[PATCH] audit: log nftables configuration change events once per table
by Richard Guy Briggs
Reduce logging of nftables events to a level similar to iptables.
Restore the table field to list the table, adding the generation.
Indicate the op as the most significant operation in the event.
A couple of sample events:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(2021-03-18 09:30:49.801:143) : proctitle=/usr/bin/python3 -s /usr/sbin/firewalld --nofork --nopid
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(2021-03-18 09:30:49.801:143) : arch=x86_64 syscall=sendmsg success=yes exit=172 a0=0x6 a1=0x7ffdcfcbe650 a2=0x0 a3=0x7ffdcfcbd52c items=0 ppid=1 pid=367 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=roo
t sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=firewalld exe=/usr/bin/python3.9 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 key=(null)
type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2021-03-18 09:30:49.801:143) : table=firewalld:2 family=ipv6 entries=1 op=nft_register_table pid=367 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld
type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2021-03-18 09:30:49.801:143) : table=firewalld:2 family=ipv4 entries=1 op=nft_register_table pid=367 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld
type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2021-03-18 09:30:49.801:143) : table=firewalld:2 family=inet entries=1 op=nft_register_table pid=367 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(2021-03-18 09:30:49.839:144) : proctitle=/usr/bin/python3 -s /usr/sbin/firewalld --nofork --nopid
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(2021-03-18 09:30:49.839:144) : arch=x86_64 syscall=sendmsg success=yes exit=22792 a0=0x6 a1=0x7ffdcfcbe650 a2=0x0 a3=0x7ffdcfcbd52c items=0 ppid=1 pid=367 auid=unset uid=root gid=root euid=root suid=root fsuid=root egid=r
oot sgid=root fsgid=root tty=(none) ses=unset comm=firewalld exe=/usr/bin/python3.9 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 key=(null)
type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2021-03-18 09:30:49.839:144) : table=firewalld:3 family=ipv6 entries=30 op=nft_register_chain pid=367 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld
type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2021-03-18 09:30:49.839:144) : table=firewalld:3 family=ipv4 entries=30 op=nft_register_chain pid=367 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld
type=NETFILTER_CFG msg=audit(2021-03-18 09:30:49.839:144) : table=firewalld:3 family=inet entries=165 op=nft_register_chain pid=367 subj=system_u:system_r:firewalld_t:s0 comm=firewalld
The issue was originally documented in
https://github.com/linux-audit/audit-kernel/issues/124
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
---
include/linux/audit.h | 29 ++++++++
net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c | 132 +++++++++++++---------------------
2 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 83 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/audit.h b/include/linux/audit.h
index 82b7c1116a85..bba6a0386742 100644
--- a/include/linux/audit.h
+++ b/include/linux/audit.h
@@ -118,6 +118,35 @@ enum audit_nfcfgop {
AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID,
};
+static const u8 nft2audit_op[] = { // enum nf_tables_msg_types
+ /* NFT_MSG_NEWTABLE */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_REGISTER,
+ /* NFT_MSG_GETTABLE */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID,
+ /* NFT_MSG_DELTABLE */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_UNREGISTER,
+ /* NFT_MSG_NEWCHAIN */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_REGISTER,
+ /* NFT_MSG_GETCHAIN */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID,
+ /* NFT_MSG_DELCHAIN */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_UNREGISTER,
+ /* NFT_MSG_NEWRULE */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_REGISTER,
+ /* NFT_MSG_GETRULE */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID,
+ /* NFT_MSG_DELRULE */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_UNREGISTER,
+ /* NFT_MSG_NEWSET */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_REGISTER,
+ /* NFT_MSG_GETSET */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID,
+ /* NFT_MSG_DELSET */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_UNREGISTER,
+ /* NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_REGISTER,
+ /* NFT_MSG_GETSETELEM */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID,
+ /* NFT_MSG_DELSETELEM */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_UNREGISTER,
+ /* NFT_MSG_NEWGEN */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_GEN_REGISTER,
+ /* NFT_MSG_GETGEN */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID,
+ /* NFT_MSG_TRACE */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID,
+ /* NFT_MSG_NEWOBJ */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_REGISTER,
+ /* NFT_MSG_GETOBJ */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID,
+ /* NFT_MSG_DELOBJ */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_UNREGISTER,
+ /* NFT_MSG_GETOBJ_RESET */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_RESET,
+ /* NFT_MSG_NEWFLOWTABLE */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_REGISTER,
+ /* NFT_MSG_GETFLOWTABLE */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID,
+ /* NFT_MSG_DELFLOWTABLE */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_UNREGISTER,
+ /* NFT_MSG_MAX */ AUDIT_NFT_OP_INVALID,
+};
+
extern int is_audit_feature_set(int which);
extern int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list);
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
index 8d5aa0ac45f4..ad31d8876169 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c
@@ -709,17 +709,6 @@ static void nf_tables_table_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, int event)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
- char *buf = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s:%llu;?:0",
- ctx->table->name, ctx->table->handle);
-
- audit_log_nfcfg(buf,
- ctx->family,
- ctx->table->use,
- event == NFT_MSG_NEWTABLE ?
- AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_REGISTER :
- AUDIT_NFT_OP_TABLE_UNREGISTER,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- kfree(buf);
if (!ctx->report &&
!nfnetlink_has_listeners(ctx->net, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES))
@@ -1476,18 +1465,6 @@ static void nf_tables_chain_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx, int event)
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
- char *buf = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s:%llu;%s:%llu",
- ctx->table->name, ctx->table->handle,
- ctx->chain->name, ctx->chain->handle);
-
- audit_log_nfcfg(buf,
- ctx->family,
- ctx->chain->use,
- event == NFT_MSG_NEWCHAIN ?
- AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_REGISTER :
- AUDIT_NFT_OP_CHAIN_UNREGISTER,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- kfree(buf);
if (!ctx->report &&
!nfnetlink_has_listeners(ctx->net, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES))
@@ -2838,18 +2815,6 @@ static void nf_tables_rule_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
- char *buf = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s:%llu;%s:%llu",
- ctx->table->name, ctx->table->handle,
- ctx->chain->name, ctx->chain->handle);
-
- audit_log_nfcfg(buf,
- ctx->family,
- rule->handle,
- event == NFT_MSG_NEWRULE ?
- AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_REGISTER :
- AUDIT_NFT_OP_RULE_UNREGISTER,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- kfree(buf);
if (!ctx->report &&
!nfnetlink_has_listeners(ctx->net, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES))
@@ -3882,18 +3847,6 @@ static void nf_tables_set_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
struct sk_buff *skb;
u32 portid = ctx->portid;
int err;
- char *buf = kasprintf(gfp_flags, "%s:%llu;%s:%llu",
- ctx->table->name, ctx->table->handle,
- set->name, set->handle);
-
- audit_log_nfcfg(buf,
- ctx->family,
- set->field_count,
- event == NFT_MSG_NEWSET ?
- AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_REGISTER :
- AUDIT_NFT_OP_SET_UNREGISTER,
- gfp_flags);
- kfree(buf);
if (!ctx->report &&
!nfnetlink_has_listeners(ctx->net, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES))
@@ -5067,18 +5020,6 @@ static void nf_tables_setelem_notify(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
u32 portid = ctx->portid;
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
- char *buf = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s:%llu;%s:%llu",
- ctx->table->name, ctx->table->handle,
- set->name, set->handle);
-
- audit_log_nfcfg(buf,
- ctx->family,
- set->handle,
- event == NFT_MSG_NEWSETELEM ?
- AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_REGISTER :
- AUDIT_NFT_OP_SETELEM_UNREGISTER,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- kfree(buf);
if (!ctx->report && !nfnetlink_has_listeners(net, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES))
return;
@@ -6278,12 +6219,11 @@ static int nf_tables_dump_obj(struct sk_buff *skb, struct netlink_callback *cb)
filter->type != NFT_OBJECT_UNSPEC &&
obj->ops->type->type != filter->type)
goto cont;
-
if (reset) {
char *buf = kasprintf(GFP_ATOMIC,
- "%s:%llu;?:0",
+ "%s:%u",
table->name,
- table->handle);
+ net->nft.base_seq);
audit_log_nfcfg(buf,
family,
@@ -6404,8 +6344,8 @@ static int nf_tables_getobj(struct net *net, struct sock *nlsk,
reset = true;
if (reset) {
- char *buf = kasprintf(GFP_ATOMIC, "%s:%llu;?:0",
- table->name, table->handle);
+ char *buf = kasprintf(GFP_ATOMIC, "%s:%u",
+ table->name, net->nft.base_seq);
audit_log_nfcfg(buf,
family,
@@ -6492,15 +6432,15 @@ void nft_obj_notify(struct net *net, const struct nft_table *table,
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
- char *buf = kasprintf(gfp, "%s:%llu;?:0",
- table->name, table->handle);
+ char *buf = kasprintf(gfp, "%s:%u",
+ table->name, net->nft.base_seq);
audit_log_nfcfg(buf,
family,
obj->handle,
event == NFT_MSG_NEWOBJ ?
- AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_REGISTER :
- AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_UNREGISTER,
+ AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_REGISTER :
+ AUDIT_NFT_OP_OBJ_UNREGISTER,
gfp);
kfree(buf);
@@ -7300,18 +7240,6 @@ static void nf_tables_flowtable_notify(struct nft_ctx *ctx,
{
struct sk_buff *skb;
int err;
- char *buf = kasprintf(GFP_KERNEL, "%s:%llu;%s:%llu",
- flowtable->table->name, flowtable->table->handle,
- flowtable->name, flowtable->handle);
-
- audit_log_nfcfg(buf,
- ctx->family,
- flowtable->hooknum,
- event == NFT_MSG_NEWFLOWTABLE ?
- AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_REGISTER :
- AUDIT_NFT_OP_FLOWTABLE_UNREGISTER,
- GFP_KERNEL);
- kfree(buf);
if (!ctx->report &&
!nfnetlink_has_listeners(ctx->net, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES))
@@ -7432,9 +7360,6 @@ static void nf_tables_gen_notify(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb,
struct sk_buff *skb2;
int err;
- audit_log_nfcfg("?:0;?:0", 0, net->nft.base_seq,
- AUDIT_NFT_OP_GEN_REGISTER, GFP_KERNEL);
-
if (!nlmsg_report(nlh) &&
!nfnetlink_has_listeners(net, NFNLGRP_NFTABLES))
return;
@@ -7979,6 +7904,14 @@ static int nf_tables_commit(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb)
struct nft_trans_elem *te;
struct nft_chain *chain;
struct nft_table *table;
+ struct audit_log_nftdata {
+ struct nft_table *table;
+ int entries;
+ int op;
+ struct audit_log_nftdata *next;
+ } ad = { NULL, 0, 0, NULL }, *adp, *adnext;
+#define AUNFTABLENAMELEN (NFT_TABLE_MAXNAMELEN + 22)
+ char aubuf[AUNFTABLENAMELEN];
int err;
if (list_empty(&net->nft.commit_list)) {
@@ -8173,12 +8106,45 @@ static int nf_tables_commit(struct net *net, struct sk_buff *skb)
}
break;
}
+ adp = &ad;
+ if (!adp->table) {
+ adp->table = trans->ctx.table;
+ adp->entries = 1;
+ adp->op = trans->msg_type;
+ } else {
+ adnext = &ad;
+ do {
+ adp = adnext;
+ if (adp->table == trans->ctx.table)
+ goto found;
+ adnext = adp->next;
+ } while (adnext);
+ adp->next = kzalloc(sizeof(*adp->next), GFP_KERNEL);
+ adp = adp->next;
+ adp->table = trans->ctx.table;
+found:
+ adp->entries++;
+ if (!adp->op || adp->op > trans->msg_type)
+ adp->op = trans->msg_type;
+ }
}
nft_commit_notify(net, NETLINK_CB(skb).portid);
nf_tables_gen_notify(net, skb, NFT_MSG_NEWGEN);
nf_tables_commit_release(net);
+ adp = &ad;
+ while (adp && adp->table) {
+ snprintf(aubuf, AUNFTABLENAMELEN, "%s:%u", adp->table->name,
+ net->nft.base_seq);
+ audit_log_nfcfg(aubuf, adp->table->family, adp->entries,
+ nft2audit_op[adp->op], GFP_KERNEL);
+ adnext = adp->next;
+ if (adp != &ad)
+ kfree(adp);
+ adp = adnext;
+ }
+
return 0;
}
--
2.27.0
3 years, 7 months
Additional parameter in PROCTITLE.proctitle when executing rm
by Alan Evangelista
I'm trying to audit commands run in bash, including the commands arguments.
