t dev; /* associated superblock device */
- unsigned long ino; /* associated inode number */
- struct audit_parent *parent; /* associated parent */
- struct list_head wlist; /* entry in parent->watches list */
- struct list_head rules; /* associated rules */
-};
-
-struct audit_field {
- u32 type;
- u32 val;
- u32 op;
- char *se_str;
- struct selinux_audit_rule *se_rule;
-};
-
-struct audit_krule {
- int vers_ops;
- u32 flags;
- u32 listnr;
- u32 action;
- u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE];
- u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */
- u32 field_count;
- char *filterkey; /* ties events to rules */
- struct audit_field *fields;
- struct audit_field *arch_f; /* quick access to arch field */
- struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */
- struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */
- struct list_head rlist; /* entry in audit_watch.rules list */
-};
-
-struct audit_entry {
- struct list_head list;
- struct rcu_head rcu;
- struct audit_krule rule;
-};
-
extern int audit_pid;
#define AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS 32
@@ -129,7 +89,6 @@ struct inotify_watch;
extern void audit_free_parent(struct inotify_watch *);
extern void audit_handle_ievent(struct inotify_watch *, u32, u32, u32,
const char *, struct inode *);
-extern int selinux_audit_rule_update(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
extern int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t);
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/kernel/auditsc.c linux-2.6.22-audit/kernel/auditsc.c
--- linux-2.6.22-base/kernel/auditsc.c 2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/kernel/auditsc.c 2007-08-02 13:27:06.000000000 -0700
@@ -62,7 +62,6 @@
#include <linux/security.h>
#include <linux/list.h>
#include <linux/tty.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/binfmts.h>
#include <linux/highmem.h>
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
@@ -406,10 +405,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct tas
logged upon error */
if (f->se_rule) {
if (need_sid) {
- selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
f->op,
f->se_rule,
ctx);
@@ -425,12 +424,12 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct tas
if (f->se_rule) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
- result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(
name->osid, f->type, f->op,
f->se_rule, ctx);
} else if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(
ctx->names[j].osid,
f->type, f->op,
f->se_rule, ctx)) {
@@ -446,7 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct tas
aux = aux->next) {
if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
- if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule,
ctx)) {
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule,
ctx)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -759,11 +758,11 @@ void audit_log_task_context(struct audit
int error;
u32 sid;
- selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
if (!sid)
return;
- error = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
@@ -771,7 +770,7 @@ void audit_log_task_context(struct audit
}
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
return;
error_path:
@@ -823,7 +822,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct
if (!ab)
return 1;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &s, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &s, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d obj=(none)", pid);
rc = 1;
} else
@@ -954,14 +953,14 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_
if (axi->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
axi->osid);
call_panic = 1;
} else
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
break; }
@@ -1081,13 +1080,13 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_
if (n->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
call_panic = 2;
} else
audit_log_format(ab, " obj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
audit_log_end(ab);
@@ -1369,7 +1368,7 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audi
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &name->osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
}
/**
@@ -1787,7 +1786,7 @@ int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm
ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
- selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
ax->d.next = context->aux;
@@ -1948,7 +1947,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
context->target_pid = t->pid;
- selinux_get_task_sid(t, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
}
/**
@@ -2005,7 +2004,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct
audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
else
audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
- selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
}
if (!audit_signals) /* audit_context checked in wrapper */
@@ -2015,7 +2014,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct
* in audit_context */
if (!ctx->target_pid) {
ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
- selinux_get_task_sid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
return 0;
}
@@ -2032,7 +2031,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct
BUG_ON(axp->pid_count > AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
- selinux_get_task_sid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
axp->pid_count++;
return 0;
@@ -2060,16 +2059,16 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u",
audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context),
current->uid, current->gid);
- selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
else
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
- kfree(ctx);
+ security_release_secctx(ctx, len);
}
audit_log_format(ab, " pid=%d comm=", current->pid);
audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, current->comm);
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
linux-2.6.22-audit/net/netlink/af_netlink.c
--- linux-2.6.22-base/net/netlink/af_netlink.c 2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000
-0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/net/netlink/af_netlink.c 2007-08-02 08:56:11.000000000
-0700
@@ -54,7 +54,6 @@
#include <linux/mm.h>
#include <linux/types.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
-#include <linux/selinux.h>
#include <linux/mutex.h>
#include <net/sock.h>
@@ -1163,7 +1162,7 @@ static int netlink_sendmsg(struct kiocb
NETLINK_CB(skb).pid = nlk->pid;
NETLINK_CB(skb).dst_group = dst_group;
NETLINK_CB(skb).loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context);
- selinux_get_task_sid(current, &(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid));
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &(NETLINK_CB(skb).sid));
memcpy(NETLINK_CREDS(skb), &siocb->scm->creds, sizeof(struct ucred));
/* What can I do? Netlink is asynchronous, so that
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/security/selinux/exports.c
linux-2.6.22-audit/security/selinux/exports.c
--- linux-2.6.22-base/security/selinux/exports.c 2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000
-0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/security/selinux/exports.c 2007-08-02 12:33:57.000000000
-0700
@@ -21,48 +21,6 @@
#include "security.h"
#include "objsec.h"
-int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled)
- return security_sid_to_context(sid, ctx, ctxlen);
- else {
- *ctx = NULL;
- *ctxlen = 0;
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled) {
- struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
- *sid = isec->sid;
- return;
- }
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
-void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled) {
- struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
- *sid = isec->sid;
- return;
- }
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
-void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid)
-{
- if (selinux_enabled) {
- struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
- *sid = tsec->sid;
- return;
- }
- *sid = 0;
-}
-
int selinux_string_to_sid(char *str, u32 *sid)
{
if (selinux_enabled)
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/security/selinux/hooks.c
linux-2.6.22-audit/security/selinux/hooks.c
--- linux-2.6.22-base/security/selinux/hooks.c 2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000
-0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/security/selinux/hooks.c 2007-08-02 12:32:41.000000000
-0700
@@ -2717,6 +2717,13 @@ static int selinux_file_receive(struct f
/* task security operations */
+static void selinux_get_task_sid(struct task_struct *tsk, u32 *sid)
+{
+ struct task_security_struct *tsec = tsk->security;
+ *sid = tsec->sid;
+ return;
+}
+
static int selinux_task_create(unsigned long clone_flags)
{
int rc;
@@ -3599,8 +3606,8 @@ out:
static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
{
u16 family;
- char *addrp;
- int len, err = 0;
+ char *addrp = NULL;
+ int len = 0, err = 0;
struct avc_audit_data ad;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security;
@@ -3682,6 +3689,13 @@ out:
return err;
}
+static void selinux_get_inode_sid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *sid)
+{
+ struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
+ *sid = isec->sid;
+ return;
+}
+
static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, struct sk_buff
*skb, u32 *secid)
{
u32 peer_secid = SECSID_NULL;
@@ -4014,6 +4028,13 @@ static int selinux_netlink_recv(struct s
SECCLASS_CAPABILITY, CAP_TO_MASK(capability), &ad);
}
+static void selinux_get_ipc_sid(const struct kern_ipc_perm *ipcp, u32 *sid)
+{
+ struct ipc_security_struct *isec = ipcp->security;
+ *sid = isec->sid;
+ return;
+}
+
static int ipc_alloc_security(struct task_struct *task,
struct kern_ipc_perm *perm,
u16 sclass)
@@ -4656,6 +4677,30 @@ static void selinux_release_secctx(char
kfree(secdata);
}
+static int selinux_audit_rule_supplied(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+ switch (f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
@@ -4838,6 +4883,12 @@ static struct security_operations selinu
.secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
.release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
+ .inode_getsecid = selinux_get_inode_sid,
+ .ipc_getsecid = selinux_get_ipc_sid,
+ .audit_rule_supplied = selinux_audit_rule_supplied,
+ .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
+ .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
+ .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
.unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
.unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/security/selinux/include/security.h
linux-2.6.22-audit/security/selinux/include/security.h
--- linux-2.6.22-base/security/selinux/include/security.h 2007-07-08
16:32:17.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/security/selinux/include/security.h 2007-08-02
10:24:36.000000000 -0700
@@ -125,5 +125,43 @@ static inline int security_netlbl_sid_to
const char *security_get_initial_sid_context(u32 sid);
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure.
+ * @field: the field this rule refers to
+ * @op: the operater the rule uses
+ * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule
+ * @vpp: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule
structure
+ * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure
with
+ * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vpp);
+
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure.
+ * @vp: pointer to the audit rule to be freed
+ *
+ * This will free all memory associated with the given rule.
+ * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed.
+ */
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vp);
+
+struct audit_context;
+/**
+ * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule.
+ * @sid: the context ID to check
+ * @field: the field this rule refers to
+ * @op: the operater the rule uses
+ * @vp: pointer to the audit rule to check against
+ * @actx: the audit context (can be NULL) associated with the check
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and
+ * -errno on failure.