The proctitle parameter in the PROCTITLE record seems to be the most
reliable source to get that, but it does not contain exactly the "rm"
command I have typed on bash. Example:
1) rm /data/test2,txt -f
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1616095201.302:40381): arch=c000003e syscall=263
success=yes exit=0 a0=ffffffffffffff9c a1=1b1f0c0 a2=0 a3=7fff3677a720
items=3 ppid=15954 pid=3398 auid=201327714 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0
fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=pts0 ses=2663 comm="rm" exe="/usr/bin/rm"
key="filesystem_op"
type=CWD msg=audit(1616095201.302:40381): cwd="/home/aevangelista"
type=PATH msg=audit(1616095201.302:40381): item=0 name="/data/test2.txt"
inode=38030531 dev=08:11 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
objtype=NORMAL cap_fp=0000000000000000 cap_fi=0000000000000000 cap_fe=0
cap_fver=0
type=PATH msg=audit(1616095201.302:40381): item=1 name="/data/" inode=64
dev=08:11 mode=040755 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00 objtype=PARENT
cap_fp=0000000000000000 cap_fi=0000000000000000 cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0
type=PATH msg=audit(1616095201.302:40381): item=2 name="/data/test2.txt"
inode=38030531 dev=08:11 mode=0100644 ouid=0 ogid=0 rdev=00:00
objtype=DELETE cap_fp=0000000000000000 cap_fi=0000000000000000 cap_fe=0
cap_fver=0
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(1616095201.302:40381):
proctitle=726D002D69002F646174612F74657374322E747874002D66
The proctitle value 726D002D69002F646174612F74657374322E747874002D66 is
equal to "rm-i /data/test2.txt -f" in ASCII. Where did this -i come from?
Is it expected?
Regards,
Alan
3 years, 7 months
[PATCH v2 0/2] audit: add documentation for /proc/PID/stable interfaces
by Richard Guy Briggs
Add Documentation/ABI entries for audit interfaces in /proc/PID/ that have
been stable for more than a decade.
Richard Guy Briggs (2):
audit: document /proc/PID/loginuid
audit: document /proc/PID/sessionid
.../ABI/stable/procfs-audit_loginuid | 27 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/stable/procfs-audit_loginuid
--
2.27.0
3 years, 7 months
[PATCH v2] MAINTAINERS: update audit files
by Richard Guy Briggs
Add files maintaned by the audit subsystem.
Files from arch/*/*/*audit*.[ch] and arch/x86/include/asm/audit.h were not
added due to concern of the list not holding up over time. There exist
already exceptions that caused the need for this specificity.
Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs <rgb(a)redhat.com>
---
MAINTAINERS | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/MAINTAINERS b/MAINTAINERS
index d92f85ca831d..1249655459d3 100644
--- a/MAINTAINERS
+++ b/MAINTAINERS
@@ -2979,9 +2979,11 @@ L: linux-audit(a)redhat.com (moderated for non-subscribers)
S: Supported
W: https://github.com/linux-audit
T: git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/audit.git
+F: include/asm-generic/audit_*.h
F: include/linux/audit.h
F: include/uapi/linux/audit.h
F: kernel/audit*
+F: lib/*audit.c
AUXILIARY DISPLAY DRIVERS
M: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda(a)kernel.org>
--
2.27.0
3 years, 7 months
deadlock bug related to bpf,audit subsystems
by Serhei Makarov
Moving this discussion to kernel mailing lists.
Problem description:
Upstream kernel 5.11.0-rc7 and later was found to deadlock during a
bpf_probe_read_compat call within a sched_switch tracepoint. The
problem is reproducible with the reg_alloc3 testcase from SystemTap's
BPF backend testsuite on x86_64 as well as the runqlat,runqslower
tools from bcc on ppc64le. Example stack trace from [1]:
[ 730.868702] stack backtrace:
[ 730.869590] CPU: 1 PID: 701 Comm: in:imjournal Not tainted
5.12.0-0.rc2.20210309git144c79ef3353.166.fc35.x86_64 #1
[ 730.871605] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009),
BIOS 1.13.0-2.fc32 04/01/2014
[ 730.873278] Call Trace:
[ 730.873770] dump_stack+0x7f/0xa1
[ 730.874433] check_noncircular+0xdf/0x100
[ 730.875232] __lock_acquire+0x1202/0x1e10
[ 730.876031] ? __lock_acquire+0xfc0/0x1e10
[ 730.876844] lock_acquire+0xc2/0x3a0
[ 730.877551] ? __wake_up_common_lock+0x52/0x90
[ 730.878434] ? lock_acquire+0xc2/0x3a0
[ 730.879186] ? lock_is_held_type+0xa7/0x120
[ 730.880044] ? skb_queue_tail+0x1b/0x50
[ 730.880800] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x4d/0x90
[ 730.881656] ? __wake_up_common_lock+0x52/0x90
[ 730.882532] __wake_up_common_lock+0x52/0x90
[ 730.883375] audit_log_end+0x5b/0x100
[ 730.884104] slow_avc_audit+0x69/0x90
[ 730.884836] avc_has_perm+0x8b/0xb0
[ 730.885532] selinux_lockdown+0xa5/0xd0
[ 730.886297] security_locked_down+0x20/0x40
[ 730.887133] bpf_probe_read_compat+0x66/0xd0
[ 730.887983] bpf_prog_250599c5469ac7b5+0x10f/0x820
[ 730.888917] trace_call_bpf+0xe9/0x240
[ 730.889672] perf_trace_run_bpf_submit+0x4d/0xc0
[ 730.890579] perf_trace_sched_switch+0x142/0x180
[ 730.891485] ? __schedule+0x6d8/0xb20
[ 730.892209] __schedule+0x6d8/0xb20
[ 730.892899] schedule+0x5b/0xc0
[ 730.893522] exit_to_user_mode_prepare+0x11d/0x240
[ 730.894457] syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x27/0x70
[ 730.895361] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xae
Jiri Olsa also reports seeing a similar deadlock at v5.10. I'm in the
middle of double-checking my bisection which ended up at a
seemingly-unrelated commit [2]
[1] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1938312
[2] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit...
Reasonable amount of context below:
On Thu, Mar 18, 2021 at 7:48 AM Jiri Olsa <jolsa(a)redhat.com> wrote:
> > In that case the issue is in the selinux / audit department, not on bpf side.
> >
> > To be honest, I'm actually puzzled that from bpf_probe_read_*() we end up sending
> > audit messages, this seems highly questionable given those BPF helpers are used in
> > performance critical code, and they can be called from any contexts. So going and
> > allocating an skb for audit is just completely wrong. It should probably be at min
> > avc_has_perm_noaudit() if anything ...
>
> I just noticed this discussion is not on the list ;-)
> let's bring it there and include some audit folks
Yes, my apologies. This started as a quick note from me to Daniel to
glance at the RHBZ and the cc:s gradually snowballed from there.