+ */
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vp,
+ struct audit_context *actx);
+
+
#endif /* _SELINUX_SECURITY_H_ */
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/security/selinux/ss/services.c
linux-2.6.22-audit/security/selinux/ss/services.c
--- linux-2.6.22-base/security/selinux/ss/services.c 2007-07-08
16:32:17.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/security/selinux/ss/services.c 2007-08-02
10:05:32.000000000 -0700
@@ -2001,17 +2001,19 @@ struct selinux_audit_rule {
struct context au_ctxt;
};
-void selinux_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
+void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vp)
{
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule*)vp;
+
if (rule) {
context_destroy(&rule->au_ctxt);
kfree(rule);
}
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
- struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
+int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vpp)
{
+ struct selinux_audit_rule **rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule**)vpp;
struct selinux_audit_rule *tmprule;
struct role_datum *roledatum;
struct type_datum *typedatum;
@@ -2102,10 +2104,10 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u
return rc;
}
-int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
- struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
+int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vp,
struct audit_context *actx)
{
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule = (struct selinux_audit_rule*)vp;
struct context *ctxt;
struct mls_level *level;
int match = 0;
@@ -2214,7 +2216,7 @@ out:
return match;
}
-static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = NULL;
+static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_rule_update_callout;
static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
@@ -2239,11 +2241,6 @@ static int __init aurule_init(void)
}
__initcall(aurule_init);
-void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
-{
- aurule_callback = callback;
-}
-
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
/*
* NetLabel cache structure
Casey Schaufler
casey(a)schaufler-ca.com
17 years, 4 months
- 2
- 2
Audit rule that applies when auid >= 500
by Søren Olesen
Hello,
I would like some of my audit rules to apply when auid >= 500
For example consider this use case:
[root@localhost audit]# auditctl -v
auditctl version 1.3.1
[root@localhost audit]# cat /etc/audit/audit.rules
# This file contains the auditctl rules that are loaded
# whenever the audit daemon is started via the initscripts.
# The rules are simply the parameters that would be passed
# to auditctl.
# First rule - delete all
-D
# Increase the buffers to survive stress events.
# Make this bigger for busy systems
-b 256
# Feel free to add below this line. See auditctl man page
-a exit,always -S socketcall -F a0=4 -F auid>=500 -k eq_greater_than_test
[root@localhost audit]# /etc/init.d/auditd restart
Stopping auditd: [ OK ]
Starting auditd: [ OK ]
[root@localhost audit]# auditctl -l
LIST_RULES: exit,always a0=4 (0x4) auid=500 (0x1f4) key=eq_greater_than_test syscall=socketcall
In "/etc/audit/audit.rules" I specify that "auid>=500" but "auditctl -l" shows that the rule matches "auid=500".
What is the syntax for creating a rule that applies when auid>=500 ?
Med venlig hilsen / kind regards
Søren Olesen
Systems Engineer
Systematic Software Engineering A/S
Søren Frichs Vej 39, DK-8000 Aarhus C
Tel.: +45 8943 2055
Fax: +45 8943 2020
Web: www.systematic.dk <blocked::http://www.systematic.dk/>
17 years, 4 months
- 2
- 1
Why enable the dist target?
by John D. Ramsdell
Let me give two reasons for enabling the dist target.
1. It makes it easier for those without access to the source code
repository to provide patches. With a distribution generated by
make dist, small modifications to a few Makefile.am files or the
configure.ac file are handled by the make command, which propagates
only the required updates. As a result, diff'ing produces a patch
that is comparable in size to the amount of changes made to source
files.
2. It makes it so that anyone with access to the source code
repository can generate the same distribution, as the dist target
alone specifies what files are to be included. Audit 1.5.6
included files such as auparse/test/test.log, which appear to be
files left over from testing.
I just wanted to explain why I took the time to send recent patches.
John
[ramsdell@goo audit-1.5.6]$ cat ac.diff
--- /home/ramsdell/a.txt 2007-07-30 07:51:13.000000000 -0400
+++ c.txt 2007-07-30 12:59:59.000000000 -0400
@@ -39,24 +42,22 @@
audit-1.5.6/auparse/test/auparse_test.ref
audit-1.5.6/auparse/test/Makefile.am
audit-1.5.6/auparse/test/Makefile.in
-audit-1.5.6/auparse/test/test2.log
-audit-1.5.6/auparse/test/test.log
-audit-1.5.6/auparse/test/tmp
-audit-1.5.6/auparse/test/tmp1
-audit-1.5.6/auparse/test/tmp2
audit-1.5.6/auparse/typetab.h
audit-1.5.6/AUTHORS
-audit-1.5.6/autogen.sh
audit-1.5.6/bindings/
audit-1.5.6/bindings/Makefile.am
+audit-1.5.6/bindings/Makefile.in
audit-1.5.6/bindings/python/
audit-1.5.6/bindings/python/auparse_python.c
audit-1.5.6/bindings/python/Makefile.am
+audit-1.5.6/bindings/python/Makefile.in
audit-1.5.6/bindings/python/setup.py
audit-1.5.6/ChangeLog
audit-1.5.6/compile
audit-1.5.6/config.guess
+audit-1.5.6/config.h.in
audit-1.5.6/config.sub
+audit-1.5.6/configure
audit-1.5.6/configure.ac
audit-1.5.6/contrib/
audit-1.5.6/contrib/avc_snap
17 years, 4 months
- 2
- 1
Setting audit logs as different group ID
by Ameel Kamboh
Is there a way to have the audit log files be a member of a different
group (other then root)
Currently I am seeing this:
-rw-r----- 1 root root 837716 Aug 3 10:06 audit.log
-r--r----- 1 root root 52428840 Aug 3 08:24 audit.log.1
-r--r----- 1 root root 5242936 Jul 24 10:56 audit.log.2
-r--r----- 1 root ntsecadm 5242911 Jul 23 15:33 audit.log.3
I had originally set the group for /var/log/audit/audit.log to
root:ntsecadm during post install or RH5
After the audit logs rotate the new files take on root:root ownership, I
would like them to also be root:ntsecadm
Can this be set in audit.conf?
Ameel Kamboh
SIP Core Network and Security
Phone: 972.685.4922 (esn 445-4922)
Mobile: 978-590-2280
SIP: akamboh(a)techtrial.com
email: akamboh(a)nortel.com
17 years, 4 months
- 2
- 1
Audit messages on console
by Ameel Kamboh
I notice that if the auditd service is not running,
I see all my audit logs go out on the console,
When I start auditd service they go to the appropriate log file.
Is there a way to turn this off in the kernel?
Below is my auditd.conf file:
log_file = /var/log/audit/audit.log
log_format = RAW
priority_boost = 3
flush = INCREMENTAL
freq = 20
num_logs = 10
max_log_file = 50
max_log_file_action = ROTATE
space_left = 750
space_left_action = SYSLOG
action_mail_acct = root
admin_space_left = 250
admin_space_left_action = SYSLOG
disk_full_action = SYSLOG
dispatcher = /usr/sbin/SnareDispatcher /sbin/auditspd
Ameel Kamboh
SIP Core Network and Security
Phone: 972.685.4922 (esn 445-4922)
Mobile: 978-590-2280
SIP: akamboh(a)techtrial.com
email: akamboh(a)nortel.com
17 years, 4 months
- 3
- 3
[PATCH][RFC] V1 Remove SELinux dependencies from linux-audit via LSM
by Casey Schaufler
From: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
This patch removes SELinux specific code from the kernel auditing
system, replacing it with LSM hook invocations that perform the
functions appropriate to those behaviors.
The LSM interface is extended to provide interfaces for a module
to add audit filters. Interfaces are added to get secids from
inodes and ipcs.
The audit code is revised to call these hooks instead of the SELinux
functions. This requires some structure definitions to change header
files.
The SELinux code is changed to export the old interfaces as LSM hooks
instead of doing so directly. The SELinux specific audit filter code
has been moved into the SELinux module.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey(a)schaufler-ca.com>
---
I hope for some suggestions regarding how appropriate the header file
changes I've made are. My confidence level in them is fairly low. Also,
in my haste to get some feedback the testing has been limited. There
are three projects (SELinux, audit, and LSM) whose code I've changed,
and I expect there may be differences of opinion about what's right,
what's wrong, and how to go about reconciling the differences. I see
this as the start.
Thank you.