- Serhei
> jirka
>
> >
> > > ----
> > > [ 56.866377] =============================
> > > [ 56.866397] [ BUG: Invalid wait context ]
> > > [ 56.866407] 5.11.0 #4 Tainted: G E
> > > [ 56.866420] -----------------------------
> > > [ 56.866438] swapper/69/0 is trying to lock:
> > > [ 56.866458] c000000002120038 (notif_lock){....}-{3:3}, at: avc_compute_av.isra.0+0x14c/0x430
> > > [ 56.866508] other info that might help us debug this:
> > > [ 56.866528] context-{2:2}
> > > [ 56.866545] 3 locks held by swapper/69/0:
> > > [ 56.866566] #0: c000001fff1f7a98 (&rq->lock){-.-.}-{2:2}, at: sched_ttwu_pending+0x5c/0x1e0
> > > [ 56.866613] #1: c00000000208b9d8 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: bpf_trace_run1+0x8/0x240
> > > [ 56.866659] #2: c00000000208b9d8 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: avc_compute_av.isra.0+0x7c/0x430
> > > [ 56.866704] stack backtrace:
> > > [ 56.866724] CPU: 69 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/69 Tainted: G E 5.11.0 #4
> > > [ 56.866761] Call Trace:
> > > [ 56.866778] [c0000000109fb310] [c000000000a42784] dump_stack+0xe8/0x144 (unreliable)
> > > [ 56.866817] [c0000000109fb360] [c0000000001f02a0] __lock_acquire+0xaa0/0x2800
> > > [ 56.866857] [c0000000109fb490] [c0000000001f2b40] lock_acquire.part.0+0xc0/0x390
> > > [ 56.866885] [c0000000109fb570] [c00000000118af0c] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x6c/0xc0
> > > [ 56.866923] [c0000000109fb5b0] [c00000000089cc4c] avc_compute_av.isra.0+0x14c/0x430
> > > [ 56.866961] [c0000000109fb670] [c00000000089e0a0] avc_has_perm+0x2c0/0x300
> > > [ 56.866997] [c0000000109fb780] [c0000000008a7d34] selinux_lockdown+0xd4/0x100
> > > [ 56.867034] [c0000000109fb810] [c000000000891140] security_locked_down+0x50/0xb0
> > > [ 56.867086] [c0000000109fb840] [c000000000346b7c] bpf_probe_read_compat+0xbc/0x130
> > > [ 56.867125] [c0000000109fb880] [c00800000e63bd38] bpf_prog_3de2db9929262fab_raw_tracepoint__sched_wakeup+0x5c/0x4324
> > > [ 56.867167] [c0000000109fb8f0] [c000000000349784] bpf_trace_run1+0xe4/0x240
> > > [ 56.867204] [c0000000109fb940] [c00000000018f238] __bpf_trace_sched_wakeup_template+0x18/0x30
> > > [ 56.867243] [c0000000109fb960] [c000000000190834] trace_sched_wakeup+0xe4/0x200
> > > [ 56.867281] [c0000000109fb9a0] [c0000000001983bc] ttwu_do_wakeup+0x4c/0x1f0
> > > [ 56.867317] [c0000000109fba20] [c00000000019c190] sched_ttwu_pending+0x120/0x1e0
> > > [ 56.867355] [c0000000109fbac0] [c00000000026cd6c] flush_smp_call_function_queue+0x1bc/0x3c0
> > > [ 56.867397] [c0000000109fbb50] [c000000000059fd4] smp_ipi_demux_relaxed+0xf4/0x100
> > > [ 56.867436] [c0000000109fbb90] [c0000000000537fc] doorbell_exception+0xbc/0x370
> > > [ 56.867474] [c0000000109fbbd0] [c0000000000168d4] replay_soft_interrupts+0x1f4/0x2d0
> > > [ 56.867512] [c0000000109fbdb0] [c000000000016a20] arch_local_irq_restore+0x70/0xe0
> > > [ 56.867550] [c0000000109fbde0] [c000000000df9d34] cpuidle_enter_state+0x124/0x500
> > > [ 56.867587] [c0000000109fbe40] [c000000000dfa1ac] cpuidle_enter+0x4c/0x70
> > > [ 56.867613] [c0000000109fbe80] [c0000000001a5dc8] do_idle+0x338/0x450
> > > [ 56.867649] [c0000000109fbf10] [c0000000001a62bc] cpu_startup_entry+0x3c/0x40
> > > [ 56.867686] [c0000000109fbf40] [c00000000005ac34] start_secondary+0x2a4/0x2b0
> > > [ 56.867727] [c0000000109fbf90] [c00000000000c054] start_secondary_prolog+0x10/0x14
> > >
> >
>
3 years, 7 months
checkpoint question
by Lenny Bruzenak
I'm trying to use the ausearch checkpoint feature in conjunction with
the "--just-one" option in order to parse some events one at a time.
However, using this I only get the first event (audit 2.8.5).