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/include/linux/audit.h
linux-2.6.22-audit/include/linux/audit.h
--- linux-2.6.22-base/include/linux/audit.h 2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/include/linux/audit.h 2007-08-01 21:55:10.000000000
-0700
@@ -321,20 +321,63 @@ struct audit_rule { /* for AUDIT_LIST,
#ifdef __KERNEL__
#include <linux/sched.h>
-struct audit_sig_info {
- uid_t uid;
- pid_t pid;
- char ctx[0];
-};
-
struct audit_buffer;
struct audit_context;
+struct audit_parent;
struct inode;
struct netlink_skb_parms;
struct linux_binprm;
struct mq_attr;
struct mqstat;
+struct audit_sig_info {
+ uid_t uid;
+ pid_t pid;
+ char ctx[0];
+};
+
+struct audit_watch {
+ atomic_t count; /* reference count */
+ char *path; /* insertion path */
+ dev_t dev; /* associated superblock device */
+ unsigned long ino; /* associated inode number */
+ struct audit_parent *parent; /* associated parent */
+ struct list_head wlist; /* entry in parent->watches list */
+ struct list_head rules; /* associated rules */
+};
+
+struct audit_field {
+ u32 type;
+ u32 val;
+ u32 op;
+ char *se_str;
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *se_rule;
+};
+
+struct audit_krule {
+ int vers_ops;
+ u32 flags;
+ u32 listnr;
+ u32 action;
+ u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE];
+ u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */
+ u32 field_count;
+ char *filterkey; /* ties events to rules */
+ struct audit_field *fields;
+ struct audit_field *arch_f; /* quick access to arch field */
+ struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */
+ struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */
+ struct list_head rlist; /* entry in audit_watch.rules list */
+};
+
+struct audit_entry {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct rcu_head rcu;
+ struct audit_krule rule;
+};
+
+extern int audit_rule_update_callout(void);
+
#define AUDITSC_INVALID 0
#define AUDITSC_SUCCESS 1
#define AUDITSC_FAILURE 2
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/include/linux/security.h
linux-2.6.22-audit/include/linux/security.h
--- linux-2.6.22-base/include/linux/security.h 2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000
-0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/include/linux/security.h 2007-08-01 20:14:18.000000000
-0700
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
#include <net/flow.h>
struct ctl_table;
+struct audit_krule;
+struct selinux_audit_rule;
/*
* These functions are in security/capability.c and are used
@@ -1328,6 +1330,16 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*setprocattr)(struct task_struct *p, char *name, void *value, size_t
size);
int (*secid_to_secctx)(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen);
void (*release_secctx)(char *secdata, u32 seclen);
+ void (*inode_getsecid) (const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid);
+ void (*ipc_getsecid) (struct kern_ipc_perm *p, u32 *secid);
+ int (*audit_rule_supplied) (struct audit_krule *rule);
+ int (*audit_rule_match) (u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
+ struct audit_context *actx);
+ int (*audit_rule_init) (u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ struct selinux_audit_rule **rule);
+ void (*audit_rule_free) (struct selinux_audit_rule *rule);
+
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
int (*unix_stream_connect) (struct socket * sock,
@@ -2122,6 +2134,44 @@ static inline void security_release_secc
return security_ops->release_secctx(secdata, seclen);
}
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode,
+ u32 *secid)
+{
+ security_ops->inode_getsecid(inode, secid);
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *p, u32 *secid)
+{
+ security_ops->ipc_getsecid(p, secid);
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_supplied(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+ return security_ops->audit_rule_supplied(rule);
+}
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ return security_ops->audit_rule_match(sid, field, op, rule, actx);
+}
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
+{
+ return security_ops->audit_rule_init(field, op, rulestr, rule);
+}
+
+static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
+{
+ security_ops->audit_rule_free(rule);
+ return;
+}
+
+
/* prototypes */
extern int security_init (void);
extern int register_security (struct security_operations *ops);
@@ -2796,6 +2846,39 @@ static inline int security_secid_to_secc
static inline void security_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
{
}
+
+static inline void security_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode,
+ u32 *secid);
+{
+}
+
+static inline void security_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *p, u32 *secid)
+{
+}
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_supplied(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op,
+ struct selinux_audit_rule *rule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
+static inline int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr,
+ struct selinux_audit_rule **rule)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static inline void security_audit_rule_free(struct selinux_audit_rule *rule)
+{
+ return;
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/include/linux/selinux.h
linux-2.6.22-audit/include/linux/selinux.h
--- linux-2.6.22-base/include/linux/selinux.h 2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000
-0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/include/linux/selinux.h 2007-08-01 12:21:16.000000000
-0700
@@ -60,16 +60,6 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u3
struct audit_context *actx);
/**
- * selinux_audit_set_callback - set the callback for policy reloads.
- * @callback: the function to call when the policy is reloaded
- *
- * This sets the function callback function that will update the rules
- * upon policy reloads. This callback should rebuild all existing rules
- * using selinux_audit_rule_init().
- */
-void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void));
-
-/**
* selinux_sid_to_string - map a security context ID to a string
* @sid: security context ID to be converted.
* @ctx: address of context string to be returned
@@ -151,11 +141,6 @@ static inline int selinux_audit_rule_mat
return 0;
}
-static inline void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
-{
- return;
-}
-
static inline int selinux_sid_to_string(u32 sid, char **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
{
*ctx = NULL;
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/kernel/audit.c linux-2.6.22-audit/kernel/audit.c
--- linux-2.6.22-base/kernel/audit.c 2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/kernel/audit.c 2007-08-01 12:16:36.000000000 -0700
@@ -252,7 +252,7 @@ static int audit_set_rate_limit(int limi
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if ((rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
+ if ((rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_rate_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u"
" subj=%s res=%d",
@@ -287,7 +287,7 @@ static int audit_set_backlog_limit(int l
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if ((rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
+ if ((rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_backlog_limit=%d old=%d by auid=%u"
" subj=%s res=%d",
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static int audit_set_enabled(int state,
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if ((rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
+ if ((rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_enabled=%d old=%d by auid=%u"
" subj=%s res=%d",
@@ -365,7 +365,7 @@ static int audit_set_failure(int state,
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if ((rc = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
+ if ((rc = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len)) == 0) {
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE,
"audit_failure=%d old=%d by auid=%u"
" subj=%s res=%d",
@@ -590,7 +590,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
if (status_get->mask & AUDIT_STATUS_PID) {
int old = audit_pid;
if (sid) {
- if ((err = selinux_sid_to_string(
+ if ((err = security_secid_to_secctx(
sid, &ctx, &len)))
return err;
else
@@ -628,7 +628,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
"user pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u",
pid, uid, loginuid);
if (sid) {
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
sid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab,
" ssid=%u", sid);
@@ -657,7 +657,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
"pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u",
pid, uid, loginuid);
if (sid) {
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
sid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab,
" ssid=%u", sid);
@@ -691,7 +691,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
"pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u",
pid, uid, loginuid);
if (sid) {
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
sid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab,
" ssid=%u", sid);
@@ -714,7 +714,7 @@ static int audit_receive_msg(struct sk_b
loginuid, sid);
break;
case AUDIT_SIGNAL_INFO:
- err = selinux_sid_to_string(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
+ err = security_secid_to_secctx(audit_sig_sid, &ctx, &len);
if (err)
return err;
sig_data = kmalloc(sizeof(*sig_data) + len, GFP_KERNEL);
@@ -805,10 +805,6 @@ static int __init audit_init(void)
audit_initialized = 1;
audit_enabled = audit_default;
- /* Register the callback with selinux. This callback will be invoked
- * when a new policy is loaded. */
- selinux_audit_set_callback(&selinux_audit_rule_update);
-
audit_log(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_KERNEL, "initialized");
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/kernel/auditfilter.c linux-2.6.22-audit/kernel/auditfilter.c
--- linux-2.6.22-base/kernel/auditfilter.c 2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/kernel/auditfilter.c 2007-08-01 20:22:36.000000000 -0700
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
#include <linux/sched.h>
#include <linux/inotify.h>
#include <linux/selinux.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
#include "audit.h"
/*
@@ -138,7 +139,7 @@ static inline void audit_free_rule(struc
for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) {
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
kfree(f->se_str);
- selinux_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
+ security_audit_rule_free(f->se_rule);
}
kfree(e->rule.fields);
kfree(e->rule.filterkey);
@@ -588,8 +589,8 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to
goto exit_free;
entry->rule.buflen += f->val;
- err = selinux_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
- &f->se_rule);
+ err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str,
+ &f->se_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (err == -EINVAL) {
@@ -832,10 +833,10 @@ out:
return new;
}
-/* Duplicate selinux field information. The se_rule is opaque, so must be
- * re-initialized. */
-static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_field(struct audit_field *df,
- struct audit_field *sf)
+/* Duplicate security module field information.
+ * The se_rule is opaque, so must be re-initialized. */
+static inline int audit_dupe_security_field(struct audit_field *df,
+ struct audit_field *sf)
{
int ret = 0;
char *se_str;
@@ -847,8 +848,8 @@ static inline int audit_dupe_selinux_fie
df->se_str = se_str;
/* our own (refreshed) copy of se_rule */
- ret = selinux_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
- &df->se_rule);
+ ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->se_str,
+ &df->se_rule);
/* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they
* become valid after a policy reload. */
if (ret == -EINVAL) {
@@ -906,7 +907,7 @@ static struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_ru
case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- err = audit_dupe_selinux_field(&new->fields[i],
+ err = audit_dupe_security_field(&new->fields[i],
&old->fields[i]);
break;
case AUDIT_FILTERKEY:
@@ -1210,7 +1211,8 @@ static inline int audit_add_rule(struct
struct audit_entry *e;
struct audit_field *inode_f = entry->rule.inode_f;
struct audit_watch *watch = entry->rule.watch;
- struct nameidata *ndp, *ndw;
+ struct nameidata *ndp = NULL;
+ struct nameidata *ndw = NULL;
int h, err, putnd_needed = 0;
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
int dont_count = 0;
@@ -1453,7 +1455,7 @@ static void audit_log_rule_change(uid_t
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
else
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
@@ -1695,38 +1697,12 @@ unlock_and_return:
return result;
}
-/* Check to see if the rule contains any selinux fields. Returns 1 if there
- are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. */
-static inline int audit_rule_has_selinux(struct audit_krule *rule)
-{
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
- struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
- switch (f->type) {
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
- case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
- case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
- return 1;
- }
- }
-
- return 0;
-}
-
/* This function will re-initialize the se_rule field of all applicable rules.