IOW I'm doing:
# let CNT=10
# while [ $CNT -gt 0 ] ; do
> auditctl -m "Event $CNT"
> let CNT=$CNT-1
> done
# ausearch -i -ts recent --checkpoint /tmp/check --just-one -m user
< Returns event 10 >
but
# ausearch -i --checkpoint /tmp/check --just-one -m user
<no matches>
Thx,
LCB
--
Lenny Bruzenak
MagitekLTD
3 years, 7 months
Backlog not working with kernel 3.10
by Alan Evangelista
AFAIK, the purpose of the backlog (a queue of audit events in the kernel)
is to assure no events are lost when events are generated at a faster speed
than they are consumed.
I'm using CentOS7 with kernel 3.10.0-1160.15.2.el7.x86_64 and trying to
test the backlog, but it seems it's not working at all.
Audit rule:
-a always,exit -F dir=/sasdata -F arch=b64 -S creat -S open -S openat -S
unlink -S unlinkat -S symlink -S symlinkat -S link -S linkat -S rename -S
renameat -S chmod -S fchmod -S fchmodat -S chown -S fchown -S fchownat -S
mkdir -S mkdirat -S rmdir -S setxattr -S lsetxattr -S fsetxattr -S
removexattr -S lremovexattr -S fremovexattr -k filesystem_op
First I turned auditd off so that events are not consumed:
# service stop auditd
Then I make sure that the backlog size is greater than 0:
# auditctl -s
enabled 1
failure 1
pid 0
rate_limit 5000
backlog_limit 8192
lost 0
backlog 0
loginuid_immutable 0 unlocked
I have run some simple commands in /data that should be logged , e.g.
touch file, mkdir dir. Finally, I have run auditctl-s and expected to see
the backlog events counter go up, but it's still 0. If I start auditd
again, the events are never logged. Am I missing something here?
Thanks in advance.
3 years, 7 months
[RFC PATCH 0/4] Split security_task_getsecid() into subj and obj variants
by Paul Moore
As discussed briefly on the list (lore link below), we are a little
sloppy when it comes to using task credentials, mixing both the
subjective and object credentials. This patch set attempts to fix
this by replacing security_task_getsecid() with two new hooks that
return either the subjective (_subj) or objective (_obj) credentials.
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/806848326.0ifERbkFSE@x2/T/
Casey and John, I made a quick pass through the Smack and AppArmor
code in an effort to try and do the right thing, but I will admit
that I haven't tested those changes, just the SELinux code. I
would really appreciate your help in reviewing those changes. If
you find it easier, feel free to wholesale replace my Smack/AppArmor
patch with one of your own.
---
Paul Moore (4):
lsm: separate security_task_getsecid() into subjective and objective variants
selinux: clarify task subjective and objective credentials
smack: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials
apparmor: differentiate between subjective and objective task credentials
security/apparmor/domain.c | 2 +-
security/apparmor/include/cred.h | 19 +++++--
security/apparmor/include/task.h | 3 +-
security/apparmor/lsm.c | 23 ++++++---
security/apparmor/task.c | 23 +++++++--
security/selinux/hooks.c | 85 ++++++++++++++++++--------------
security/smack/smack.h | 18 ++++++-
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 40 ++++++++++-----
8 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 66 deletions(-)
--
Signature
3 years, 7 months
[PATCH 0/2] audit: add documentation for /proc/PID/stable interfaces
by Richard Guy Briggs
Add Documentation/ABI entries for audit interfaces in /proc/PID/ that have
been stable for more than a decade.
Richard Guy Briggs (2):
audit: document /proc/PID/loginuid
audit: document /proc/PID/sessionid
.../ABI/stable/procfs-audit_loginuid | 27 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 Documentation/ABI/stable/procfs-audit_loginuid
--
2.27.0
3 years, 7 months
Fwd: Backlog not working with kernel 3.10
by Alan Evangelista
RB> since you haven't indicated if you have tried and
> tested this already, please start by running those
> simple commands while the auditd service is running
> and verifying that those commands do get logged as
> expected. If they don't, fix that first.
The commands are logged when the auditd service is running.
3 years, 7 months