* It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain selinux
* specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the
* selinux field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the
* updated rule. */
-int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
+int audit_rule_update_callout(void)
{
struct audit_entry *entry, *n, *nentry;
struct audit_watch *watch;
@@ -1737,7 +1713,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_update(void)
for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) {
list_for_each_entry_safe(entry, n, &audit_filter_list[i], list) {
- if (!audit_rule_has_selinux(&entry->rule))
+ if (!security_audit_rule_supplied(&entry->rule))
continue;
watch = entry->rule.watch;
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/kernel/audit.h linux-2.6.22-audit/kernel/audit.h
--- linux-2.6.22-base/kernel/audit.h 2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/kernel/audit.h 2007-08-01 21:55:27.000000000 -0700
@@ -55,46 +55,6 @@ enum audit_state {
/* Rule lists */
struct audit_parent;
-struct audit_watch {
- atomic_t count; /* reference count */
- char *path; /* insertion path */
- dev_t dev; /* associated superblock device */
- unsigned long ino; /* associated inode number */
- struct audit_parent *parent; /* associated parent */
- struct list_head wlist; /* entry in parent->watches list */
- struct list_head rules; /* associated rules */
-};
-
-struct audit_field {
- u32 type;
- u32 val;
- u32 op;
- char *se_str;
- struct selinux_audit_rule *se_rule;
-};
-
-struct audit_krule {
- int vers_ops;
- u32 flags;
- u32 listnr;
- u32 action;
- u32 mask[AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE];
- u32 buflen; /* for data alloc on list rules */
- u32 field_count;
- char *filterkey; /* ties events to rules */
- struct audit_field *fields;
- struct audit_field *arch_f; /* quick access to arch field */
- struct audit_field *inode_f; /* quick access to an inode field */
- struct audit_watch *watch; /* associated watch */
- struct list_head rlist; /* entry in audit_watch.rules list */
-};
-
-struct audit_entry {
- struct list_head list;
- struct rcu_head rcu;
- struct audit_krule rule;
-};
-
extern int audit_pid;
#define AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS 32
@@ -129,7 +89,6 @@ struct inotify_watch;
extern void audit_free_parent(struct inotify_watch *);
extern void audit_handle_ievent(struct inotify_watch *, u32, u32, u32,
const char *, struct inode *);
-extern int selinux_audit_rule_update(void);
#ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
extern int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct task_struct *t);
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/kernel/auditsc.c linux-2.6.22-audit/kernel/auditsc.c
--- linux-2.6.22-base/kernel/auditsc.c 2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/kernel/auditsc.c 2007-08-01 19:50:23.000000000 -0700
@@ -406,10 +406,10 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct tas
logged upon error */
if (f->se_rule) {
if (need_sid) {
- selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = selinux_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
f->op,
f->se_rule,
ctx);
@@ -425,12 +425,12 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct tas
if (f->se_rule) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
- result = selinux_audit_rule_match(
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(
name->osid, f->type, f->op,
f->se_rule, ctx);
} else if (ctx) {
for (j = 0; j < ctx->name_count; j++) {
- if (selinux_audit_rule_match(
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(
ctx->names[j].osid,
f->type, f->op,
f->se_rule, ctx)) {
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct tas
aux = aux->next) {
if (aux->type == AUDIT_IPC) {
struct audit_aux_data_ipcctl *axi = (void *)aux;
- if (selinux_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule,
ctx)) {
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(axi->osid, f->type, f->op, f->se_rule,
ctx)) {
++result;
break;
}
@@ -759,11 +759,11 @@ void audit_log_task_context(struct audit
int error;
u32 sid;
- selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
if (!sid)
return;
- error = selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len);
+ error = security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len);
if (error) {
if (error != -EINVAL)
goto error_path;
@@ -823,7 +823,7 @@ static int audit_log_pid_context(struct
if (!ab)
return 1;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &s, &len)) {
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &s, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, "opid=%d obj=(none)", pid);
rc = 1;
} else
@@ -954,7 +954,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_
if (axi->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
axi->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u",
axi->osid);
@@ -1081,7 +1081,7 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_
if (n->osid != 0) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(
n->osid, &ctx, &len)) {
audit_log_format(ab, " osid=%u", n->osid);
call_panic = 2;
@@ -1369,7 +1369,7 @@ static void audit_copy_inode(struct audi
name->uid = inode->i_uid;
name->gid = inode->i_gid;
name->rdev = inode->i_rdev;
- selinux_get_inode_sid(inode, &name->osid);
+ security_inode_getsecid(inode, &name->osid);
}
/**
@@ -1787,7 +1787,7 @@ int __audit_ipc_obj(struct kern_ipc_perm
ax->uid = ipcp->uid;
ax->gid = ipcp->gid;
ax->mode = ipcp->mode;
- selinux_get_ipc_sid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
+ security_ipc_getsecid(ipcp, &ax->osid);
ax->d.type = AUDIT_IPC;
ax->d.next = context->aux;
@@ -1948,7 +1948,7 @@ void __audit_ptrace(struct task_struct *
struct audit_context *context = current->audit_context;
context->target_pid = t->pid;
- selinux_get_task_sid(t, &context->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &context->target_sid);
}
/**
@@ -2005,7 +2005,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct
audit_sig_uid = ctx->loginuid;
else
audit_sig_uid = tsk->uid;
- selinux_get_task_sid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(tsk, &audit_sig_sid);
}
if (!audit_signals) /* audit_context checked in wrapper */
@@ -2015,7 +2015,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct
* in audit_context */
if (!ctx->target_pid) {
ctx->target_pid = t->tgid;
- selinux_get_task_sid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &ctx->target_sid);
return 0;
}
@@ -2032,7 +2032,7 @@ int __audit_signal_info(int sig, struct
BUG_ON(axp->pid_count > AUDIT_AUX_PIDS);
axp->target_pid[axp->pid_count] = t->tgid;
- selinux_get_task_sid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
+ security_task_getsecid(t, &axp->target_sid[axp->pid_count]);
axp->pid_count++;
return 0;
@@ -2060,12 +2060,12 @@ void audit_core_dumps(long signr)
audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u uid=%u gid=%u",
audit_get_loginuid(current->audit_context),
current->uid, current->gid);
- selinux_get_task_sid(current, &sid);
+ security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
if (sid) {
char *ctx = NULL;
u32 len;
- if (selinux_sid_to_string(sid, &ctx, &len))
+ if (security_secid_to_secctx(sid, &ctx, &len))
audit_log_format(ab, " ssid=%u", sid);
else
audit_log_format(ab, " subj=%s", ctx);
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/security/selinux/hooks.c
linux-2.6.22-audit/security/selinux/hooks.c
--- linux-2.6.22-base/security/selinux/hooks.c 2007-07-08 16:32:17.000000000
-0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/security/selinux/hooks.c 2007-08-01 21:42:32.000000000
-0700
@@ -4656,6 +4656,30 @@ static void selinux_release_secctx(char
kfree(secdata);
}
+static int selinux_audit_rule_supplied(struct audit_krule *rule)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < rule->field_count; i++) {
+ struct audit_field *f = &rule->fields[i];
+ switch (f->type) {
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN:
+ case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_USER:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW:
+ case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, struct task_struct *tsk,
@@ -4838,6 +4862,12 @@ static struct security_operations selinu
.secid_to_secctx = selinux_secid_to_secctx,
.release_secctx = selinux_release_secctx,
+ .inode_getsecid = selinux_get_inode_sid,
+ .ipc_getsecid = selinux_get_ipc_sid,
+ .audit_rule_supplied = selinux_audit_rule_supplied,
+ .audit_rule_match = selinux_audit_rule_match,
+ .audit_rule_init = selinux_audit_rule_init,
+ .audit_rule_free = selinux_audit_rule_free,
.unix_stream_connect = selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect,
.unix_may_send = selinux_socket_unix_may_send,
diff -uprN -X linux-2.6.22-base/Documentation/dontdiff
linux-2.6.22-base/security/selinux/ss/services.c
linux-2.6.22-audit/security/selinux/ss/services.c
--- linux-2.6.22-base/security/selinux/ss/services.c 2007-07-08
16:32:17.000000000 -0700
+++ linux-2.6.22-audit/security/selinux/ss/services.c 2007-08-01
17:48:17.000000000 -0700
@@ -2214,7 +2214,7 @@ out:
return match;
}
-static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = NULL;
+static int (*aurule_callback)(void) = audit_rule_update_callout;
static int aurule_avc_callback(u32 event, u32 ssid, u32 tsid,
u16 class, u32 perms, u32 *retained)
@@ -2239,11 +2239,6 @@ static int __init aurule_init(void)
}
__initcall(aurule_init);
-void selinux_audit_set_callback(int (*callback)(void))
-{
- aurule_callback = callback;
-}
-
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
/*
* NetLabel cache structure
Casey Schaufler
casey(a)schaufler-ca.com
17 years, 4 months
- 2
- 6
[Fwd: [PATCH] improved xfrm_audit_log() patch]
by Joy Latten
Forgot to send to audit list too.
Regards,
Joy Latten
17 years, 4 months
- 1
- 0